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Abstract 
This thesis explores representations of the self in Rousseau's ýmile (1762). 
Wordsworth's The Prelude (1805) and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein (1818). It 
uses the idea of 'the orphan' not in a strictly literal sense, but in order to explore 
representations of the self that stress an individual's autonomy, and thus tend to 
minimise the importance of society and cultural inheritance to the formation of 
the self. Crucial to understanding this model of the self is the idea found in 
Emile of autonomous natural growth: the idea that a child brought up in relative 
seclusion in the countryside, and offered the minimum of assistance from its 
adult carers, is capable of developing naturally, seemingly under its own volition. 
Rousseau believed that such a child would have an authenticity lacking in those 
children unduly contaminated by external cultural factors. The model of 
autonomous growth proposed by Rousseau relates to the discourse of possessive 
individualism and to the idea of the self-made man, beholden to no one, and free 
to make his own way in the world. This model of the self influenced 
Wordsworth and Mary Shelley, who both respond to and react against 
Rousseau's thinking. 
The thesis explores the contradictions implicit in this model of self-formation. It 
stresses the impossibility of keeping children free from external human factors, 
looking at the way that physical and mental development is necessarily 
accompanied by a child's acculturation, for example in relation to language 
acquisition. It explores the complications that arise from this in relation to 
questions of autonomy. The thesis highlights the sense of alienation and the 
emotional cost experienced by the child who is brought up to perceive itself as 
set apart from 'others', as exemplified by the loneliness felt by the most isolated 
of the 'children' under discussion, Victor Frankenstein's creation. In contrast to 
the discourse of possessive individualism this study persists in treating the self as 
historically situated, and inhabited by the culture that surrounds it. 
1) 
Abbreviations 
The following abbreviations have been used: 
Emile 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile [ 1762], trans. Barbara Fox1ey (London: Everyman 
2002) 
Second Discourse 
A Discourse on the Origin ofInequality in The Social Contract and Discourses 
[1755], trans. G. D-H Cole (London: Everyman 1993) 
The Prelude 
All references are to the 1805 poem and are taken from, The Prelude 1799,1805, 
1850: Authoritative Texts Context and Reception Recent Critical Essays, eds. 
Jonathan Wordsworth, M. H. Abrams and Stephen Gill (London: Norton 1979) 
Frankenstein 
Mary Shelley, Frankenstein: 1818 Text, ed. Marilyn Butler (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1993) 
T, - Essay 
John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding [ 1689], ed. Peter N 
Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1979) 
Introduction 
All three of the writers discussed in this thesis experienced the loss of one or 
both of their parents in childhood. Mary Shelley and Jean-Jacques Rousseau lost 
their mothers in childbirth, whereas Wordsworth lost his mother when he was 
seven years old and his father in early adolescence. The impact of these losses 
clearly influenced these writers and attention is paid to this fact, but it needs to be 
made clear from the outset that this is not a thesis about literal orphans, but rather 
about the idea of 'orphanhood' as a way of understanding a concept of the self au 
that emerges around the middle of the eighteenth century. This concept of the 
self employs a model of autonomous individuality. The individual is in 
possession of a self that is distinct from society and culture, and thus the path he 
chooses to take in life is not determined by social factors but by his own free 
will, or so the logic goes. I say 'he' because the selves under discussion, whether 
it be Rousseau's Emile, the young William Wordsworth of The Prelude or Victor 
Frankenstein and his creation in Frankenstein, are male. 1 So this is also a study 
'I have decided to treat Victor Frankenstein's creation as 'male' in order to focus on the ways 
that he absorbs and comes to reiterate the masculinist ideologies of men like Felix De Lacey and 
Victor Frankenstein not from a subordinate position but in an attempt to achieve self mastery 
(See Chapters Six and Seven). However, many critics, particularly those approaching 
Frankenstein from a feminist perspective, have made insightful readings of the novel that identify 
the Creature as 'female' or as displaying female attributes. See Alan Richardson, Literature, 
Education, and Romanticism: Reading as Social Practice, 1780- 1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1994), pp. 203-212. Margaret Homans, Bearing the Word: Language and 
Female Experience in Nineteenth-century Women's Writing (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 1986), pp. 100- 119. Mary Poovey, The Proper Lady and the Woman Writer (Chicage: 
University of Chicago Press 1984), pp. 114-142. U. C. Knoepflmacher, 'Thoughts on the 
Aggression of Daughters' in The Endurance of Frankenstein: Essays on Mary Shelley's Novel. 
eds George Levine and U. C. Knoepflmacher (Berkeley: University of California Press 1982), pp. 
88-119. Sandra Gilbert and Susan Gubar, The Madwoman in the Attic: The Woman ; Vriter and 
the Nineteenth-centut-v Literary Imagination (New Haven, Yale Universit,, Press 1979), pp. 213 3- 
247. 
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of a version of masculinity, and the price that is paid by male middle-class 
children in order that they might grow up to be 'self-made* men. 
Rousseau's Emile will be the main text under discussion in Chapters One 
and Two, but it is also discussed throughout the thesis, as it provides a useful 
theoretical co-ordinate for understanding the types of subjectivity under 
discussion, as both Wordsworth and Mary Shelley respond to and react against 
Rousseau's writing. However, it is important to make clear that the model of the 
self presented in Emile, in which the education of Rousseau's pupil involves the 
minimum of contact with the social world beyond his tutor, contrasts with his 
conception of the citizen, most famously expressed in The Social Contract. in 
which the self is subsumed by the demands of the state. In this context Rousseau 
conceived of the State as the ideal educator of children. Indeed, in The 
Confessions one of the reasons Rousseau gives for having deposited his own 
children in an orphanage is that his abandonment of them would result in their 
becoming better citizens: 
I will be content with a general statement that in handing my children over for the 
State to educate, for lack of means to bring them up myself, by destining them to 
become workers and peasants instead of adventurers and fortune-hu nters, I thought 
I was acting as a citizen and a father, and looked upon myself as a member of 
Plato's Republic. More than once since then the regret in my heart has told me that 
I was wrong. But for my reason having told me the same story, I have often 
blessed Heaven for having thus safeguarded them from their father's fate, and from 
that which would have overtaken them at the moment when I should have been 
compelled to abandon them. 2 
In the above passage Rousseau acknowledges that he was wrong to 
nt, abandon his children, but he holds to the belief that they are better off without 
him. He clearly believes he would have been a bad influence on his children. 
2 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Confessions ofJean-Jacques Rousseau. trans. J. M. Cohen 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin 1953), p. 3333. 
suggesting that it is likely that they would have turned out to be adventurers or 
fortune-hunters if they had remained in his care. These two 4professions' are 
very individualistic pursuits and strongly contrast with his hope that his children 
would become workers or peasants. Rousseau's aspirations for his children are 
universalist in nature; he imagines them as anonymous workers rather than 
speculating on the type of individuals they might have grown up to be. To 
understand Rousseau's thinking it is useful to turn to an article he , N-rote for 
Diderot's and d'Alembert's Encylopidie, on 'Political Economy', in which he 
proposes a system of public education in which the state takes the place of 
fathers and so minimises the impact of individuals on a child's developing sense 
of self. The education system Rousseau proposes is intended to ensure the 
production of good citizens: 
The education of children should not be left to their father's capacities and 
prejudices, especially since it is even more important to the state than to their 
fathers; for in the natural course of things the father's death often deprives him of 
the ultimate benefits of having educated his child, but his country will sooner or 
later feel the effects of what he has done: the state remains while the family is 
dissolved. If the public authorities, by replacing fathers and ftilfilling their 
important ftinctions, acquire their rights in carrying out their duties, they have the 
less grounds for complaint since, in this respect, all that happens, properly 
speaking, is that they are described differently, and that under the name of citizens 
they hold the same authority, in common over their children as they had separately 
under the name of fathers; they will be as well obeyed when they speak in the name 
of the law as they were when speaking in the name of nature. 3 
By way of contrast in Emile (1762) Rousseau proposes that the ideal 
educator of a child is its own father. Moreover, whilst remaining true to many of 
the republican values that he expresses in, for example, The Social Contract, he 
articulates in tmile a deep sense of unease about modem society and culture, in 
particular urban culture and the emergence of a global economy supported by 
overseas trade. Rousseau may have been content to have children educated 
3 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on Political Economy in Discourse on Political Economy 
and The Social Contract, trans. Christopher Betts (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), p. 23. 
6 
I within a classical model of the republic. but by the time of writing Emile it is 
clear that he had become increasingly uneasy about the impact of the modem 
world on the shaping of young lives. Rousseau' understanding of hoxv cultural 
and historical factors contribute to the production of subjectivities, and indeed 
how individuals, most notably a child's treatment at the hands of its mother or 
father, influence personality, reveal an awareness of the waý' that the self is 
constructed by outside factors. But Rousseau also retained the idea of an 
authentic self, the remnants of 'natural man', whose characteristics he describes 
in his Second Discourse. It is this self that Rousseau hoped to reveal in tmile, by 
removing, as far as is possible all the contaminants of modem life and culture, 
and bringing up his pupil in relative social isolation. In Emile an individual tutor 
is in total control of his pupil's learning environment. However, traces of 
Rousseau's republican thinking can be seen to Persist in Emile, for though 
Rousseau acknowledges that in general it is the birth father's job to bring up his 
children, he insists that in the case of tmile his birth parents have no contact or 
influence over their child's education. Thus the relationship between Rousseau's 
tutor and his pupil is depersonalised. Particularly in early infancy the tutor's job 
is to facilitate his child's natural growth, not to develop a personal relationship 
with him. This is to ensure that, as far as possible, Emile grows as nature 
intended, that he is indeed the authentic article. 
Here a contradiction emerges that is central to our discussion of all three 
writers. In order to become an autonomous, self-determined individual, one has 
to be detached from outside influences and so develop an independence of mind. 
But our sense of 'who we are' is in part informed by experiences and social 
encounters we have no control over. And vet we tend to understand our 'inner' 
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self as distinct from these encounters, as something we carry with us that is 
unaffected by external forces. But if as Rousseau does, ý, N-e remove social and 
cultural influences from a child's upbringing, do we then produce a person who 
is true to his own nature orjust a socially dysftinctional one? All three writers, 
Rousseau, Wordsworth often implicitly and Mary Shelley more often than not 
explicitly, express an ontological anxiety of influence. This can be related to the 
concept of possessive individualism, and to the question of how much of who we 
are actually belongs to us. 4 
Rousseau's educational programme demands that children be allowed to 
grow up at their own pace with only the minimum of assistance. Stress is placed 
upon the natural landscape as an educational space, with Rousseau alloxving 
children to learn through their physical interaction with their surroundings, 
commenting: 'The real object of our study is man and his environment' (Emile, 1, 
p. 10). In Rousseau's schema a child's earliest experience of itself should be a 
bodily one. For example Emile learns of the distinction between 'self and 'not 
self by reflecting on the sensations arising from material difference. Crucially, 
this sense of a distinction between 'self and 'not self does not produce the same 
sense of estrangement that a child feels when he comes to recognise human 
beings as other to him. Rousseau consciously postpones ýmile's encounter with 
I other' people for as long as possible, in the hope that by keeping tmile ignorant 
of society he will prevent him from suffering the trauma of alienation that 
accompanies a child's entrance into the social order. 
4 The concept of possessive individualism is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Six, N% here the 
idea is discussed in relation to Locke's Two Treatises of Government. The discussion wIII use 
C. B. Macpherson's analysis of Locke to reveal Mary Shelle,, 's criticism of possessM models of 
the self. See thesis pp. 180-182. 
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However, Rousseau's attempt to keep the social -world at bay undoubtedly 
compromises his claim that his educational programme is as close to nature as 
possible. For in order for things to remain 'natural' tmile's tutor must remain 
constantly vigilant and make interventions to ensure that things remain free from 
cultural contaminants. But in order to have an understanding of what these 
contaminants are he must of course have knowledge of the social world he is 
keeping at bay. Thus Emile's social ignorance and lack of self-consciousness 
depends upon his tutor's acute consciousness of the social world and its perils. 
From his charge's earliest infancy Rousseau's tutor must choose a wetnurse, but 
make sure that she is dispensed with once her duties have been perfonned and 
before her nursling develops too strong a bond with her. He must make sure that 
his little pupil does not engage in damaging conversations with household 
servants, for fear that they might contaminate him with their prejudices and 
superstitions. He must limit the contact that his pupil has with other children, 
and from what we might call the culture of childhood, for example children's 
fables or moral tales that might tempt him from his true path as the 'authentic 
child'. 
f As Emile progresses the more manipulative and less natural Rousseau's 
theory of education becomes and the more Rousseau's constructionist tendencies 
come to the fore. When Rousseau does finally allow tinile to enter the social 
world it is totally on his tutor's terms and with his guidance. For example when 
Emile 'chooses' a wife it just happens to be the woman Jean-Jacques intended 
for his prot6ge, a woman whose education conforms to Rousseau's exacting 
standards for females. 
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When we leave tmile at the end of the text he is to become a gentleman 
farmer living with his wife and children on his own estate. In this way he 
conforms to the ideology of possessive individualism, but, folloxving his ý-ears of 
manipulation at the hands of his tutor, we may well ask, ývhether tmile really is 
his own man. Moreover, traile's being in possession of his own estate cannot 
disguise his dependence on his wife as homemaker. Rightly, much comment has 
been made of the gross unfairness of Rousseau's attitude to female education. 
But I want to highlight the way that Rousseau acknowledges that male 
subjectivity is dependent upon the presence of the female other. In Rousseau's 
writing women are often portrayed as the agents of culture, and that is why they I 
are excluded from Emile's upbringing. In tmile women are associated with 
urban culture and conspicuous consumption. Women's sense of self is far more 
self-conscious and self-reflexive than men's: they are acutely aware of how they 
appear to others, and of their position in society. Rousseau finds this deeply 
threatening, but he also sees in women a type of self-awareness that men lack. 
Thus he proposes to educate women to subject themselves to men, and so 
provide the male with his missing complement. By domesticating women he 
hopes to make the home a space of retreat for the male self. So once again the 
idea of the autonomous individual is compromised, for in order for men to be 
their own proprietor, women must provide the ontological scaffolding upon 
which men's sense of individuality depends. 
Chapters Three and Four consider how Wordsworth reacts against 
Enlightenment theories of education, but also how such thinking influenced him. 
In particular how he shares with Rousseau an anxiety about how social contact 
compromises the autonomy of the self, and how Wordsworth, bý- reactitig against 
I () 
the Enlightenment, manages to advance some of its ideological aspirations. In 
The Prelude (1805) Wordsworth addresses many of the contradictions that 
accompany Rousseau's attempt to produce an autonomous individual (key to this 
is the idea that autonomous individuals can be 'produced'), but in doing this 
Wordsworth reveals fresh contradictions of his own. In The Prelude, as far as is 
possible, we are presented with the biography of a self-made man, or at least a 
man whose personal and spiritual growth was not interfered with. or unduly 
influenced by human 'others'. This is not to say that Wordsworth does not 
accept the contribution of human agents to his childhood development. His 
description of his mother's contribution to his earliest years in Book Two 
acknowledges the debt he owes her. But crucially for Wordsworth once he is old 
enough to look after himself physically, the presence of 'others', though 
sometimes welcomed, is not allowed to detract from his own self-determined 
path to maturity. 
Wordsworth is uncomfortable with the mechanistic and constructiomst 
tendencies present in Enlightenment thought, particularly with the way in which 
thinkers like Rousseau, influenced by John Locke, believed that the genesis of 
understanding, including an individual's knowledge of himself., could be 
schernatised so as to present a universally applicable model of self-formation. In 
doing this, both Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding and 
Rousseau in Emile represent the development of subjectivity in tenns of fixed 
stages of mental development, and present these stages of development, for 
example the refinement of a particular sensation, as seemingly detached 
from the 
development of the whole person. For Wordsworth such thinking presents 
human beings as little more than a fragmented collection of mental processes. 
The idea of the self as separated into composite parts produces a sense of 
alienation, of a self-divided, rather than a unified concept of the self in control of 
its own mental faculties. Wordsworth counters the Enlightenment's stress on 
universals by stressing the specificity of his own childhood experiences. 
Wordsworth represents himself as a unique individual motivated by spiritual 
forces whose origins and operations cannot be rationalised. 
But in establishing his own uniqueness he must (and here he echoes 
Rousseau) downplay the influence of other human beings on his development. 
In The Prelude Wordsworth's mother recedes into the background long before 
her literal death, whereas his father appears to have contributed little or nothing 
to his son's development. Chapter Three explores Wordsworth' anxiety about 
the continuation of the maternal presence by analysing the 'Infant Babe' passage 
in Book Two of The Prelude, and Wordsworth's representation of mothers in 
two poems from the Lyrical Ballads, 'The Thom' and 'The Mad Mother'. In 
contrast to the 'Infant Babe' passage, in which the mother is a benign presence 
up to the point of her withdrawal, the two poems from the Lyrical Ballads 
represent overbearing matemal desire as a potentially destructive and stifling 
influence on a child's development. 
Chapter Four looks at the absence of male authority figures from 
Wordsworth's childhood. In Book Five of The Prelude Wordsworth makes clear 
his suspicion of Enlightenment pedagogues such as Rousseau, 'the Wardens of 
our faculties' (The Prelude, V, 377), and criticises their attempts to manage and 
direct children's developing minds. Wordsworth is conscious of how such men 
compromise childhood independence, and believes that the child who is forced to 
submit to their authority surrenders something of itself. 
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But crucially, Wordsworth's reaction to the model of the Enlightenment 
tutor does not involve an outright rejection of Enlightenment thinking. Rather it 
is an attempt to establish an ideological position that refuses any encroachment 
on the concept of autonomous individuality. Wordsworth is prepared to reject 
Enlightenment thinking that compromises this ideological stance. but he is also 
prepared to adapt aspects of Enlightenment thinking that support his demand for 
self-determination. For example, his concept of the natural landscape as a space 
that allows for both physical and spiritual growth has some distinctly I 
D- 
R. ousseauian undertones, as does his stress on the growing physical independence 
that the young Wordsworth achieves as a result of his solitary forays into the 
local countryside. Thus like Rousseau, Wordsworth stresses the importance of a 
child's encounter with his surroundings, but goes even further than Rousseau in 
rejecting the mediation of the experience of nature, by refusing to allow the 
presence, however inconspicuous, of any authority figure that might challenge 
the child's claim to autonomy. However, Wordsworth is also careful not to 
present his childhood self as a socially alienated figure alone in the natural world. 
In order to do this he rejects a materialist interpretation of nature and the natural 
world. Nature for Wordsworth is a spiritual realm that is aware of his presence, 
to the extent that where necessary it will intervene on his behalf In Chapter Four 
I argue that the 'spiritualisation' of nature, its representation as an intentional 
space that is emotionally responsive to a child's needs, can only occur, and is in 
fact a psychological by-product of Wordsworth's socialisation, a process that 
was begun by his mother in infancy. It is too simplistic, and indeed factually 
inaccurate to represent Wordsworth as an antisocial child. But neither is his 
ability to be happiest in his own company. and the impression he gives of being 
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self-sufficient and independent, innate to his personality. In Chapter Four I 
reveal how Wordsworth sense of autonomy is the product of the social world that 
he believes himself to be independent of, and how Wordsworth's sense of self- 
possession is not in fact the birthright he presents it as, but a negotiated 
'settlement' established through his interaction with the social world. 
Chapters Five, Six and Seven discuss Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. In 
these chapters the relationship between socialisation and self-formation is 
brought into still sharper focus. The narrative the Creature delivers to Victor 
Frankenstein reveals that the Creature's sense of himself as an autonomous, self- 
determining individual, is acquired only when he has acquired a knowledge of 
the social world from which he is excluded, a knowledge that comes to him 
through his observations of the De Lacey family from a concealed position 
behind a blocked up window. Though physically marginal to the life of the 
cottagers, over time the Creature is inhabited by the culture he is observing. To 
the extent that, even when he is rejected by the De Laceys, he carries what he has 
learnt of their culture with him. But though inhabited by their culture, he is 
excluded from their society. Thus the Creature develops a sense of self- 
possession, of being dependent on himself and no one else, that is inseparable 
from his experience of social exclusion. The education he acquires from the De 
Laceys in which he learns about social and economic inequalities, the knowledge 
of which forces him to realise his own marginal status as a non-owner-occupier, 
also results in his recognition that he is in possession of very little but himself. 
In this way the Creature reveals the limits of Locke's model of possessive 
individualism which decrees that 'every Man has a property in their own person I, 
and which, as C. B. Macpherson remarks. understood the individual as the 
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4proprietor of his own person or capacities. owing nothing to society for them"-'ý 
For the Creature the realisation that he is his own proprietor causes him 
unbearable suffering resulting in a kind of psychological solitary confinement 
from which there is no escape. 
Focussing on the Creature's narrative of its early life, and with particular 
reference to Locke's An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Chapter Five 
examines Mary Shelley's stress on the involuntary nature of knowledge 
acquisition. Shelley reveals through the Creature how the emotional experience 
of growing up is inseparable from the process of leaming. Shelley stresses the 
Creature's emotional responses to its earliest thoughts and sensations, responses 
that become increasingly more complex as its social awareness develops. 
Shelley's stress on childhood feelings has parallels with Wordsworth's, but for 
the fact that the Creature's emotions are overwhelmingly negative, and more 
importantly because the intensity of these negative emotions increases along with 
its knowledge of its social alienation. For unlike the young Wordsworth the 
Creature has no choice but to be alone, and certainly does not crave solitude. 
The Creature's sense of independence, of being his own man, results in him 
living a nightmare existence of unending psychological pain. Moreover the pain 
he is feeling is something that takes possession of him. The Creature may appear 
to be independent and autonomous, in the sense that his actions are not controlled 
by 'others, but he is not in control of himself because he is not fully in control of 
his emotions - emotions that constantly threaten to transforrn themselves into 
destructive impulses. 
5 See John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1999), pp. 287-288. C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory ql'Possessive 
Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford Universm Press 1977). p. -3 ). 
Iý 
Mary Shelley's novel exposes the myth behind the ideologý- of possessive 
individualism. For what the Creature's narrative reveals is that in order for an 
individual to proclaim himself independent he must belong to a community that 
he can claim independence from. Both Emile and the young William 
Wordsworth are presented as valued members of society when and if they choose 
to be so (though of course this assertion is fraught with contradictions). But 
when an individual has his independence, but belongs to no community, then he 
is an exile, and if he was to declare his independence then his declaration would 
be meaningless, precisely because it would fall on deaf ears. Thus declarations 
of independence depend for their validity on being overheard. The ideology of 
possessive individualism is the ideology of a class fraction, even though in 
declaring his independence the individual in question appears to be denying 
membership of it. 
However to say that the Creature is not a member of society is also too 
simplistic; though, certainly, he is not a recognised member of society, the 
Creature is something of a cultural gate-crasher. Chapter Six analyses how the 
socialisation the Creature experiences as a result of observing the De Lacey 
family, and particularly his acquisition of language, complicates the assumption 
that he is a marginal figure. As his narrative develops it becomes clear that the 
Creature has internalised the cultural values of his 'hosts', to the extent that he 
begins to articulate aspects of the very ideology that excludes him. Chapter Six 
begins by looking at Locke and Rousseau's theories of language in An Essay on 
Human Understanding and tmile, and particularly the way that both writers 
attempt to maintain a close relationship between the acquisition of knowledge, 
and the development of language. Both philosophers insist that a child, or an 
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adult for that matter, should not know more words than it has ideas for. In other 
words a child's linguistic development should not exceed its intellectual 
development. Both philosophers stress individual experience over the collective 
experience of communication. The Creature's narrative complicates Locke's and 
Rousseau's theories, for as the Creature learns a language he is simultaneously 
enveloped within a culture that he has no direct experience of as an active 
participant. The model of the individual that the Creature inherits along with its 
acculturation conforms to the ideology of possessive individualism. This 
ideology takes possession of him, allowing him to believe he is in possession of 
himself This in turn produces the hope that, by confronting his creator and 
utilising his expertise, he might construct a future for himself free from the 
society that has excluded him. But, and here there is a parallel with Rousseau's 
F Emile, the Creature can only become self-sufficient through the reassuring 
presence of the female other. 
Frankenstein reveals how the concept of autonomous individuality is not 
an innate birthright but an ideological inheritance. With a view to this Chapter 
Seven examines the childhood of Victor Frankenstein, and in particular the way 
Victor has instilled in him a sense of vocation, of duty to a calling, that closely 
resembles Max Weber's concept of the Protestant work ethic as elaborated in The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. The history of the Frankensteins' 
hometown of Geneva, the home of Calvinism, relates it to this emergent, 
increasingly secularised ideology. Victor's father, Alphonse Frankenstein, has a 
sense of vocation intimately related to the idea of public service. Indeed he 
scales down his public duties in order that he might fulfil another of his social 
obligations and provide the state with children. There are clear parallels here 
17 
with Rousseau who 'gave' his children up in order that they might become good 
citizens, though of course Alphonse doesn't abandon his children in order to 
fulfil his civic duty. There are further parallels with, ýmile in the way Alphonse 
educates his children. For Alphonse as for Rousseau parenting is a vocation. 
The enlightened Alphonse uses kindness and friendship to educate his children 
rather than discipline and fear. But Alphonse also instils in his children, as does 
Rousseau in Emile, a sense of their obligation to him. In theory theY are free to 
follow their own destinies, but in reality they are obliged to act in accordance 
with their father's expectations. Victor's childhood is determined in relation to a 
utilitarian agenda. All activities must be useful and have a clear purpose. The 
fact that certain aspects of Victor's adult life appear to have already been mapped 
out for him during his childhood, and his experience of childhood as a vocation, 
prýoduces in Victor what Max Weber describes as the inner loneliness of the 
single individual. This loneliness is not bom of social isolation, as is the 
Creature's, but is the product of a fonn of social inculcation that represses fonns 
of self-expression that do not conform to a predetermined set of cultural values. 
By embarking on his project of discovering how to animate dead matter, 
Victor appears to confound his father's expectations. But Victor cannot free 
himself from the ideology he was brought up with, and replaces one self- 
consuming vocation with another. By taking possession of a vocation of his own 
choosing it might be assumed that Victor takes control of his destiny, and so 
takes possession of himself, but it soon becomes clear that his vocation has taken 
possession of him, as he has no life outside the work he is doing. Moreover his 
labour is unending, for following the completion of his work his creation returns 
to insist that he continue in his 'vocation'. It is as if his offspring is the inheritor 
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of the work ethic that originally moti,, 'ated him. The Creature is explicit about 
the loneliness that compels him to call his creator to labour on his behalf The 
Creature's experience of loneliness reflects Victor's inner loneliness that he 
attempts to hide from view. Thus Frankenstein reveals the emotional. 
psychological and social costs of self-possession, which always and necessarily 
involves some form of dispossession both in relation to the self and society. 
r 
Emile, The Prelude, and Frankenstein do not provide us xvith a uniforrn 
model of the self-, indeed both Wordsworth and Shelley develop a model of self- 
formation that is critical of as well as being influenced by Rousseau's. The three 
texts have been chosen because of the way they can be made to stand in 
dialectical tension with one another, showing the contradictions and limits in 
each others' argument, and in so doing producing fresh contradictions of their L- 
own. Moreover, all three texts present or address the idea that the modem 
subject must be distinct from society, and have an inner life of his own. The 
logic of this is that some level of alienation is a price worth paying in order to 
achieve independence and self-determination. As a study of masculinity I hope 
not only to show how writers such as Rousseau and Wordsworth contribute to 
the emergence of a distinctly individualist ideology but also how they are victims 
of it, particularly how male middle-class children in this period were forced to 
reconcile themselves to their status as social orphans, and to internalise the 
ideology of possessive individualism to the extent that they became agents of its 
propagation. 
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Chapter One 
It's a Boy: Rousseau and the Birth of the Enlightened Subject 
Alienating Knowledge 
Of all human sciences the most useful and most imperfect appears to me to be that 
of mankind: and I will venture to say, the single inscription on the Temple of 
Delphi [know thyselfl contained a precept more difficult and more important than 
is to be found in all the huge volumes that moralists have ever written. 
(Second Discourse p. 43 )) 
In the Dialectic ofEnlightenment Theodore Adomo and Max Horkheimer 
describe how Enlightenment ideology involves 'the projection onto nature of the 
subjective'. with every question concerning the mysteries of life responded to 
with the answer Oedipus gave to the Sphinx's riddle: "It is man' is the 
Enlightenment stereotype repeatedly offered as information, irrespective of 
whether it is faced with a piece of objective intelligence, a bare schernatisation, 
fear of evil powers, or hope of redemption. ' 6 In Adorno's and Horkheimer's view 
the 'content' of a given object is in reality a reflection of 'knowledge'. the 
knowledge of its nature, a knowledge that emanates from the enlightened subject 
rather than residing in the object itself In this way subject and object exist in 
mimetic relationship to one another. But paradoxically Enlightem-nent 
rationalism must disregard the production of content, denying the mimetic 
structure of the subject-object relationship. It neutralises objects by demanding 
their equivalence within the grand scheme of things - the natural order. 
6 Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming 
(London: Verso 1997), p. 7. 
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In the light of Adomo's and Horkheimer's observations it should perhaps 
come as no surprise that the object of greatest intellectual curiosity for Rousseau 
was 'Man', and that the imperative 'know thyself was the guiding imperative of 
much of his thinking. However, what is remarkable about Rousseau is the way 
that he anticipates Adomo's and Horkheimer's assertion, also made in the 
Dialectic ofEnlightenment, that the pursuit of this kind of knowledge results in 
the pursuer becoming estranged from the object of his study, in this case himself- 
It is still more cruel that, as every advance made by the human species removes it 
still further from its primitive state, the more discoveries we make, the more we 
deprive ourselves of the means of making the most important of all. Thus it is, in 
one sense, by our very study of man, that knowledge of him is put out of our 
power. (Second Discourse p. 43) 
Here we are presented with one of the most important of Rousseau's 
paradoxes: that knowledge of ourselves alienates us from our nature, as human 
nature becomes an object of study, and so divorced from the human being who is 
studying it. Of course, all this does not prevent him from believing in man's 
essential nature,, and of conceiving of an original archetype that reveals what man 
truly 'is'. The declaration 'it is man' that Rousseau makes in the Second 
Discourse is by his own admission speculative as we are too far advanced from 
our original state to truly know ourselves. By speculating on our past self, which 
is also our 'true' self, we are able to speculate on our present deformity, and so 
posit a lack that is based upon a speculation of otherness that has no basis in 
historical fact but only in the assumption of historical transformation: 'For it is 
by no means a light undertaking to distinguish properly between what is original 
and what is artificial in the actual nature of man, or to form a true idea of a state 
which no longer exists. perhaps never did exist. and probably neN-er,, -., -Ill exist. 
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and of which it is, nevertheless, necessary to have a true idea, in order to form a 
proper judgement of our present state' (Second Discourse p. 44). So the modem 
self is the self transformed, a self somehow at odds with itself. The truth of our 
authentic self has floated free of history, to the extent that we cannot be totally 
sure that we have ever been, or will ever be, what we truly are. Moreover it is 
only by reflecting on our inauthenticity that we can gain the intimation of our 
'lost' authenticity. Rousseau's speculation on the nature of man complicates 
Adorno's and Horkheimer's very useful observations of Enlightenment ideology. 
because Rousseau's tentative declaration 'it is man' is riven with anxiety and 
uncertainty both in relation to his own subjective position and in relation to the 
object of his study. It is clear that Rousseau's own sense of alienation, both from 
himself as a modem man and from civilisation, results in his making a 
psychological investment in his model of an idealised primitive man who cannot 
experience alienation because he has no concept of society. So the projection 
that takes place is a negative one as it involves a rewinding of history to a mythic 
age of 'unknowing'. But, as Rousseau acknowledges, we cannot tum back the 
clock, knowledge once acquired cannot be dispensed with. In the Second 
Discourse Rousseau attempts to identify the social processes that led to the 
present state of unhappiness. 
In the Second Discourse Rousseau conceives of natural man living at one 
with nature, isolated but content in himself and harming no one, motivated by 
self-love but also capable of pity (pity is the result of a limited form of 
identification grounded in self-love). This is Rousseau's original ideal. 
However, something went wrong with the setting in train of cause and effect. 
Social interaction over time led to the emergence of loose social bonds and 
increasing interdependence, separating man from his 'natural' state of isolation. 
With the emergence of the concept of private property, and the social inequality 
and hierarchies that arise from this, man was forced away from nature and 
towards civilisation. 
Rousseau's break with the doctrine of original sin is often cited as a 
radical departure from the dogma of the Church. The universality of sin is 
replaced by an essentialised concept of human goodness. Rousseau claims that 
man is born good and that pre-civilised or natural man was fundamentally good. 
However, Rousseau does not mean good in terms of being moral, for morality is 
associated with the knowledge of good and evil. What Rousseau means by good 
is in fact a state of amorality -a state of blissful ignorance that excludes the 
knowledge of good and evil. 
Rousseau replaces the doctrine of original sin with a myth of pre-civilised 
authenticity. Every human action, thought, intention, motivation that deviates 
from what is natural (and what is natural is self-producing) is by this logic a 
corruption of the natural order of things. In a sense Rousseau's theory echoes the 
doctrine of original sin, as for Rousseau the acquisition of knowledge and its 
application is still the source of man's light. However, Rousseau's theory makes r, p 
less sense than the doctrine of original sin he claims to repudiate, for in Genesis 
Adam and Eve are tempted to eat of the tree of knowledge by an outside agent - 
the serpent. But what motivates Rousseau's natural man to transgress and 
forsake his state of happiness? If he is essentially good then there is nothing in 
him that would motivate him to deviate from the path of nature. 7 Thus his only 
7 Mary Wollstonecraft in .4 
Vindication of the Rights of Iloman responds to some of the 
contradictions in Rousseau's theological thinking: 'the paradoxical exclamation, that God has 
made all things right, and that error has been introduced by the creature, \ý horn he formed, 
knowing what he formed, is as unphilosophical as impious'. What is of particular note in 
motivation must reside in 'others', but no single other, for isolated individuals 
are 4 good'. The only way Rousseau can account for this is with a theory of 
deviation in which mutual need leads to socialisation, the extent of NA-hich 
increases over time. Thus dialogue, interaction and exchange over time produce 
an objectified form of knowledge that belongs to no single individual but is 
produced collectively by the group. Over time, through social and cultural 
differentiation, through the division of labour, through a mapping of the material 
world, a social space is established with its own customs, habits and institutions 
that are utterly distinct from the 'natural order of things. In other words there is 
a move from the universal (the universal nature of natural man), to the particular 
(the localised particularity of a given cultural group). So in Rousseau's 
philosophy, society takes on an objectified form. However, beneath the debris of 
civil sation, man's essential nature remains intact. Rousseau engineers a 
theoretical split between a homogenous totalised and trans-historical concept of 
'Man' that is universally applicable, and a localised particularism in which a 
given society produces cultural identities. 
However,, though every development that takes us away from the state of 
nature contributes to humanity's eventual corruption, not every step along the 
road to civilisation is presented in a completely negative light. For example, the 
point in human history when human beings had learnt to construct shelters, and 
were living together in intimate family groups is said by Rousseau to have given 
Wollstonecraft's response is how as a woman strongly influenced by Enlightenment ideals, she is 
unable to accept, and in fact finds illogical, Rousseau's negative conception of human progress: 
'But if, to crown the whole, there were to be rational creatures produced, allowed to rise in 
excellence by the exercise of powers implanted for that purpose; if benignity itself thought fit to 
call into existence a creature above the brutes, who could think and improve himself, Ný hy should 
that inestimable gift, for a gift it was, if man was so created as to have a capacItN to rise above the 
state in which sensation produced brutal ease. be called, in direct terms, a curse"'. MarN 
Wollstonecraft, .4 Vindication of the 
Rights Qf 0 Oman, ed. Janet Todd (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1993), p. 78; pp. 78-79. 
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rise to 'the finest feelings known to humanity. conjugal love and paternal 
affection' (Second Discourse p. 88). Responding to this Susan Meld Shell 
contends that for Rousseau the 'happiest and most durable epoch" in human 
history was not when human beings were living as isolated individuals, but in 
their earliest forms of co-habitation. 8 As Shell points out, the real beneficiaries 
of co-habitation were women. Before the establishment of family groups 
Rousseau describes how the sexes would meet to procreate in relative anonymity. 
and when the sexual act was complete would go their separate ways. For men 
this left them free of responsibility, whereas women were left in a vulnerable 
state having to birth and rear their children. The establishment of social groups 
resulted in the emergence of monogamous relationships, with the father acting as 
protector to his partner and child. Rousseau comments in Emile: 'Though a man 
does not brood like a pigeon, and though he has no milk to suckle the young, and 
must in this respect be classed with the quadrupeds, his children are feeble and 
helpless for so long a time, that mother and children could ill dispense with the 
father's affection, and the care which results from it' (Emile, V, p. 471). 
Clearly co-habitation brings palpable benefits to women, but it is less clear 
whether Rousseau believes it brings equivalent benefits to men. Shell is right to 
point out that socialisation is not always described in a negative way, but overall 
Rousseau's message in the Second Discourse seems to be that interdependence 
on any level between human beings in a state of nature will eventually lead us in 
the direction of inequality and unhappiness: 
[S]o long as they undertook only what a single person could accomplish, and 
confined themselves to such arts as did not require the joint labour of several 
' Susan Meld Shell, 'tmile: Nature and the Education of Sophy', The Cambridge Companion to 
Rousseau, ed. Patrick Riley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2001). p. 280. 
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hands, they lived free, healthy, honest, and happy lives, in so far as nature allowed. 
and they continued to enjoy the pleasures of mutual and independent intercourse. 
But from the moment one man began to stand in need of the help of another; from 
the moment it appeared advantageous to any one man to have enough provisions 
for two, equality disappeared, property was introduced, work became 
indispensable, and vast forests became smiling fields, which man had to water NA ith 
the sweat of his brow, and where slavery and misery were soon seen to germinate 
and grow up with the crops. (Second Discourse, p. 92) 
In the Second Discourse Rousseau does not point the finger at women 
directly for being the cause of man's misery. But as has been shown women. 
because of their role as mothers, do benefit far more from co-operation and co- 
habitation than men. Moreover, when in the above extract Rousseau cites as one 
of the causes of our move towards civilisation the realisation that it would be 
advantageous to have provisions enough for two, it can be surmised that the 
couple he had in mind are husband and wife. Of course mothers, having another 
mouth to feed, would already be put in the position of finding provisions enough 
for two, and of thus being in a situation of interdependence that would benefit 
from increased co-operation with others. The benefits of civilisation then appear 
in Rousseau's schema to be more than a little one-sided. 
Women are also portrayed as being agents of socialisation because of the 
rivalry they inspire between men. As social interaction increases beyond the 
confines of the family hut, men start to compete for the attention of the most 
beautiful women, for example singing and dancing in front of the hut of the 
woman they desire in the hope of impressing her. In its most extreme form this 
rivalry would result in violence and even death. Most disturbingly it results 
in 
discrimination on the grounds of preference, encouraging ideas of value and 
merit that contribute to the growth of inequality. In 
tmile Rousseau cites 
coquettishness as a, natural' attribute of women, and makes much of the way 
women manipulate men to their own ends; in the Second 
Discmirse he stops 
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short of blaming women for humanity's misery but by the time of, ýmile he 
seems more than happy to point the finger at women. The authoritarian 
education he imposes on women in Book Five, Rousseau informs us. is in part 
womeWs own fault because of the destructive passions they inspire in men, 
passions beyond the power of men to fully satisfy. Rousseau insists that women 
master the art of self-control, not for their own sake, but for the sake of men: 'the 
life of a good woman is a perpetual struggle against self, it is only fair that 
woman should bear her share of the ills she has brought upon man' (Emile 
p. 398). Of course, the representation of women as temptresses has a long history 
in Judeo-Christian culture. In Rousseau's schema women act as catalysts for 
men') s socialisation, and so are at least in part responsible for man leaving the 
state of nature. If we look again at the above extract where Rousseau describes 
how interdependence led inevitably to men having to expend the sweat of their 
brows, only to live in virtual slavery, then we will see that it bears a strong 
similarity to the Genesis myth, where the source of man's new found knowledge, 
and his present state of misery, is indeed a woman: 
Because you have listened to the voice of your wife, and have eaten of the tree 
about which I commanded you, 'You shall not eat of it', cursed is the ground 
because of you; in toil you shall eat of it all the days of your life; thorns and thistles 
it shall bring forth for you; and you shall eat the plants of the field. By the sweat of 
your face you shall eat bread, until you return to the ground. 9 
Rousseau incorporates, albeit it in secularised form, some of the key 
ideological components of the Judeo-Christian creation myth, including the 
symbolic position of Woman as the spur to the acquisition of 'knowledge', and 
the negative consequences of this. However, too direct a parallel cannot be 
drawn because Rousseau does not subscribe to the key concept contained in 
N. R. S. V. Genesis ' 3.17-19. 
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Genesis - the idea of original sin. In tmile Rousseau does not offer us a creation 
myth, but rather a re-creation myth. By marrying aspects of Enlightenment 
Ideology and Christian thinking, he produces for us a new Adam in the form of 
I his prodigy, Emile. Rousseau is careful not to introduce his Adam , Emile. to his 
Eve, Sophy, until he has reached adulthood. During his childhood traile's 
contact with women is kept to a minimum, for fear that they might tempt him 
from the true path that is Rousseau's educational programme. However. 
Rousseau does not dispense with women all together: as Shell rightly asserts, 
Rousseau felt a strong attraction to the family life of pre-civilised man. Shell 
points out that Rousseau saw the romance of tmile and Sophy as an idealised 
version of 'the history of our species', with tmile educated to be as close to the 
ideal of the natural man as possible, and with Sophy educated to acquire the best 
attributes that Rousseau associated with humanity's earliest domesticity. Thus 
Sophy is the kind of woman who can help her husband to recreate this lost ideal 
of family life. 'O 
The Enlightenment's concept of nature, with its emphasis on natural 
determinism,, combined with its concept of man's universal nature led Rousseau 
to the conclusion that a child, brought up in a 'natural' environment, would 
develop into a natural man. The state of nature then had not been lost, but 
endlessly returns in the form of children unaccustomed to and therefore 
uncorrupted by the world. This can be linked to Christian thinking and 
iconography, with the figure of the Christ child who holds out the possibility of 
redemption to a fallen world. Indeed Rousseau's 
tmile can be seen as a 
rationalisation of the immaculate conception: 
ýmile is an orphan, his parents 
" Susan Meld Shell kmile: Nature and the Education of Sophy', p. 278. pp. 272-29-4. 
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having voluntarily given him up to his tutor. leaving the child relatively free of 
the added 'complications' of familial and cultural ties. Rousseau attempts 
through his educational programme to create a radically new form of 
consciousness by harnessing natural forces. This has parallels with Mar-Y 
Shelley's Frankenstein. But whereas Victor Frankenstein plays with the material 
substances that produce life, Rousseau attempts to put together, stage by stage, 
the mind of a man. 
Rousseau's Materialism and the Education of the Senses 
We are bom capable of learning, but knowing nothing, perceiving nothing. The 
mind, bound up within imperfect and half grown organs, is not even aware of its 
own existence. The movements and cries of the new-bom child are purely reflex, 
without knowledge or will. ' (, ýmile, 1, p. 32) 
Rousseau's description of the newly bom infant as an unformed and 
undirected mass of impulses and sensations is distinctly modem. For example, it 
bears comparison with Freud's conception of the newly born as a 
II 
polymorphously perverse bundle of undirected corporeal drives . Rousseau's 
materialism is also modem in its recognition that the human infant is not just a 
man or woman in miniature, but is psychologically unformed. This relates, for 
example, to a child's lack of awareness concerning its own body, its material 
environment, the distinction between subject and object and its abilities 
concerning spatial differentiation and orientation. Rousseau's concept of the 
newly born develops the tabula rasa theory of human development championed 
by Locke in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Rousseau 
understands the importance of childhood as a developmental stage central to the 
See Freud's 'Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality' The Penguin Freud Librarj,. Vol. 7, ed. 
James Strachey (Harmondsworth: Pengulin 1991) 
formation of human consciousness. Alan Richardson draws attention to a 
passage in Emile that he suggests may have influenced Mary Shelley in her 
description of the Creature's emergence into consciousness in which Rousseau 
describes the likely consequences of the birth of a ftilly-grown man: 12 
Suppose a child was born with the size and strength of manhood, entering upon life 
full grown like Pallas from the brain of Jupiter; such a child-man would be a 
perfect idiot, an automaton, a statue without motion and almost without feeling; he 
would see and hear nothing, he would recognise no one, he could not turn his eyes 
towards what he wanted to see; not only would he perceive no external objects. he 
would not even be aware of sensation through the several sense-organs. (tmile, 1, 
p. 32) 
Rousseau does not make the mistake of Victor Frankenstein whose 
creation is a fully formed man. Nevertheless his basic ideology and entrenched 
materialism have strong parallels with Frankenstein's but for the fact that 
Rousseau realises the importance of an extended incubation period. The sensual 
body of the child is the raw material from which Rousseau seeks to mould a new 
form of consciousness, allowing it to develop slowly at its own pace, in a fonn of 
'negative education. 
Rousseau recognises three forms of education: by nature, by men and by 
things. The former occurs naturally through the physical growth and the 
psychological development of the body and sense organs. Education by men is 
something that Rousseau wants to avoid for as long as possible, because of his 
view of the corrupting influence of civilisation, but he does concede its 
significance from a utilitarian perspective, as it teaches the child the use value of 
'things'. Of the three types of education Rousseau's principal concern is 'the 
education of things', which he describes as 'what we gain by our experience of 
our surroundings' (Emile, 1, p. 6). Rousseau releases his fictional child into a 
12 Alan Richardson, Literature, Education, and Romanticism: Reading as Social Practice, 1 780- 
1832 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994), pp. 205-205- 
natural landscape, in order that he may experience the widest variety of 
sensations possible. The child's sensory experiences are crucial to his 
developing spatial awareness and to the child's sense of its own bodily location 
within the material world. Rousseau instructs: 
He wants to touch and handle everything; do not check these movements which 
teach him invaluable lessons. Thus he learns to perceive the heat, cold, hardness, 
softness, weight, or lightness of bodies, to judge their size and shape and all their 
physical properties, by looking, feeling, listening, and, above all, by comparing 
sight and touch, by judging with the eye what sensation they would cause to his 
hand. (tmile, 1, p. 36) 
Following this passage, Rousseau makes the assertion that even a child* s 
concept of self and other is grounded in materiality. Rousseau does not then 
conceive of the emergence of a discourse of the self in early infancy, but rather 
conceives of the development of a wider sensory field that contains the self. 
Shifting positionalities over time teach the child of its status as a locatable, but 
moving body, contained within a spatio-temporal field: 'It is only by movement 
that we learn the difference between self and not self, it is only by our own 
movements that we gain the idea of space' (The movement of the body here 
involves a movement in time). To draw a distinction between self and 
environment, or indeed self and not self is to miss Rousseau's point. In 
Rousseau's thinking the inside/outside dichotomy that plagues modem concepts 
of the self is elided. The child inhabits not itself but its immediate environment, 
with self and environment (not-self) as contingent categories. 
Rousseau's education of the senses through the experience of 'things' 
allows the child to gain a sense of perspective on the world and to develop a 
sense of its place in the wider scheme of things. This mapping of self and 
environment lies at the heart of Rousseau's concept of rationality, for it involves 
an awareness of the ratio of things. However, Rousseau's pronounced 
materialism does not allow him to overstep the mark between the sensory self 
and its material context. For example, he distinguishes between the ability to 
orientate oneself spatially, which he associates with the imagination, and the 
material nature of things - reality. For Rousseau, our sense of perspective is 
illusory, a means of mapping the material world: 'If we perceive the real 
dimensions of things, we should know nothing of space; everything would seem 
close to our eyes' (11, p. 124). This helps to explain Rousseau's merging of self 
and environment. The concept of 'environment' is the product of the subjective 
imagination. The child's environment only becomes imbued with meaning as 
space, as a result of the spatial perspective that arises from the child's cognitive 
mapping of its material environment through its sensory engagement with it. So 
such concepts as proximity, distance, expanse and so on, are all functions of the 
imagination, and correspond to the dimensions of the self. Our concept of our 
immediate environment involves a representation of reality, not reality itself, 
what is gained is aperspective on the nature of things. 
The emergence of the imagination in childhood involves the awakening 
of desires resulting from an expansion in 'the bounds of possibility. Rousseau's 
pedagogy seeks to contain this expansion by restricting the child's immediate 
environment: 'The world of reality has its bounds, the world of imagination is 
boundless, as we cannot enlarge the one, let us restrict the other; for all the 
sufferings which really make us miserable arise from the difference between the 
real and the imaginary' (Emile, 11, p52). The horizon that Rousseau seeks to hide 
from the child's view is the prospects and possibilities offered by European 
civilisation. and the allurements that arise from the siren calls of the modern 
metropolis. Rousseau does not want his child's mind infected by the European 
Imperialist and Capitalist imagination, with its dream of places and things 
beyond its reach: 
Thus we grasp everything, we cling to everything; we are anxious about time, 
place, people, things, all that is and will be; we ourselves are but the least part of 
ourselves. We spread ourselves, so to speak, over the whole world, and all this vast 
expanse becomes sensitive. No wonder our woes increase when we may be 
wounded on every side. How many princes make themselves miserable for the loss 
of lands they never saw, and how many merchants lament in Paris over some 
misfortune in the Indies! (tmile, 11, p. 55) 
The Imperialist imagination spreads itself across the globe rendering 
merchants and traders 'sensitive' to dangers occurring thousands of miles away. 
Rousseau's language suggests that the dimensions of the Imperialist imagination 
are a projection of the body's limits. The European imagination takes the shape 
of a man spread Gulliver-like over a vast expanse of land and sea. Rousseau 
attempts to 'protect' his child from the horrors of the historical present by 
controlling the dimensions of his imagination. He does this by controlling his 
environment and by refusing to allow the child to come into contact with objects 
or people that might act as signposts pointing towards the existence of a wider 
world beyond the child's immediate surroundings. However, Rousseau's desire 
to protect his pupil by controlling his enviromnent should be treated with 
scepticism. Rousseau may make spirited attacks on Imperialism and the slave 
trade., but the logic of his educational programme reflects the same logic of 
domination. Rousseau intends to colonise Emile's imagination and to harness his 
will. All this can be done, Rousseau informs us, without sacrificing Emile's 
sense of freedom: 
[L]et him always think he is master while you are reallý, master. There is no 
subjection so complete as that which preserves the forms of freedom; it is thus that 
the will itself is taken captive. Is not this poor child, \ý ithout knowledge, strength, I 
or wisdom, entirely at your mercy? Are you not master of his whole ený ironment 
so far as it affects him? Cannot you make of him what you please? (tmile, 11, 
P. 100) 
Throughout Emile Rousseau describes the automaton and puppet-like 
nature of conventionally brought up children, but it is Rousseau who has brought 
into being an automaton. By combining a universalised concept of human nature 
with environmental determinism, Rousseau is certain that his educational 
programme will produce a fixed, non-variable outcome. Even when tmile takes 
4possession' of himself, Rousseau feels assured that his creation will act in 
accordance with his will: 'So long as I could not get the mastery over his NA-111, I 
retained my control over his person; I never left him for a moment. Now I 
sometimes leave him to himself because I control him continually' (ýmile, IV 
p. 356). Emile, like a clockwork toy, is released in order to act in accordance 
with his programming. Once again parallels can be drawn with Mary Shelleý`s 
Frankenstein. In both tmile and Frankenstein 'the human' is emptied out. 
Enlightenment Ideology scoops the soul out of the human subject, replacing it 
with a materialist mechanistic conception of the self. Gone are questions 
concerning free will, with complex notions of human motivation and 
intentionality replaced by 'natural' inclinations and the acting out of mechanistic 
instincts. Enlightenment ideology has turned its eyes inwards, and is attempting 
to colonise itself by colonising childhood as the originating source of the self, in 
a paradoxical drive to preserve the illusion of freedom in-adult life 
In the Dialectic ofEnlightenment Adorno and Horkheirner link the 
Enlightenment drive to dominate nature with a dictator's need to dominate the 
people he rules over: 'Men pay for the increase of their power with alienation 
from that over which they exercise their pov, -er. Enlightenment behaN-es towards 
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things as a dictator towards men. He knows them in so far as he can manipulate 
them'. 13 The figure of tmile captures this logic perfectly. tmile is both man 
and object, as quite late into his childhood Rousseau conceives of his creation as 
being 'little more than a body', and recommends that he be ýtreat[edj as such' 
r (Emile, ll, p. 180). The merging of the split between tmile as a human subject 
and as a material object has a profoundly alienating affect on us as readers. Hoxv 
should we relate to Emile? What exactly are his rights, and what are our rights in 
relation to him? What gives us as adults the right to manipulate and govern him? 
In order to have dominion over the 'realm' of childhood Rousseau must 
distance us from it. Rousseau demands that adults and children keep their place 
by remaining in their own distinct zones of consciousness: 'Mankind has its 
place in the sequence of things; childhood has its place in the sequence of human 
life; the man must be treated as a man and the child as a child. Give each his 
place and keep him there. ' (Emile, 11, p. 5 1) Human life is mapped into 
developmental stages of consciousness, as we pass from one stage to another we 
become alienated from the stages we have passed through. The passage from 
childhood to adulthood involves the recognition of one's place in the human life 
cycle. One becomes an adult when one recognises that one is no longer a child. 
So in the gateway between childhood and adulthood stands the figure of the 
child: childhood in an objectified form. To take one's place as an adult involves 
an act of renunciation through this objectification of childhood. This in turn 
allows us to have dominion over children, but it can also result in our alienation 
from childhood. As childhood is transformed into a universal category the child 
we once were becomes a stranger to us. 
13 Adorno, Theodor W. and Horkheimer, Max, Dialectic of Enlightenment. trans. John Cumming 
(London: Verso 1997), p. 9. 
Outward Bound 
Rousseau's materialism is not as 'neutral' as it first appears. The bundle of 
sensations and reflexes that Rousseau educates into consciousness is. for 
example, male and Rousseau will have it no other way. Rousseau also demands 
that his pupil be able-bodied. Significantly, Rousseau associates physical 
disability with effeminacy, whereas masculinity is associated with physical 
prowess and the ability to adapt to environmental change. Also, as we have seen. 
Rousseau's materialist concept of self and not-self is likely to lead him to the 
conclusion that physical disability would impact upon a child's spatial awareness 
and therefore its concept of self. His association of physical disability with 
confinement leads to a description of the infirm as walking corpses: 'What matter 
if they make the dead walk, we have no need of corpses; they fail to give us men, 
and it is men we need' (Emile, 1, p. 26). Rousseau sees the salvation of 
civilisation as involving the production of strong and healthy men, and leaves the 
fate of those who do not fit into this category in the balance. From his rhetoric 
one suspects that Rousseau is content to leave them to die. Rousseau's 
educational programme allows children to sink or swim, offering them the bare 
minimum of assistance. Rousseau says that children should be dipped in *the 
waters of the Styx'. The symbolism here is important for the Styx is the river in 
Hades that marks the crossing point between life and death. tmile is initiated 
into a masculine realm of action man machismo. He must undergo certain 
privations and physical hardships to prove his worth as a man: 
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Accustom them therefore to the hardship they will have to face; train them to 
endure extremes of temperature, climate, and condition, hunger. thirst and 
weariness. Dip them in the waters of the Styx. (tmile, 1, p. 17) 
Not only must Rousseau Is pupil be male and able-bodied but he must also 
be a white European. Rousseau justifies this by employing his familiar rhetoric 
of environmental determinism. Different climates, Rousseau informs us, produce 
different national characteristics, for example Rousseau regards Negroes and 
Laps as being less wise than Europeans. 14 He also remarks that these two racial 
groups, coming from extreme climates, are unable to adapt to extreme 
environmental changes. Europeans on the other hand, particularly those coming 
from the temperate zone which conveniently enough includes France, are able to 
adapt to a wide range of climates: 'A Frenchman can live in New Guinea or in 
Lapland, but a Negro cannot live in Tornea nor a Samoyed in Benin' (Emile. 1, 
p. 22). The logic of Imperialism here is undeniable, with Europeans uniquely 
adapted to globetrotting and colonisation. Finally Rousseau demands that his 
child come with a dowry, for though an orphan tmile has inherited wealth. 
Rousseau is content for the poor to bring up their own children: 'the poor may 
come to manhood without our help' (Emile, 1, p. 23). 
14 The idea that climate and environment contributed to national characteristics was not unique to 
Rousseau. For example Montesquieu in The Spirit of the Laws (1748) suggested that the South 
Asian climate sapped people's mental and physical strength making them lethargic and 
intellectually lazy. This problem was compounded by the fact that the land needed little effort to 
cultivate, and so did not provide an incentive for development and innovation, leaving Asians 
behind the more developed Europeans. Rousseau's thinking even more closely resembles that of 
the Comte de Buffon who in his Natural History, General and Particular put forward the view 
that the geographical position of Southern Europeans marked them out as a classificatory 
standard by which other racial groups should be measured: 'The most temperate climate lies 
between the 40th and 50'hdegree of latitude, and it produces the most handsome and beautiful 
men. It is from this climate that the ideas of the genuine colour of mankind, and the various 
degrees of beauty, ought to be derived. The extremes are equally remote from truth and from 
beauty' (quoted in The Great Map of Mankind p. 245). For a discussion of these theories see P. J. 
Marshall and Glyndwr Williams, The GreatWap ofiVankind: British Perception of the World in 
theAge of Enlightenment (London: J. M. Dent and Sons 1982). The first 15 volumes of Buffon's 
Natural History were published in Paris between 1749 and 1767. 
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Emile as an enlightened wealthy white European male is the tý-pe of 
person that Rousseau and the other philosophes looked towards to push for, -vard 
the boundaries of the Enlightenment project. In this way we might see Emile as 
a potential explorer who will discover new domains as yet untouched by 
Enlightenment ideology. 15 In this section I want to focus on another adventurer 
by drawing a comparison between tmile and the epic explorer Odysseus as 
portrayed in Adorno's and Horkheimer's Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
Emile's education allows him to gain a sense of location and perspective 
in relation to his environment. Through a rationalisation of space Emile gains 
the lie of the land. His spatial awareness creates a knowledge/power dynamic 
that allows him to adapt to changes in his environment but also to forecast 
possible dangers and hazards and so avoid them. Rousseau puts stress on 
developing the skills of orientation. Indeed certain sections of tmile seem to 
more resemble a boy-scout manual than an educational treatise. For example. he 
describes an instance in which he and his pupil find themselves lost in a forest. 
They are lost by design, as it is an orientation exercise set up by Rousseau to see 
if Emile can find his way home unassisted. Emile represents a model of the 
bourgeois traveller who, snail-like, carries his home with him, but can also find 
his way back to his 'fixed estate' or "homeland. This parallels the description of 
Odysseus in the Dialectic ofEnlightenment: 
Though trembling and shipwrecked, the hero anticipates the work of the compass. 
Though he is powerless, no part of the sea remains unknown to him, and so his 
powerlessness also indicates that the mighty powers will be put down. But the 
evident untruth in myths, the deception of the claim that the waters and the earth 
are actually inhabited by demons, the magical deceit of inherited popular religion, 
becomes in the eyes of the mature traveller something that is merely 'misleading', 
15 Yet another parallel to Frankenstein presents itself here, with Emile being comparable to the 
explorer Robert Walton. 
in contradistinction to the unequivocal purposiveness of his own self-preservation, 
and his return to his homeland and fixed estate. 16 
In the above extract Adorno and Horkheimer describe Odysseus' domination of 
the mythic, realm of the supernatural. Rousseau describes this realm when 
speculating on pre-history: 
Thus man began by thinking that all things whose action affected him were alive. 
He did not recognise the limits of their powers, and he therefore supposed that they 
were boundless; as soon as he had supplied them with bodies they became his gods. 
In earliest times men went in terror of everything and everything seemed alive. 
The idea of matter was developed as slowly as that of spirit, for the former is itself 
an abstraction. Thus the universe was peopled with gods like themselves. The 
stars, the winds and the mountains, rivers, trees, and towns, their very dwellings, 
each had its soul, its god, its life. (tmile, IV, p. 262) 
Earlier in this section I described the Enlightenment explorer as expanding 
the bounds of the 'known' world, but in doing this, the Enlightenment had to 
restrict the bounds of the 'unknown' world by containing the imagination. The 
Enlightenment transforms the 'boundless' realm of magic, where everything 
'seemed alive', to a natural realm of dead matter. An interesting example, and 
one that brings out the rhetoric of light and darkness that characterised so much 
Enlightenment thinking, is the episode in Emile where Rousseau stresses the 
importance of teaching children not to fear the dark. Rousseau here 
inadvertently supplies us with a dialectical image to represent Enlightenment: a 
man standing in the dark secure in the knowledge of his surroundings. With his 
usual machismo Rousseau berates those adults who still succumb to a fear of the 
dark: 
I have seen thinkers, unbelievers, philosophers, exceedingly brave by daylight, 
tremble like women at the rustling of a leaf in the dark. This terror is put down to 
nurses' tales; this is a mistake; it has a natural cause. What is this cause? What 
16 Adorno, Theodor W. and Horkheirner, Max, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming 
(London: Verso 1997), p. 47. 
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makes the deaf suspicious and the lower classes superstitious? Ignorance of the 
things about us, and what is taking place around us. (tmile. 11, p. 117) 
Childhood is traditionally associated with folk tales, nursery rhymes and 
moral tales,, but Rousseau seems to want to break this link in an attempt to further 
rationalise childhood. He even recommends the exclusion of children's authors 
that he has enjoyed reading such as Charles Perrault, remarking that they should 
be read in adulthood when the moral content of their work can be fully 
'comprehended'. The magic of childhood, which is expressed through the 
childish imagination but also through the cultural transmission of fables and 
tales, is subjected to Rousseau's relentless rationalism. In doing this however, 
the imaginative bounds of the child are considerably reduced. 
One of the central paradoxes of the Enlightenment is that in order to 
expand its knowledge of the natural world it had to limit its horizons. 
Rousseau's thinking is driven by the dialectic of limit and extension. Two forces 
exist in Enlightenment thinking: first the need to survey the unknown world in 
order to map it thus allowing for future expansion; second, the need to fence in 
existing knowledge in order to exploit it as a useful resource. These two forces 
are characterised by Adorno and Horkheimer in the figures of Odysseus and 
Crusoe: 'Odysseus and Crusoe are both concerned with totality: the fon-ner 
measures whereas the latter produces it'. 17 Interestingly, Rousseau, having 
refused to allow Emile to read children's stories, describing books as 'the curse 
of childhood', does make one concession allowing him to read Robinson Crusoe. 
He describes how Emile should identify with Crusoe and how his imagination 
should be full of 'his castle, his goats, his plantations' (Emile, 11, p. 63). In 
17 Adorno, Theodor W. and Horkheirner, Max, Dialectic of Enlightenment. trans. John Curnminc, Z-7 
(London: Verso 1997), p. 62. 
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Rousseau's thinking man is an island. Alienated from society, and even from the 
expansive possibilities of his own imagination he defines himself by the limits of 
his knowledge. 
For Rousseau childhood as a zone of consciousness is virgin territory -a 
limitless expanse waiting to be occupied. But Rousseau's attempts at 
colonisation cannot result in the occupation of the space of childhood. Indeed his 
ability to hold sway over tmile is, as has been discussed, the result of his 
alienation from childhood. But what of young Odysseus-Emile, surely he can 
gain dominion over his own childhood? No, because his Crusoe-like act of self- 
possession leaves him on the same side of the fence as his tutor. 
Finding Children, Losing Mothers 
Rousseau insists that his prot6ge be an orphan. He does not mean this literally. 
He is not concerned with whether Emile's parents are living or dead. However, 
he is insistent that Emile's parents relinquish control over their child allowing 
Rousseau complete 'authorship' of his fictional creation: 'Emile is an orphan. 
No matter whether he has father or mother, having under taken their duties I am 
invested with their rights. He must honýour his parents, but he must obey me. 
That is my first and only condition' (Emile, 1, p. 23). This assertion is strange, as 
elsewhere Rousseau remarks that the best teacher of a child is his father, and the 
best nurse is his mother. So in a sense Rousseau could be accused of settling for 
second best. But one doesn't get the impression that Rousseau really believes I 
that he is settling for second best. tmile is represented at all times as the model 
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child, at least as good a child as it is possible to -produce' given the corruptions 
imposed from without by the demands of the modem world. 
Rousseau's insistence that tmile be an orphan is also interesting in 
relation to his own life. Rousseau notoriously gave up all five of his own 
children to foundling homes. In Emile Rousseau sounds a note of bitter regret, 
identifying with fathers who have failed in their duty: 'If a man of any natural 
feeling neglects these sacred duties he will repent it with bitter tears and "vill 
never be comforted' (Emile, 1, p. 19). In the light of this we might see Emile as 
the product of guilt, with Rousseau trying to right the wrong of abandoning his 
own children by 'bringing up' a fictional child of his own. Except that the child 
is not his own,, and he insists upon this. If he had wanted he could have written a 
novel about the relationship of a father and son. This would have been the ideal 
vehicle for Rousseau to play at being a father. But what Rousseau wants to do is 
imagine himself in the role of the tutor of an orphan. For Rousseau, what is 
seductive about Emile is that he is without parents. More than this, he clearly 
believes that Emile's parents should feel no guilt, for in handing their child over 
to a tutor they are ensuring that he receives the best possible education. 
Rousseau enacts a benevolent adoption, free of the guilt that was attached 
to abandoning his children to an orphanage where their future would have been 
far from secure. Rousseau presents us with the 'happy orphan', a child that feels 
no ill feelings towards his parents for abandoning him. Moreover he is more 
than compensated for his loss because he is being educated by the best of all 
possible tutors, a man who is more than a tutor, but rather a friend for life. In 
Rousseau's model all the messy feelings of parental guilt. and the child's 
resentment at having been abandoned are resolved. Mary Jacobus notes another 
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psychological loose end that Rousseau ties up by creating this scenario. 
Rousseau's mother died before he knew her. Jacobus sees Rousseau* s 
')"k abandonment of his own children, and tutoring of a fictional orphan in, ýmile as a 
response to his own sense of being 'abandoned' by his mother as an infant: 
In unburdening himself of his children, Rousseau at a stroke ensured a repetition of his own abandonment by the mother who died at his birth, and put a stop to it. 
When, therefore, he writes in tmile that "women have stopped being mothers" he 
was complaining about a stoppage that intimately concerned himself His solution 
was to get rid of the mother as well as the enfants trouvg, leaving the educator in 
charge. " 
Rousseau's psychological impulse to rid himself of the mother is 
complicated, because though the tutor can step into the role once occupied by the 
father, he cannot entirely dispense with 'mothers' (even if the mother in question 
is not the birth mother) because of their role in feeding. Moreover, though 
Jacobus is right to suggest that in terms of Emile's upbringing the mother is 
absent, readers in the eighteenth century tended to emphasise Rousseau's 
message that mothers should not abandon their children to wet nurses, but should 
breast feed them themselves. This is not to say that Jacobus' analysis of 
Rousseau psychological motivation is wrong, but rather that Rousseau's feelings 
of antipathy for 'mothers' is expressed in contradictory ways. Rousseau's attack 
on modem motherhood further allows him to project any guilt he feels for 
abandoning his own children onto 'mothers', who as Mary Jacobus points out, 
with reference to Winnicott, can never be quite 'good enough'. 19 
" Mary Jacobus, 'Incorruptible Milk: Breast Feeding and the French Revolution', Rebel 
Daughters: Women and the French Revolution. eds. Sara E. Melzer and Leslie W. Rabine 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1992) p. 58. 
'9 Jacobus remarks: 'ýmile suggests that every mother is unnatural - either refusing to nurture her 
own child, like the woman of society. or choosing to nurture someone else's for mone\ In place 
of her own, like the peasant wet nurse. No mother can vet be (in Winnicott's phrase) good 
enough, no milk impervious to corruption. The parasite is endemic to the system. ' lbid, p. 60. 
In Book One, Rousseau vents his anger at mothers who deliver their 
newly bom children into the hands of rural wet-nurses. In Rousseau's \ iew 
mothers had failed in their 'first duty' by refusing to nurse their own children 
p (Emile, 1, p. 12). This failure marked them out as bad mothers because it broke 
the natural bond between a mother and her infant. Even when the child , vas 
returned to its birth mother this bond could not be easily reinstated, for during the 
child's absence maternal feelings continue to wane: 'motherhood becomes a 
burden; means are found to avoid it' (Emile 1, p. 13). 
In the case of wet-nurses Rousseau contended that such a woman could 
not be a good-mother substitute, because in order to become a wet-nurse she 
would have had to cut short the weaning period of her own child in order to feed 
a stranger's baby: 'The woman who nurses another's child in place of her own is 
a bad mother; how can she be a good nurseT (Emile, p. 14). Such a woman, 
Rousseau insists, would be inclined to neglect a stranger's child, Putting in the 
minimum amount of effort to ensure its well-being. But even if the wet-nurse 
turns out to be attentive to her charge, and develops a motherly affection for the 
child, Rousseau is still not happy. A mother who allows her child to develop 
motherly affection for another woman is an unnatural mother. Moreover the 
child will itself become confused when he returns home. Who should the child 
bestow his affections on, his birth mother or the woman who has nursed and 
looked after him? Rousseau is concerned that a child might develop too strong a 
bond with its wet-nurse, resulting in psychological trauma when it is forced to 
part from her. Rousseau describes how attempts to break an infant's bond N,,,, -ith 
its wet-nurse will inevitably result in the child growing up to despise both its 
wet-nurse and its mother: 
44 
To remove this difficulty, children are taught to look down on their nurses. to treat 
them as mere servants. When their task is completed the child is withdrawn or the 
nurse is dismissed. Her visits to her foster-child are discouraged by a cold 
reception. After a few years the child never sees her again. The mother expects to 
take her place, and to repair by her cruelty the results of her own neglect. But she 
is greatly mistaken; she is making an ungrateful foster-child, not an affectionate 
son; she is teaching him ingratitude, and she is preparing him to despise at a later 
day the mother who bore him, as he now despises his nurse. (Eýmile, p. 14) 
But where are fathers in all this? Are they not also to be 'despised^ for 
sending their children to hired hands? Apparently not. In Rousseau's view 
wives are manipulating their husband in order to gain free time away from their 
babies. Rousseau plays on the husband's fear of adultery. He addresses 
husbands and fathers, suggesting that their wives are 'tricking" them in order to 
avoid caring for their children. Moreover, he insinuates that if wives are able to 
trick their husbands in order to avoid their matemal duties, then they are likely to 
trick them over their duties as a wife. Free from their infants women have the 
opportunity to act on their desires: 
I have sometimes watched the tricks of young wives who pretend that they wish to 
nurse their own children. They take care to be dissuaded from this whim. They 
contrive that husbands, doctors, and especially mothers should intervene. If a 
husband should let his wife nurse her own baby it would be the ruin of him; they 
would make him out a murderer who wanted to be rid of her. A prudent husband 
must sacrifice paternal affection to domestic peace. Fortunately for you there are 
women in the country districts more continent than your wives. You are still more 
fortunate if the time thus gained is not intended for another than yourself (Emile, 1, 
p. 13) 
In reality the wet-nursing business in eighteenth-century France was very 
different from the scenario that Rousseau presents us with. As Valerie Lastinger 
points out the wet-nursing business was largely run 
by men: 'historical records 
show that it was the father, rather than the mother, who was the wet nurse's 
employer, hiring her, paying her, corresponding with the nurse or 
her husband. 20 
2. Y Motherhood: Breast-Feeding and the French Enlightennierit', 0 Valerie Lastinger, 'Re-Defining 
Women's Studies, vol. 25,1996, p. 606. 
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Lastinger notes that it was male sexual desire that often motivated fathers to send 
their infants away to be wet-nursed. It was commonly believed that sexual 
excitement in lactating women would spoil their milk. Thus if a man wanted to 
have sexual relations with his wife after she had given birth it was in his interest 
to have his child sent away. Moreover, during the nursing period women's sex 
drive tended to be lower. Lastinger describes how men put pressure onwomen 
to make a choice: 'intense pressure was made on her to "choose" matemal 
nursing and therefore to practice sexual abstinence. On the other hand, she was 
also submitted to the direct pressure of her husband, since she shared 
responsibility in any sin of masturbation or adultery committed by her husband 
during the abstinence period' .21 This adds an interesting twist to Rousseau's 
'observations'. If women insisted on nursing their own children they were likely 
to be blamed for their husbands' sexual indiscretion. But if they sent their 
children away to wet-nurses, men like Rousseau were quick to suggest that they 
would commit adultery and were not to be trusted. Women were placed in a no- 
win situation. 
There is further evidence to suggest that women were indeed manipulated 
by their husbands as well as other family members into giving up their infants to 
wet nurses. Nancy Senior cites an anecdote recalled by Mme Le Rebourds, who 
wrote a book, partly inspired by her own experience as a mother, which gave 
advice on infant feeding. Mme Le Rebourds book Avis aux Meres qui veulent 
nourrir leurs enfants (1767 ) encouraged women to breast feed their own 
children, but rather than heaping vitriol on young mothers as Rousseau does, 
Mme Le Rebours recognised the difficulties that young women faced and the 
21 ibid, p. 611. 
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opposition that existed to breast-feeding within their own family. The anecdote 
that Senior cites presents a situation that is the exact opposite of the one that 
Rousseau presents. It is the mother who is being tricked and manipulated by 
those closest to her: 
If one is to believe our author, there was in some cases quite literally a conspiracy 
to prevent mothers from [nursing their own children]. She [Mme Le Rebours] cites 
a case where garde, husband, and grandmother did not want a new mother to feed 
her child. They gave the baby cow's milk before bringing it to the mother, then 
told her that the child's refusal to suck showed that she had no milk. Once, despite 
the fact that the child had already fed successfully, the midwife told the gullible 
young woman that she could not nurse her child because her breasts were not of the 
right shape. 22 
Both Rousseau and Mme Le Rebours provide us with anecdotal evidence 
that we might question the validity of In any case we might overlook their 
differences and emphasise the fact that both writers advocated that first time 
mothers should breast-feed their children. We might absolve Rousseau of his 
misogyny on the grounds that he had the child's best interests at heart. But such 
a conclusion would only serve to paper over the cracks, and ignore the driving 
ideology behind Rousseau's response to mothers and motherhood. Rousseau 
concedes that his remonstrations are in vein: 'Women have ceased to be mothers, 
they do not and will not return to their duty' (Emile, 1, p. 15). In the light of this 
we might ask what exactly was the point of Rousseau's invective against 
mothers. One answer to this question is that Rousseau's psychological warfare 
is 
intended to remove what is left of women's self-confidence, and make them 
pliable to the manipulation of their husbands and other male authority 
figures. 
At one point, after attempting to inspire guilt and self-hatred 
in mothers 
Rousseau performs a remarkable rhetorical turn around. Modem urban mothers. 
22 Nancy Senior, 'Aspects of Infant Feeding in Eighteenth-Cenairy 
France'. Eighteenth- Centzin, 
Studies, 1983, vol. 16, p. 376. 
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Rousseau declares, are just not up to the job of nursing their children. In the light 
of this their children are better off with wet-nurses after all: 
There can be no doubt about a wife's duty, but, considering the contempt in xhich it is held, it is doubtful whether it is not just as good for the child to be suckled by a 
stranger. This is a question for the doctor's to settle, and in my opinion theý have 
settled it according to the women's wishes, and for my own part I think it is better 
that the child should suck the breast of a healthy nurse rather than of a petted 
mother, if he has any further evil to fear from her who has given him birth. (tmile, 
1, pp. 13-14) 
It is unavoidable, indeed essential, if Rousseau's project is to succeed, that 
the infant tmile is totally under the control of his tutor Jean-Jacques. As has 
been said, the child can do without its father,, as Jean Jacques can take his place, 
but the child needs a mother, even if it is somebody else's mother. For 
D- 
Rousseau, such a woman must know her place, she must be subject to the control 
and surveillance of the child's tutor,, and most importantly she must know when 
to withdraw. The ideal woman for this role is ironically a wet-nurse: a hired 
servant. What Rousseau does is to reduce all women to the status of wet nurses. 
In a notable passage in which Rousseau sets out to 'choose' a suitable nurse for 
Emile, it is interesting how the identity of birth mother and wet-nurse merge into 
one another, and both into that of the servant. It is not important whether the 
child's nurse is its mother or not, what is important is that the mother or nurse 
does not contradict Rousseau's advice, and is content to obey her male 'master': 
When our life begins our needs begin too. The new-born infant must have a nurse. 
If his mother will do her duty, so much the better; her instructions will be given her 
in writing, but this advantage has its drawbacks, it removes the tutor from his 
charge. But it is to be hoped that the child's own interests, and her respect for the 
person to whom she is about to confide so precious a treasure. will induce the 
mother to follow the master's wishes ... (tinile, 
1, p, 27) 
In addressing mothers, Rousseau has given mixed messages and often 
contradictory advice. But though many of Rousseau's pronouncements appear to 
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cancel each other out, one thing that is not cancelled out is the guilt he attempts 
to instil in young mothers. The combined effect of this guilt, his constant 
undermining of women's confidence and his questioning of their matemal 
judgement, is to disorientate young mothers and so make them malleable to the 
demands placed upon them by their husbands and other 'experts ,. 23 
Whether the child is breast-fed by its birth mother or a wet-nurse Rousseau 
insists that it remain in her care for only as long as is strictly necessary, until her 
duties have been performed. Rousseau insists that once the child is weaned he 
should pass from the hands of the mother/wet-nurse to the father, or in tmile's 
case his tutor. Rousseau is anxious to avoid 'outsiders' intervening between him 
and his charge. As we have seen, earlier in Emile Rousseau attacks the practice 
of wet-nursing on the grounds that if a child does develop 'too' strong a bond 
with his nurse then he will suffer the trauma of separation when he returns home. 
In consequence of this Rousseau believes that the child would come to hold both 
his wet-nurse and mother in contempt later in life. Rousseau, by demanding that 
a child pass from its mother to its father, is enforcing a similar form of traumatic 
separation. Moreover, the reason behind this enforced separation, that mothers 
are simply not good enough to bring up their own children once they are weaned, 
would surely lead male children to 'despise' their mothers in later life, indeed to 
treat them as servants whose role is defined by a physiological function rather 
than their skills as carers. 
23Nancy Senior argues more generally that the undermining of the confidence particularly of first 
time mothers by medical experts actually contributed to the growth of the "vet nursing 
business in 
eighteenth century France: 'I contend that, what ever may have been the various other 
factors, 
medical opinion contributed to the wetnursing phenomenon 
by underming the confidence of 
prospective parents, and particularly of young mothers-to-be, in the woman's ability to nurse a 
child. ' Ibid p. 375. 
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In view of this it is not surprising that in the case of tmile Rousseau 
appears to prefer a wet nurse, and takes great care in describing how to choose 
the best one. As Valerie Fildes points out the characteristics that are associated 
with the ideal wet nurse had changed very little since antiquity. 24 Rousseau 
realises that he is following conventional wisdom in asking for a caring, hygiene- 
conscious, healthy woman, docile in character (for 'violence of the passion 
may spoil the milk'), and moderate in her habits (Emile, 1, p. 28). He also 
requires a woman who has only recently become a nurse. This is interesting as 
earlier Rousseau had lambasted wet-nurses for neglecting their own children in 
favour of a stranger's child. In the eighteenth century it was uncommon for a 
woman to take up a post as a wet-nurse before she had nursed her own child for 
up to six months. Surely then by demanding that his nurse be a woman who has 
only recently given birth Rousseau becomes the agent of the very neglect he has 
criticised. It seems that Rousseau is prepared to be a hypocrite in order to ensure 
that Emile receives only the very best care during his infancy. 
Mary Jacobus rightly asserts that Rousseau's overriding concern is not with 
the person of the wet-nurse, but with the quality of her milk: 'tmile's wet-nurse 
is reduced to the sum of her milk, viewed as the product of a carefully regulated 
system of biological, temperamental, moral, and dietary components. ' 25 Jacobus 
goes on to wittily connect Rousseau's insistence that his wet-nurse follow a 
largely vegetarian diet to the image of a cow being put out to pasture: 
Rousseau's recipe for purifying both milk and morals is pastoralization. Ideally, he 
says, the wet-nurse should be a healthy peasant woman of good character. I Iving in 
the country, and (this is important) eating a largely vegetarian diet: 'The milk of 
herbivorous females is sweeter and healthier than that of carnivores. Formed of a 
substance homogenous with its own, it preserves its nature better and becomes less 
24 For a description of these characteristics see Valerie Fildes, Wet Nursing: .4 Histon, ftom 
Antiquity to the Present (Oxford: Blackwell 1988), p. 20. 
25 Mary Jacobus, * Incorruptible Milk: Breast-Feeding and the French Revolution', p. 59. 
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subject to putrefaction'. Meat eating on the part of the wet-nurse leads to bad 
morals as well as (so Rousseau believes) intestinal parasites in infants. Since 
corruption begins at the breast, the only safeguard against moral infection or 26 infestation by worms is to put women out to grass . 
Mothers in Emile are reduced to the status of milk cows, with Rousseau's 
language often coming close to resembling that of the cattle breeder going to 
market to purchase the right breed. He favours rural peasant women over urban 
upper class women, trusting in the superior quality of their milk yield. It is not 
unusual in the history of wet-nursing for women from particular locations to be 
favoured for the quality of their milk. Valerie Fildes remarks with reference to 
Plutarch how in the classical period Spartan women appear to have been 
0- .- tavoured. In Renaissance Florence the women of Casentino were sought after, 
while later in nineteenth-century Paris it was the women of Morvan. 17 Rousseau 
may not share the racial determinism that favoured women from particular 
regions, but it is comparable to his environmental determinism, which certainly 
does apply here. Moreover, despite attacking wet-nurses Rousseau does appear 
to view women as marketable commodities. Rousseau's search for a suitable 
nurse can be related to an economic history that stretches back at least to Roman 
times when nurses and their 'customers' did business beside specially designated 
columns in the Roman Forum known as lactaria. 
28 
A hired woman is obliged to obey the commands of her employer, and this 
relationship seems to suit Rousseau. As Jacobus points out by robbing women of 
their agency and of the exercising of their reason they are reduced to the status of 
dumb animals. Rousseau remarks: 'Do not argue with the nurses; give your 
orders, see them carried out' (Emile, 1, p. 32). Rousseau treatment of wet-nurses 
26 lbid, p. 59. 
27 Valerie Fildes, Wet Nursing, p. 17. 
28 lbid, p. 18. 
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has parallels with his advice on disciplining young children: "I should no more 
expect judgement in a ten-year old child than I should expect him to be five feet 
high' (Emile, 1, p. 63). Clearly for Rousseau women and small children are not to 
be reasoned with. 
Another comparison can be drawn between the 'selection process' that 
Rousseau employs to choose an orphan, and the selection process he employs to 
select a suitable wet-nurse. His orphan, like his wet-nurse, must be physically fit 
and healthy. Moreover after being nursed Emile is, to use Jacobus' phrase, 'put 
out to grass', spending much of his childhood roaming the countryside. But 
f 
whereas Emile in later life will be allowed to develop a personality (albeit one 
shaped by his tutor), the mother or wet nurse is doomed to anonymity. Her 
contribution to her nursling is restricted to the earliest stage of development, 
when the child's personality has not yet fully emerged. Thus in order that 
Rousseau can find his orphan, his enfant trouvi, the 'mother' must be lost, her 
contribution all but erased from the child's memory, as she is banished before her 
nursling can be fully conscious of her as a person in her own right. The mother, 
not the child, is abandoned. She must endure the psychological trauma of not 
knowing her child as he grows up; a trauma that is perhaps as devastating as the 
experience of being orphaned. 
During his childhood and youth Emile has the bare minimum of contact 
with the female sex. As we have seen, and as we shall go on to explore in 
Chapter Two, Rousseau had little respect for modem women, and did not want 
his educational Programme contaminated by their presence. But like the God of 
the Old Testament he also believes that 'it is not good that man should be alone* 
and is determined to provide Emile with *his promised helpmeet' (ýmile. p. -384). 
S-) 
Unbeknown to tmile Jean-Jacques has a young woman in mind. a woman ývhose 
education has conformed to his exacting standards, and so has none of the 
'blemishes' of modem womankind. tmile's tutor plays matchmaker to these tN,, -o 
young people, mediating between the two lovers, and is held in high esteem bý- 
both. Rousseau's pleasure in writing this romance involves both his centrality 
and marginality to the emerging relationship. The two youngsters, still wary of 
each other,, use Jean-Jacques as the conduit for their love. He is gratified to hear 
his name mentioned in conversation between Emile and Sophy: 'When I consider 
that the tender love of my young friend has brought my name so prominently into 
his first conversation with his lady-love, I enjoy the reward of all my trouble, his 
affection is a significant recompense' (Emile, V p. 460). One might assume that 
when the couple are married then Jean-Jacques' role would finally be at an end, 
but not so, for Emile on discovering a few months later that his wife is pregnant 
runs to his trusty tutor, full of anxiety, to enlist his help on child-rearing: 'Advise 
and control us; we shall be easily led, as long as I live I shall need you. I need 
you more than ever now that I am taking up the duties of manhood. You have 
done your own duty; teach me to follow your example, while you enjoy your 
well-earned leisure' (Emile, V, p. 533). Jean-Jacques is now indispensable to his 
young pupil, whose psychological dependence on his tutor is now complete. But 
the reality of Rousseau's life is that he did not do his duty to his children. Emile 
is an act of psychic disavowal, with Rousseau enacting a fantasy in which he is 
rewarded for the time and effort he has spent on his fictional child. He has been 
judged a good father, albeit by his fictional son rather than his actual children. 
Thus, through his writing, and at least in his own eyes, it would appear Rousseau 
has been redeemed. The supreme irony of, 
ýmile is that at the close of the book it 
is Rousseau who is adopted by the family he has brought into existence. So. 
though mothers are marginalized and abandoned, Rousseau has at last been 
claimed -pýre trouve. 1 
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Chapter Two 
When I Came to Man's Estate: Emile's Entrance into Adulthood 
Time Demarcation and the Imposition of the Distinction Between Work and Play 
In the first two books of Emile, Rousseau's pupil learns to adapt to where he is. 
but he has not yet gained an awareness of where he is going in the sense of v, -ho 
he is to become. Emile has a limited spatial awareness that allows him to 
orientate himself to particular situations, but he has not yet developed long-term 
objectives that would allow him to develop a sense of a destination (destination 
as destiny). Emile is trapped in the immediate, having only a limited memory of 
the past. This memory consists of a sensory map of his physical experiences. a 
map that affords him an even more limited future horizon. It is ýmile's entrance 
into the 'age of reason', at about the age of 12 or 13 that allows him to plot a path 
into the future. He develops foresight, allowing him to develop a sense of 
purpose. At this point Rousseau insists that a distinction be drawn between work 
and play, and so on entering adulthood temporal distinctions are imposed on the 
value of time and the difference between work and relaxation. The development 
offoresight presents new dangers for Rousseau. His pupil is now presented with 
choices as to how he will occupy his time, and these choices involve value 
judgments that have moral implications: 
As soon as he has sufficient self-knowledge to understand what constitutes his 
well-being, as soon as he can grasp such far-reaching relations as to judge what is 
good for him and what is not, then he is able to discem the difference between 
work and play, and to consider the latter merely as relaxation. The objects of real 
utility may be introduced into his studies and may lead him to more prolonged 
attention than he gave to his games. The ever-recurring la\ý of necessit-\ soon 
teaches a man to do what he does not I ike, so as to avert evils \N filch he would 
dislike still more. Such is the use of foresight, and this foresight. well or ill used, is 
the source of all the wisdom or the wretchedness of mankind. (Itmile. 111. p. 168) 
Rousseau's language here chimes in with the rhetoric associated , vith the 
Protestant work ethic, with Rousseau fearing the moral consequences of idle 
hands. However, it is important to note that Rousseau in earlier chapters is set 
against the imposition of a work ethic thus allowing Emile to develop at his own 
pace and emphasising the importance of play to childhood development. Indeed. 
before the age of reason the child is unable to draw a distinction between work 
and play: 'Work or play are all one to him, his games are his work; he knows no 
difference. He brings to everything the cheerfulness of interest, the charm of 
freedom 
... ' (ýmile, 11, p. 150). However once he is able to discern the distinction 
between work and play he is required to divide his time between work and leisure 
and to abandon 'play' as a pass-time. 
Once Emile has reached the age of reason Rousseau sees fit to keep him 
busy by introducing him to a range of trades before finally specialising in the 
trade of carpentry. Now it might seem odd, particularly as tmile has inherited 
wealth, for Rousseau to choose to train him in a trade that is associated with the 
artisan class. However, Rousseau, throughout Emile, is consistently opposed to 
what might be described as the emergence of a 'new economy' characterised by 
urban upper class commodity consumption. Rousseau sees the emergence of this 
economy as a symptom of the degeneration of European civilisation. Like other 
Enlightenment thinkers, and particularly later thinkers such as Moses 
Mendelsohn and Emanuel Kant 29 , Rousseau conceives of civilisation as 
having a 
29 See Immanuel Kant, 'An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment? ' and, Moses 
Mendelssohn 'On the Question: What is Enlightenment "' in What is Enlightenment' Eighteenth- 
Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions, ed. James Schmidt (Berkele\: Uni versit\ of 
California Press 1996). 
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life span that mirrors that of the human subject. Rousseau was convinced that 
European civilisation was on the brink of collapse and revolution. He comments 
in Book Three: 'crisis is approaching and we are on the edge of a revolution. 
He expands on this point in a footnote: 'In my opinion it is impossible that the 
great kingdoms of Europe should last much longer. Each of them has had its 
period of splendour, after which it must inevitably decline' (tmile, 111. p. 18 8). In 
the light of his view that a revolution was just around the comer Rousseau's 
choice of the trade of carpenter is understandable, in fact it makes sound 
economic sense. Rousseau is giving his pupil a transferable skill as part of a 
contingency plan in the event of a revolutionary transformation of society. 
Rousseau laments the emergence of commodity culture and is particularly 
scomful of those trades that supply the markets with luxury goods such as 
ý goldsmiths, engravers, gilders, embroiders' who he considers to be 'lazy people' 
playing 'quite useless games' (Emile,, 111. p. 180). In a telling passage Rousseau 
focuses his criticism on the makers of fine clocks, 30 comparing the way a clock 
keeps time to the way a child lives it: 'The happy child enjoys Time without 
being a slave to it; he uses it, but he does not know its value. The freedom from 
passion which makes everyday alike to him, makes any means of measuring time 
r 
unnecessary' (Emile, 111, p. 180). The clock can be seen as symbolic of the new 
economy. Increasingly the clock functioned as a means of regulating and 
policing industrial labour in order to enforce a fixed quantifiable value on the 
way people used their time. It made it possible for individuals to synchronise 
with the wider operations of the capitalist system. The clock was also a 
commodity in itself, an attractive possession that allowed its wealthy owner a 
30 It is worthy of note that Rousseau's father was a clock-maker from Geneva. 
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certain amount of autonomy over his own time so that he might manage it better. 
This autonomy can be seen as a form of self-possession - having the time - but 
this can only happen because of increased standardisation within the wider 
market place. Rousseau sees the temporal regulation offered by 'clock time' as 
being unnatural as it involves a form of time-consciousness that is at odds xvith 
lived-time (the temporal experience of living). Of course lived-time is not 
without its parameters, the need for rest, the need for physical action and even 
the experience of hunger and its satiation act as a means of marking time. But 
the symbol of the clock stands for the objectification of time. We can only lose 
time by possessing it in this objectified form, because the acquisition of time 
creates an outside that we cannot inhabit. Our consciousness of the passage of 
time, our very knowledge of time, involves both our alienation from and our 
absolute subjection to an external universal category that measures all aspects of 
life. For Rousseau the time of childhood appears to have offered a type of 
temporal resistance to the historical epoch that he was living in. If children are 
not conscious of the passage of time then time cannot be said to be external to 
them. Children, by standing outside objectified time, but by not being aware that 
they are standing outside objectified time, embody temporality without knoiving 
it, for to know it is to lose it. 
There are many contradictions in Rousseau's thinking on this subject. 
For example, he glorifies the temporality of childhood as playful and free, but 
then berates those adults who 'misuse' their time as 'lazy game players. a term 
he would never apply to a child. He attacks the standardisation of time. 
but 
embraces the Protestant work ethic that was to so comprehensive 
I regulate 
labour time in the coming century commenting: 'Man in society is bound to 
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work; rich or poor, weak or strong, every idler is a thief' (Emile, 111. p. 189). In 
order to understand the contradictions in Rousseau's thinking we need to look in 
greater depth at his reaction to the economic and historical transitions occurring 
at the time he was writing. In the next section we will examine Rousseau's 
response to some of these transitions in order to show how historical changes to 
the material conditions of existence and their impact upon culture can be related 
to the emergence of a distinctly modem form of subjectivity. This ne,,, N- form of 
subjectivity is Ifeminised' by Rousseau and can be linked to commodity culture 
and the 'new economy'. 
Consuming Subjects 
In Book Three of Emile Rousseau introduces his pupil to economic practices 
both local and global, and elaborates upon some of their social impacts. 
Rousseau makes a sustained attack on the urban upper class, the leisured class 
and aristocracy attacking their consumption as far in excess of their labour. To 
use Marxist tenninology, which addresses itself quite neatly to Rousseau's 
economic thinking, those he takes exception to are the people who live off the 
products arising from the surplus labour of others. To illustrate his point 
Rousseau takes Emile to two separate social occasions, the first at a rich man's 
house and the second at the home of a peasant. At the meal at the rich man's 
house, amidst all the luxury and splendour, Rousseau asks Emile: 'How many 
hands do you suppose the things on this table passed through before they got 
hereT. He then goes on to reveal to his pupil some of the consequences of 
Z, 
European colonial expansion and mercantile capitalism that allow the rich to live 
such extravagant lives: 
[W]hat will he think of luxury when he finds that every quarter of the globe has 
been ransacked, that some 2,000,000 men have laboured for years, that many lives have perhaps been sacrificed, and all to furnish him with fine clothes to be wom at 
midday and laid by in the wardrobe at night. (tmile, 111, p. 184) 
Rousseau then takes his pupil to a meal at a local miller's house -,, N-here the 
food they have prepared and even the clothes they are wearing are the products 
of their own labour. Rousseau contrasts the local with the global describing the 
miller's world as 'bounded by the nearest mill and the next market' (Emile. 111. 
p. 184). The conclusion he wants his pupil to reach is a simple one: that 
distinctions of wealth are arbitrary, and that the 'rich man's stomach is no larger 
than the poor man's (Emile, 111,184). 
The totalising and universalising tendency of the Enlightenment has 
already been discussed. But the recognition of the basic material requirements of 
all humanity, irrespective of an individual's station or rank, is an element of 
Enlightenment thinking that should be redeemed. Rousseau's universalism in 
this instant is grounded in identification. Rousseau does not have his pupil pity 
the poor from a position of superiority, but because he may one day occupy their 
social position himself: 'Make him thoroughly aware of the fact that the fate of 
these unhappy persons may one day be his own, that his feet are standing on the 
edge of the abyss, into which he may be plunged at any moment by a thousand 
unexpected irresistible misfortunes' (Emile,, 111. p. 222). However. Rousseau's 
materialism fails to take account of cultural differences. Rousseau would ha,,,, e 
us love all of humanity. but he would also have us teach our children to be 
unaware of their own distinctness as members of localised classes or cultural 
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groups: 'teach your pupil to love all men. even those who fail to appreciate him; 
act in such a way that he is not a member of any class, but takes his place in all' 
(Emile, 111, p. 224). Rousseau's universalism would neutralise any political 
action that attempted to redress the balance between rich and poor that arose 
from the experiences of a particular oppressed group. In contrast to localised 
class-consciousness, Rousseau's universalism is founded on a trans-historical 
and trans-cultural assumption founded on species recognition. Nevertheless. his 
methodology has produced a universal category that can be applied to humanity 
in general and is worth retaining. 
But it is when Rousseau moves from the general to the particular that 
problems arise. He cannot, for example, see the culturally diverse space of the 
modem metropolis of Paris as anything other than a manifestation of humanity's 
corruption in its totality. As we have seen Rousseau advocates bringing children 
up in relative isolation in the countryside, advising that children be taken away 
'from the vile morals of the town, whose gilded surface makes them seductive 
and contagious to [them]' (Emile, 11, p. 70). The attractions of the city act upon 
children like a disease infecting their minds. But it is not just children who are 
attracted to these 'gilded surfaces', as women are also described as being 
particularly susceptible, abandoning their duties as wives and mothers in order to 
pursue 'the pleasures of the town' (Emile, 1, p. 12). Women are singled out 
for 
their conspicuous consumption and their 'slavish' devotion to fashion. For 
Rousseau the space of modem Paris is both a feminine space and a feminising 
space. For example, the makers of luxury goods - embroiders, goldsmiths, 
jewellers - are all seen as purveyors of 
'effeminate' trades; trades that cater to 
the whims and desires of the ultimate consumers - women. 
These more delicate 
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'effeminate' trades are contrasted with manly trades involving physical labour. 
In one of Rousseau's 'if I ruled the world' diatribes he takes his ideas on the 
gender division of labour to an extreme, threatening with castration those men 
who are only fit for 'feminine' modes of employment: 
If I were King I would only allow needlework and dressmaking to be done by 
women and cripples ... The weak, feeble, timid man is condemned by nature to a 
sedentary life, he is fit to live among women or in their fashion. Let him adopt one 
of their trades if he likes; and if there must be eunuchs let them take those men who 
dishonour their sex by adopting trades unworthy of it. Their choice proclaims a 
blunder on the part of nature; correct it one way or the other, you will do no harm. 
(tmile, III, p. 194) 
The threat of castration that Rousseau would impose on 'effeminate' men 
is clearly an expression of his own sense of emasculation when confronted with 
the ferninising space of the city. Rousseau feels hýelpless before the urban 
environment, utterly unable to establish any autonomy as a cultural agent or to 
impose his pedagogic structures on children whose minds are 'infected' by 
outside agents. Indeed, we might infer that he feels more than just sympathy for 
the city children whom he describes as being abandoned to the pleasure seeking 
inclinations of urban women, but rather, that he identifies with them. 
In contrast, urban upper class women often found the experience of city 
life to be liberating, affording them a new role as both consumers and agents of 
urban culture. 31 As Jennifer Jones points out, writing on the growth of 'fashion' 
(1a mode) in the Enlightenment, women were seen as helping to produce the 
spectacle of city life through personal display: this afforded them a means of 
self-presentation. However, rather than the idea of an autonomous self, self- 
31 See Sylvana Tomaselli, 'The Enlightenment Debate on Women', History if"orkshop Journal, 
vol. 20,1985, pp. 10 1- 124. Tomaselli stresses how many Enlightenment thinkers viewed women 
as a civilising force in relation to culture. She comments: 'Women ... not onlý benefited 
from 
culture. They were its agents. They brought it about, kindled it and nurtured its advancement' 
(p. 12 1). 
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contained and self-producing, the cultural performance of women was both 
mediated by and a reflection of a wider urban theatre. As Jones remarks. the 
Enlightenment drew certain inferences from this concerning female psychology 
During the eighteenth century pervasive beliefs concerning women's ability to 
seize and quickly absorb the visual world around them ... naturalise[d] a new role for them as 'consumers' ... Women's minds and sensory apparatus made them ideally suited to consume: their passivity rendered female consumers particularly 
vulnerable to being captured through sensual delight by agreeable and frivolous 
objects. " 
D- 
R. ousseau echoes this view of female psychology in his speculations on 
female education in Book Five of Emile. Rousseau comments: 'Even the tiniest 
little girls love finery; they are not content to be pretty, they must be admired; 
their little airs and graces show that their heads are ftill of this idea. (Emile, V, 
p. 392). The female self has a far greater mobility than the male self. In terms of 
perspective it is radically displaced perceiving it self almost entirely from the 
position of the other. This contrasts with tmile's conception of self as an infant. 
r Emile has little or no conception of the human other as anything more than 'not- 
self. The strong parallels between Rousseau's conception of the female subject 
and modem conceptions of the self cannot be missed. For example, we might 
draw a link between Rousseau's conception of the self and Freud's conception of 
self-love in 'On Narcissism'. However, this link is not straight forward and 
needs some elaboration. 
Freud begins 'On Narcissism' with a definition taken from the work of 
Paul Nackes where narcissism is described as: 'the attitude of a person who treats 
his own body in the same way in which the body of a sexual object is ordinarily 
32 ing Rousseau: Femininity and Fashion in Old R -ime 
France', Jennifer M. Jones, 'Repackagni e 21 1. 
French Historical Studies, vol. 18, no. 4.1994, p. 961. 
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treated' . 
33 In psychoanalytical terms this form of self-love involves the 
withdrawal of libidinal impulses from objects in the external world and their 
re irection towards the subjects own ego as a love-object. In Freudian theory the 
ego is not present at birth but emerges as part of a developmental process of 
subject formation. If we compare this to Rousseau, in tmile's infancy. self and 
environment are blurred to such an extent that he cannot be said to have a 
concept of self that he could cathect as being distinct from his physical 
environment; the process of objectification that will allow for the conceptual split 
between subject and object is not yet complete. Similarly in Freud the ego-libido 
and object-libido are not present in earliest childhood. However what is present 
from the outset is auto-erotism. Freud suggests in 'On Narcissism' that it is 
through the interaction over time of the infant with its own body and between the 
infant and its adult carer that enables the child to conceive of itself as being in 
possession of a totalised unitary body - its self. The ego-libido has its 
foundation in auto-erotism. The object-libido can be linked to the intervention of 
an adult carer,, with the mother being the most likely candidate for the first love- 
object of both boys and girls. In contrast, Rousseau has Emile grow up in almost 
total isolation from women, but for a paid wet-nurse who is discharged on 
serving her function. In Freudian terms it would be unlikely that tmile would 
make the libidinal transference from auto-erotism to a heterosexual love object. 
He would then be inclined towards narcissism which Freud associates with 
homosexuality: 'We have discovered, especially clearly in people whose libidinal 
development has suffered some disturbance such as perverts and homosexuals, 
that in their later choice of love-object they have taken as a model not their 
33 Sigmund Freud, 'On Narcissism' The Penguin Freud Library, vol. 2, ed. James Strachey, 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin 1991), p. 65. 
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mother but their own selves' . 
3' However, the staunchly homophobic Rousseau 
takes a very different view. He believes that too much contact with women 
results in male children becoming effeminate as they take on female manners and 
behaviour. Gender here is performative in nature and constructed through 
imitation. Now I do not intend to take sides between Freud and Rousseau as 
regards the construction of homosexual identity as I consider both positions to be 
flawed. Rather, I want to stress the way that gender and sexuality is being 
deployed by both as an ideological tool to address self-reflexivity, and the way 
that self-reflexivity is ferninised and positioned as antithetical to masculinity. 
Freud and Rousseau both associate women with narcissism. Freud 
associates the strongest manifestation of female narcissism with the onset of 
puberty. He suggests that it is most likely to occur in beautiful women: 'Women, 
especially if they grow up with good looks, develop a certain self-contentment 
which compensates them for the social restriction that are imposed upon them in 
their choice of object [namely the restriction against choosing a love object of the 
same sex]. Strictly speaking, it is only themselves that such women love with an 
intensity comparable to that of the man's love for them' 35 . In Rousseau what we 
might identify as narcissism occurs in girls long before puberty. Rousseau's 
description of the little girls love of 'mirrors jewellery, finery, and especially 
dolls' can all be linked to the emergence of a self-conscious form of subjectivity 
where the'internalised self is a projection of an imaginary outside - the self as 
object. This can be most forcibly illustrated by the example Rousseau gives of 
the love of a girl for her doll, which he makes clear is a form of self-love. This 
34 Freud, 'On Narcissism', p. 8 1. 
35 Freud, 'On Narcissism', p. 82. 
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self-love begins a developmental process of internalisation where the girl 
eventually becomes her doll: 
She is dressing her dofl, not herself, ' you will say. Just so; she sees her doll, she 
cannot see herself, she cannot do anything for herself, she has neither the training. 
nor the talent, nor the strength; as yet she herself is nothing, she is engrossed in ýer 
doll and all her coquetry is devoted to it. This will not always be so; in due time 
she will be her own doll, (tmile, V, p. 396) 
What we see here is the emergence of a distinctly modem subjectivity, 
but what is important is that it takes the form of a woman and is intimately 
related to the emergence of capitalism, commodity culture and urban space. In 
contrast, Emile's subjectivity is rooted in an earlier historical epoch, where the 
self inhabited the wider landscape of the natural world. Rousseau is clearly 
disturbed by the emergence of this 'modem woman', though he is also impressed 
by her power. What he proposes then is that this power be harnessed so that it 
might serve the purpose of men. In order to do this he must contain it by 
confining it to the domestic sphere. 
Female Domesticity, the Ideological Significance of the Home, and the 
Importance of Private Property 
Society is so general and so mixed there is no place left for retirement, and even in 
the home we live in public. We live in company till we have no family, and we 
scarcely know our own relations: we see them as strangers; and the simplicity of 
home life disappears together with the sweet familiarity which was its charm, In 
this way do we draw with our mother's milk a taste for the pleasures of the age and 
the maxims by which it is controlled. (tmile, V, p. 42 1) 
Rousseau points the accusing finger at women for a whole range of 
societal ills: population decline; the crisis of the 
family as a result of female 
inconstancy and lack of maternal care; the sexual corruption of men, particularly 
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young men 'dragged' into sexual vice by urban women and of course the 
emasculation of men by women in the big cities. However. it is also women who 
hold out the potential of redeeming society from the horrors of the age. If only 
women would change their ways, Rousseau laments, then civilisation might be 
saved: 'Would you restore all men to their primal duties, begin with the mothers; 
the results will surprise you. Every evil follows in the train of this first sin; the 
whole moral order is disturbed, nature is quenched in every breast, the home 
becomes gloomy, the spectacle of a young family no longer stirs the husband's 
love and the stranger's reverence. ' (Emile, 1, p. 15) But what if women will not 
change their ways? Then Rousseau proposes a system of education that will 
assure their compliance with the general 'good'. 
In Rousseau's programme, women are not just to be taught to be obedient 
to men, but to have such a knowledge of the men in their particular family that 
they can anticipate their wants and needs and so embody their desires. They are 
to be educated to have a sense of self that is entirely relative to male subjectivity: 
'A woman's education must ... 
be planned in relation to man. To be pleasing in 
his sight, to win his respect and love, to train him in childhood, to tend him in 
manhood, to counsel and console, to make his life pleasant and happy, these are 
the duties of woman for all time, and this is what she should be taught when 
young (Emile, V, P-393). Rousseau insists that if women are to be the life-time 
companion of men, accompanying men from cradle to grave as loyal daughters, 
wives and mothers, then they must be obedient to men whether they be their 
intellectual inferiors or superiors, kind or cruel, just or unjust: *, [F]onned to obey 
a creature so imperfect as man, a creature often vicious and always faulty, she 
should learn to submit to injustice and to suffer the 
XNTongs inflicted on her bN 
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her husband without complairtV (ýmile. V, p-399). Rousseau's education of 
women would bring them up to be at best men's servants and at worst their 
slaves. 
Rousseau's educational programme attempts to domesticate women and 
transform them into good housekeepers. Sophy, whom tmile will marry, 
represents the ideal of the good housekeeper. She has been trained in domestic 
economy from an early age by her mother, and has by her adolescence virtually 
taken over the everyday running of the household in the hope that 'by managing 
her father's house' she will be better prepared 'to manage her own" (tmile, V. 
p. 428). Sophy has been trained in needlework, keeping household accounts, 
purchasing and preparing food and the importance of personal and domestic 
cleanliness. Rousseau puts much stress on Sophy's obsessional cleanliness, 
describing it as a positive 'defect': '[S]he required such absolute cleanliness in 
her person, clothing, room, work, and toilet, that use has become habit, till it 
-1-sorbs one half of her time and controls the other; so that she thinks less of how au 
to do a thing than of how to do it without getting dirty' (Emile, V, p. 428). Sophy 
appears to be suffering from what we might now regard as an obsessive 
compulsive disorder, but it is a neurosis that arises from her upbringing and most 
importantly it addresses one of Rousseau own phobias - dirty women: 'Nothing 
could be more revolting than a dirty woman, and a husband who tires of her is 
not to blame' (Emile, V, p. 428). It would appear that Rousseau would have 
young girls internalise the practices of domestic economy to the extent that they 
manifest as symptoms of a psychic disorder. 
We have stressed the importance of Rousseau's environmental 
I 
determinism to Emile's education, and Rousseau's stroncy behaviourist instincts. L- 
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The same logic can be seen to apply to the educationof girls, but with the hope 
of achieving a very different outcome. Thus rather than being released into the 
open country young girls find themselves in a domestic environment, and set 
about adapting to it. As in the case of young males, the distinction between self 
and environment appears to blur, but this time the girl is confined to a much 
more restricted space. In time she intemalises this space; she is domesticated. 
Rousseau constantly stresses the importance of habitual restraint and the need to 
constantly police female children in order to make sure they act in accordance 
with propriety. She is made constantly aware of the effect she will have on 
others by being made to consider whether her behaviour is pleasing or not. Thus 
Rousseau would have her acutely socially aware, self-conscious to the point of 
obsession. 
Rousseau admires women's social agility in so far as it serves his 
purpose. Paradoxically, women in Rousseau's view, though submissive to men, 
are ideally suited to managing them through subtle manipulation. Women's 
power is something to be harnessed, contained and properly channelled. She 
may be subordinate to her male master, but she is indispensable to him as an 
adviser and confident: 
Woman's reign is a reign of gentleness, tact, and kindness; her commands are 
caresses, her threats are tears. She should reign in the home as a minister reigns in 
the state, by contriving to be ordered to do what she wants. In this sense, I grant 
you, that the best managed homes are those where the wife has most power. But 
when she despises the voice of her head, when she desires to usurp his rights and 
take the command upon herself, this inversion of the proper order of things leads to 
misery, scandal, and dishonour. (tmile, V, p. 444). 
Women can be seen as men's other half not just in terms of their marital 
status but also in psychic terms. They are the grasping, emotional, sensual, 
desiring self that Rousseau would have his model man disavow. BLit they are 
69 
also intelligent, socially astute and culturally engaged individuals. This is in 
marked contrast to Emile whose earlier education involves his profound social 
and cultural isolation. Women then offer a centre around which the alienated 
male subject can orbit. But if women move outside the home (for example into 
the space of the city) and start to become commanders of men rather than just 
their companions and advisers, then the order of things is unbalanced. 
As commentators such as Mary Wollstonecraft have pointed out 
Rousseau's insistence that little girls experience restraint and submission in 
childhood is in direct contradiction to his educational precepts as applied to 
Emile, where freedom from restraint is a key aspect of his pedagogical approach. 
The unfaimess of this is further highlighted by the fact that Rousseau 
acknowledges that up to puberty there is little to distinguish boys and girls 
r (Emile, V, p. 206). However, what is even more difficult to account for is that 
when Rousseau does talk of the subtle differences between little boys and girls, it 
is often little girls who come out on top. For example new-born girls are 
described as having an awareness and alertness that new-bom boys lack: 'I 
would have you examine girls, little girls, newly-bom so to speak; compare them 
with boys of the same age, and I am greatly mistaken if you do not find the little 
boys heavy, silly, and foolish, in comparison' (Emile, V, p. 400). In many ways 
little girls are more like real children than boys: 'they carry everything to 
extremes, and they devote themselves to their games with an enthusiasm even 
greater than boys' (Emile. V, p. 399). Certainly Rousseau's programme for 
female education would stifle the development of young girls and prevent them 
forin reaching their full potential, but one of the reasons for this may xxel I be I 
Rousseau's fear not that girls if allowed to develop would gro\, \- to be 
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men! 's equal, but rather that in certain respects they might grow to be their 
superiors. 
Girls also out strip boys in their language development: -Women have 
ready tongues; they talk earlier, more easily, and more pleasantly than men' 
(Emile, V, p. 405). Rousseau goes on to deride the content of women's 
conversation as often little more than inane prattle, but he does recognise its 
social function. Thus he would have little girls brought up to be constantly 
conscious of the impact their conversation is having on others. This contrasts 
with boys whose conversation is limited by the extent of their knowledge, and 
whose utterances should be restricted to what is strictly useful: 'You should not 
check a girl's prattle like a boy's by the harsh question, 'What is the use of thatT 
but by another question at least as difficult to answer, 'What effect will that 
have? " (Emile, V, p. 406). Little girls are made acutely aware that language 
takes place within a discursive space, and that their position within this space is 
determined only in relation to the effect that their speech has on others. Thus 
rather than following her own line of conversation she amplifies the conversation 
of others. Her role as speaker and listener collapse into one another, she is the 
space in which she speaks; the gap between other people's conversations. The 
tragedy of all this, of course, is that language as a means of self-expression is 
denied her. Her language skills, something she has a particular aptitude for, are 
put at the service of others; she hosts other people's conversations. 
Among women's 'positive' attributes Rousseau includes their natural wit, 
cunning and ingenuity. Women use these attributes to manipulate men and get 
what they want. Of course, in the context of the eighteenth century these 
stereotypes were not unique to Rousseau. But what is of note is how they are 
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applied to female children. The child we are presented with is far more 
recognisable as being a child than her male counterpart. For example. Rousseau 
tells the story of a little girl who, forbidden to ask for food to be passed to her 
whilst at table, contrives to taste a dish that is out of her reach. Addressing her 
dining companions she lists all the dishes she has tasted, theatrically omitting the 
one beyond her reach. When she is asked whether she has had any of the dish 
she failed to mention she replies 'softly' and 'with downcast eyes', 'Oh no', and 
is allowed to have a taste of it (Emile, V, p. 400). This anecdote may strike a cord 
with parents today, as it reveals how children manipulate adults in order to get 
what they want. However, the important point is that such behaviour would be 
unacceptable if displayed by Emile. tmile's thoughts, feelings and motivations 
must be transparent so that his tutor can read him like an open book. In contrast 
little girls do not reveal everything to their adult carers: 'for they are flatterers 
and deceitful and soon learn to conceal their thoughts' (Emile, V, p. 398). 
Rousseau's derogatory description of females as capable of dissembling 
conforms to Christian and literary representations of women as manipulative 
temptresses. But beyond his misogyny the idea that women, even as children, 
have an interior existence that does not necessarily confonn to their outward 
appearance, or public displays of self, means that the model of female selfhood 
that Rousseau presents us with conforms far more to modem concepts of 
subjectivity than does the rather two-dimensional Emile. Moreover, Rousseau is 
not against girls using their 'inner' resources, very occasionally, in order to get 
their own way: 'I should not be sorry to see her allowed occasionally to exercise 
a little ingenuity, not to escape punishment for her disobedience. but to evade the 
necessity for obedience' (Emile, V. p. 400). Thus so long as they play bY the 
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rules, then, girls can achieve a very limited form of inner freedom that is denied 
to boys. It is worthy of note that these feminine skills whereby you achieve set 
outcomes by planning ahead, and manipulate others so that they comply with 
your wishes, are indispensable skills for a Rousseauian tutor. One suspects that 
Rousseau had more in common with his archetypal little girl than he was 
prepared to admit to himself Indeed Rousseau's little girl with her inner life and 
secret thoughts and feelings may remind us, as readers, of ourselves as children. 
This incredibly self-conscious being, creative and socially astute, has her 
potential stifled, her powers redirected so that she might better serve her future 
husband. She is clearly capable of developing an inner life, that would allow her 
self-knowledge, but her fate is to be the mirror of the men in her life: 
[T]herefore she must have a thorough knowledge of man's mind; not an abstract 
knowledge of the mind of man in general, but the mind of those men who are about 
her, the mind of those men who have authority over her, either by law or custom. 
She must learn to divine their feelings from speech and action, look and gesture. 
By her own speech and action, look and gesture, she must be able to inspire them 
with the feelings she desires without seeming to have any such purpose. (tmile, V, 
p. 419) 
Men's movements, thoughts, feelings, the social significance of which 
they are only semi-conscious of, are brought to light through the presence of the 
female other. She creates a specular space that recognises him and gestures 
back. In this ontological theatre the woman must be both actress and director. 
The secret of her craft is to keep her audience, who also happens to be her 
leading man, absorbed in the theatrical spectacle she has created. In order to 
achieve this it is imperative that 'he' does not experiencing it as spectacle. 
Women are confined in order that the male can define himself Safe 
within the home, they act as a vital co-ordinate allmving for self-orientation, 
without which the male subject would be hopelessly lost. Women and the 
domestic sphere offer men a haven, a place to escape from the uncertainty and 
constant change that characterise modem life. Some historians, most notably 
Joan Landes, have described how Rousseau emphasises a gender split between 
the private and public spheres, with Rousseau banishing women to the home and 
thus leaving the public space of the city free for the debate and commerce of 
men 36 . However, this analysis fails to highlight Rousseau's profound 
ambivalence towards the modem metropolis in general, not just in relation to 
upper class women. In Emile Rousseau has his pupil visit the city, but only in 
order that he might realise what a depraved and corrupt place it is. Of course this 
is paradoxical, as Rousseau claims that he is educating the model citizen, and he 
defines a citizen as the inhabitant of a city, but Rousseau's ideal city is a 
mythical city; its a dream inspired by the classical cities of Greece and Rome. In 
terms of the Enlightemnent project, it is a city that has not yet been built. His 
horror at the modem age results in his advocating a return to the land. Women 
may lead the retreat from urban to rural, but it is in order that men may follow. 
Rousseau advocates a return to patriarchal rural life 'the earliest life of 
man, the most peaceful, the most natural, and the most attractive to the 
uncorrupted heart' (Emile, V, p. 525). He sees cities such as Paris as sapping the 
life out of the countryside, both economically and culturally: 'It is the great 
towns which exhaust the state and are the cause of its weakness; the wealth 
which they produce is a sham wealth ... I 
believe that Paris is fed by the 
provinces in more senses than one, and that the greater part of their revenues is 
poured into that town and stays there ... 
France would be much more powerful if 
Paris were destroyed' (Emile, V. p. 519). Rousseau"s call for the destruction of 
36 See Joan B. Landes, Women and the Public Sphere in theAge of the French Revolution (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press), particularly Chapter Three. 
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Pariscould not be starker. However, faced with the reality of Paris' growing 
economic significance as it sucks in 'capital' from the provinces, overseas trade 
and the colonies,, he advocated instead an entrenchment in localised social and 
economic practices that take Place within the context of rural tradition. 
Rousseau can be seen to have an ideological affinity Nvith a particular 
section of the bourgeoisie who felt ambivalent towards the pace of change 
resulting from capitalism's economic expansion. This is contradictory, as the 
bourgeoisie appear to be throwing their hands up in horror at the economic 
system their class had helped to create. However, this contradiction is the 
product of the distinction between bourgeois ideology and the concrete outcomes 
of bourgeois economic practices. Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. 
Genovese discuss the disparity between bourgeois ideology and economic 
practice in Fruits ofMerchant Capital. They describe how the free market, 
founded on 'possessive individualism' and the 'freedom of labour' produced 
uncertainty and volatility as part of its self-perpetuating dynamic. In order to 
weather this storm the bourgeoisie made a psychological as well as financial 
investment in private property. Property offered a tangible demonstration of their 
wealth but also provided a material basis for the ideology of possessive 
individualism. In this schema the household became a place of order and 
productivity dominated by the middle class obsession with household 
management, which extended to the proper management of servants and 
children: 
The individualist aspirations of those (frequently Protestants) who absorbed the 
new values of work, time discipline, and thrift, as well as new norms of family life, 
sexual division of labour, and child rearing, grounded the economic abstraction in 
the lives of ordinary people and helped create a model of self-conscious well being 
that at once wedded many to a system that took more from them than it offered in 
7 
return and provided the yardstick by which all subsequent socialist critiques -, vould 
measure the failures of capitalism's promise. '- 
This ideology, though distinctly bourgeois, offered a critique of the very 
system that produced it, revealing capitalism's 'broken promise'. while reflecting 
its aspirations and working pr4ctices. The 'mini-economy' of the home reflected 
the work ethic employed in the wider economy, but it also provided a far more 
atomised and insular form of time management that worked at a different pace 
from capitalism. The home as a spatially and temporally distinct zone grounded 
the ideology of possessive individualism. The home became a personal, 
privatised place with a cultural significance of its own. However, though the 
home allows the male a sense of self-possession, it could not exist as an 
ideological fonn without the very concept of property rights its existence 
supports. 
In Book Two Rousseau sets up a scheme to teach tmile the value of 
property. This is in contradiction to his own teaching methods as Rousseau has 
made clear his belief that up to the age of reason a child should not be taught 
albstract concepts or moral codes. However, he makes an exception to this rule 
regarding the concept of property, and devises a scheme to illustrate the 
importance of property rights to Emile. Rousseau has his Pupil plant beans on a 
plot of land. The child takes delight as the beans start to sprout. His tutor 
explains to him that the beans 'belong' to him because he has given 'his time, his 
labour, and his trouble, his very self to the labour of producing them (tmlle, 11, 
p. 72). However, one day on returning to his plot Emile is heartbroken to find his 
beans have been uprooted. He discovers that Robert the gardener has done this 
Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese. Fruits of Merchant Capital: Slaverl, and 
Bourgeois Property in the Rises and Expansion of Capitalism, (Oxford: Oxford Unlversit\ Press 
1983), p. 192. 
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because the beans had been planted on land where he had already planted 
melons. Rousseau has planned all this in order to teach tmle how the notion of 
property 'goes back naturally to the rights of the first occupier to the results of 
his work' (Emile, 11, p. 75). This right goes back beyond the life span of the 
present occupier, as Robert comments: 'I dig what my father tilled; every one 
does the same, and all the land you see has been occupied time out of mind' 
Y (Emile, V, p. 75). To an extent then, Rousseau is naturalising feudalism, but for 
his proviso that property is connected to labour - this of course favours the 
property-owning aspirations of middle class farmers with the landless labourer 
being left entirely out of the picture. Indeed the logic of Rousseau's argument 
demands that the owner has a perfect right to destroy or appropriate the labour of 
others working on his land. 
f 
Once Emile has reached the 'age of reason', the time that Rousseau 
designates for the emergence of foresight, the foundations have already been laid 
that will allow him to navigate his way through the world of business: 'The 
solidarity of the arts consists in the exchange of industry, that of commerce in the 
exchange of commodities, that of banks in the exchange of money or securities. 
All these ideas hang together, and their foundation has already been laid in early 
childhood with the help of Robert the gardener. ' (tmile, 111, p. 182). However, 
in teaching tmile about 'property rights' so early in his childhood Rousseau 
contradicts himself by introducing a temporality that is radically at odds with the 
lived-time of childhood. Property now functions as a knowable unit of space and 
time forming an ideological totality by which the subject can achieve spatial and 
temporal orientation - foresight. Max Horkheimer remarks on the importance of 
middle class property to the rise and fall of the bourgeois individual: 
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His rise and fall is deeply interconnected with the fate of middle class propert\ 
The so-called transcendental factors which constitute the ego: memorý and 
foresight, conceptual thinking, the integration of all experience into one identical 
conscience knowing itself as the same in past and future, all these elements were 
tremendously enhanced by the economic situation of the independent producer and 
businessman. The enterprise, handed down in the family, forced him to think in 
terms which transcended by far his immediate needs, even his own life span. He 
thought of himself as an autonomous subject on whom depended not only his own 
well-being but the prosperity of his family as well as that of his community and 
state. There was no agency which would tell him what to produce or where and 
what to buy and sell. He had to plan all by himself, to rely on his own farsighted 
calculations. 38 
At the end of Book Five Emile's education is complete. We are left with 
the prospect of him living a settled life with his wife Sophy and their children as 
a gentleman farmer with his own estate. He is the very model of the bourgeois 
individual outlined above by Horkheimer. But all this has come at a cost. His 
entrance into his fixed estate is founded on an earlier act of psychic 
displacement, which echoes the historical displacement of peasants from the 
land. To return to the episode with Robert the gardener, when tmiie first plants 
his bean seeds he delights in their growth, as if the beans represented his own 
natural growth - the experience of being alive that we associate with lived-time. 
The immanence that characterises the child's consciousness is then uprooted. 
Living organisms become property; the land beneath his feet is occupied, forcing 
his psychic dislocation from it. All this, as we have seen, is essential if 
ýmile is 
to take possession of himseýf in later life. But in doing this Emile is forced to 
renounce the 'childish' perspective that refuses to draw distinctions between self 
and environment and thus sees the natural world for what it is (immanent 
critique), in favour of the legislative frame of bourgeois property rights. 
38 Horkheimer, Max, 'Reason Against Itself. Some Remarks on Enlightenment', What is 
Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century. 4nswers and Tit -entieth- ('entur "v 
Questions, ed. James 
364-365. Schmidt (Berkley: University of California Press 1996) pp. ) 
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Chapter Three 
Wordsworth and the Self Without Origins 
The Prelude (1805) is a poem that traces the growth of a poet's mind, beginning 
with birth and ending in manhood. For Wordsworth, the poet is a man apart, a 
man of destiny, his fate being subject to the operation of spiritual forces. This 
contrasts with the concept of the human mind popular during the European 
Enlightenment. Here the mind was an organ whose operations could be 
compartmentalised to the extent that human behaviour could be predicted. 39 
Wordsworth,, in contrast, was adamant that the human mind held hidden 
mysteries beyond the reach of science or philosophy. Thus Wordsworth's 
account of the growth of the poet's mind can be contrasted with the post- 
Lockean model of the genesis of human understanding, with some interesting 
results. This chapter shall make just such a contrast, not only in order to reveal 
where there are theoretical differences but also where there are points of 
ideological convergence. 
Wordsworth makes clear that his autobiographical poem is not to be 
dissected too minutely in terms of cause and effect. He refuses to pinpoint 
identifiable examples of absolute genesis that produce fresh departures in new 
directions. Things are set in train from his earliest infancy. Change, or rather 
39 An early advocate of rational psychology, and a foundational figure in the development of 
faculty psychology, is the German Christian Wolf. Wolff believed that much of human 
behaviour could be predicted. In his books Psychologia empirica (1732) and Psychologia 
rationalis (1734) he used metaphysical first principals in order to construct a schema by which to 
acquire knowledge of psychological processes. Roger Smith describes how Wolff developed -an 
ordered deductive science comparable to rational mechanics'. As Smith points out: -Empirical 
psychology opened out through such projects into the everyday world of the judgements of 
character, decisions about a child's education and the regulation of the feelings'. Roger Smith, 
The Norton Histotý, of the Human Sciences (New York: Norton 1997), pp. _10-1-20-3. pp. 200-214. 
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ý growth', is the product of accumulative experiences that though influential, are 
not the sole source of the self that Wordsworth is presenting to us: 
But who shall parcel out 
His intellect, by geometric rules, 
Split, like a province, into round and square? 
Who knows the individual hour in which 
His habits were first sown, even as a seed 
Who that shall point, as with a wand, and say, 
This portion of the river of my mind 
Came from yon fountain? ' 
(The Prelude, 11,208-215) 
In part Wordsworth is reacting against philosophers such as Locke and 
Rousseau who conceived of the genesis of the human subject as something that 
could be mapped: 'like a province, into round and square'. Both philosophers 
conceive of human beings as beginning as blank slates whose subsequent 
emergence into self-awareness and knowledge is the result of a process that 
begins with the mental activities of sensation and reflection. Perhaps the ultimate 
form of self-awareness for Locke and Rousseau arrives when the subject is able 
to speculate upon the very mental activities from which he/she is constituted. The 
fact that both writers provided detailed accounts of the process of self-formation 
testifies to the fact that they regarded themselves as having attained just such an 
epistemological perspective. As Charles Taylor makes clear, Locke advocated a 
'disengaged stance' from which an individual could 'take charge of the 
processes by which associations form and shape our character and outlook ý40 . In 
this way the individual becomes an active agent, able to shape his intellectual 
destiny. The ability to isolate the processes by which the self is constituted also 
holds out the potential for shaping the intellectual destiny of others. In this way 
the ability to disengage oneself from the processes of 
knowledge fon-nation, 
40 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self- TheMaking of theAlodern Identity (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1989), p. 175,159-176. 
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allows for the possibility of holding authority over those who are intellectuallY 
'inferior', specifically children. It is no surprise then that both Locke and 
Rousseau produced educational treatises, Locke in Some Thoughts Concerning 
Education and Rousseau in Emile. Such treatises employ a systematic approach 
to a child's intellectual development with the aim of allowing the child to reach 
its full intellectual potential. This posits the concept of 'the ideal educational 
outcome', and by implication the suggestion that other routes to maturity are 
somehow lacking, producing children who fall short of this ideal. Such children 
may have been seduced by rival structures of knowledge, falling prey to cultural 
practices, customs and habits that lead them from the 'true' path of Knowledge. 
Wordsworth in The Prelude is reacting against this constructionist model of 
subj ect-fonnation. 41 Significantly, he challenges his opponents by stressing the 
41 Descartes' division of the human subject into mind and body influenced mechanistic models of 
the human subject. The body was conceived of as a machine, a collection of functioning parts 
held together within a material structure. The mind is able to steer and control the body's 
mechanical movements. However, the extent to which the mind is master of the body is brought 
into question, for as John Wright points out, Descartes also conceived of the mind as containing a 
passive element, that is more closely linked to the operation of the body: 'Descartes regards most 
'psychological' processes as being dependent upon physiological structures and motions in the 
brain and nervous system. Among the psychological functions which he attempts to model in a 
purely mechanical way are sensation, memory and imagination, appetite and passions, and the 
automatic behaviour which results from stimuli from these various sources. These functions can 
all arise from purely physical processes'. John P. Wright, -Hysteria and Mechanical Man', 
Journal of the History ofIdeas, vol, 42,1980, p. 239, pp. 233-247). See also Theodore M. Brown, 
'Descartes, Dualism, and Psychosomatic Medicine', The Anatomy ofMadness: Essays on the 
History of Psychiatry, vol. 1, eds. W. F. Bynum et al. (London: Tavistock Publications 1985). 
Towards the end of the eighteenth century mechanical models of the mind were placing less 
emphasis on the Cartesian division between mind and body. Particularly within medical discourse 
and in the emerging field of psychology the operation of the mind was being more closely related 
to the organic structure of the brain and the functioning of the nervous system. Wordsworth's 
attempt to 'revitalise' the process of subject formation can be related to debates going on at the 
time between those who adhered to mechanistic models of the human subject and those who 
subscribed to the concept of vitalism. Carolyn Steedman describes vitalism as 'a miscellany of 
contemporary beliefs united in opposition to mechanism, which contended that living processes 
could not be entirely explained by reference to their material composition and physico-chemical 
activity'. For vitalists life forces that could not be reduced to mechanical processes produced and 
sustained human, animal and plant life. Strange Dislocations: Childhood and the Idea of Human 
Interiority 1780-1930 (London: Virago 1995), p. 51 pp. 43-76. Much of the debate between 
mechanists and vitalists was taking place in Germany. Wordsworth may have become familiar 
with the concept of vitalism through Coleridge whose interest in German Natural Philosophy is 
well documented. The concept of vitalism would certaink have been more in tune ýk Ith 
Wordsworth's religious inclinations than mechanical models of the human subject. Also see 
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unreasonableness of their argument, in other words he challenges them on their 
own ground. What Wordsworth proposes is a dynamic relational model of the 
human soul, one in which a part cannot be separated from the living movement of 
the whole. In Wordsworth's view the simple ideas that Locke isolates, as the 
building blocks of understanding, cannot be isolated and extracted for analysis. 
Wordsworth presents us with the image of a cabinet containing the ideational 
artefacts that allow for a subject's intellectual progress. The image presented is a 
lifeless one, rather like a skeleton that has been taken apart, so that the function 
of each individual part can be explained without reference to the whole. 
Wordsworth addresses his complaint to his friend Coleridge: 
To thee, unblinded by these outward shows, 
The unity of all has been revealed 
And thou wilt doubt with me, less aptly skill'd 
Than many are to class the cabinet 
Of their sensations, and, in voluble phrase, 
Run through the history and birth of each, 
As of a single independent thing. 
Hard task to analyse a soul, in which 
Not only general habits and desires, 
But each most obvious and particular thought, 
Not in a mystical and idle sense, 
But in the words of reason deeply weigh'd, 
Hath no beginning. 
(The Prelude, 11,228-237) 
Mothering Desire 
In the 'Infant Babe' passage in Book Two Wordsworth presents us with 
his alternative to the constructionist model of the genesis of human 
understanding. He attempts to breathe life into the process by which the self 
emerges. For Wordsworth, the awakening of a child to life is intimately bound W 
Franqois Duchesneau, 'Vitalism in Late Ei ghteenth -century Physiology: The Case of Barthez, 
Blumenbach and John Hunter', William Hunter and the Eighteenth- centuiýý A fedical WOrld, eds. 
W. F. Bynum and Roy Porter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985). 
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up with its relationship to its mother. The introduction of human agency in the 
form of the mother presents us with an important distinction between 
Wordsworth and that other philosopher of childhood, Rousseau. In Emile 
Rousseau famously stressed the importance of good quality maternal care during 
early infancy. Rousseau's discussion of breastfeeding in Emile, though riven 
with contradictions (see Chapter One), recognises that a loving mother is less 
likely to harm or neglect her infant than an indifferent wet nurse. However, for 
Wordsworth, a mother's love for her child does more than just predispose the 
mother to her infant and so ensure its survival; it actually contributes to the 
child's emotional and spiritual development: 
Bless'd the Infant Babe, 
(For with my best conjecture I would trace 
The progress of our being) blest the Babe, 
Nurs'd in his Mother's arms, the Babe who sleeps 
Upon his Mother's breast, who, when his soul 
Claims manifest kindered with an earthly soul, 
Doth gather passion from his Mother's eye! 
Such feelings pass into his torpid life 
Like an awakening breeze, 
(The Prelude, It. 237-245) 
In Wordsworth's schema,, before a child becomes fully aware of itself as 
having a life distinct from its mother it becomes aware of itself as the object of 
another's attentions. Though it cannot fully comprehend the meaning behind its 
mother's gestures of affection it has a sense that they are directed and intentional. 
The mother's actions then are sign posts that point towards the child. and in time 
the child orientates itself in their direction. It is at this point that the child begins 
the process of focussing on valued objects. The objects that he values are those 
that are orientated towards him such as the breast and eye. In the case of the eve 
the child turns to meet the desiring gaze of its mother. and 
in so doing recognises 
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itself as the desired object, and so the child's earliest desire is for the one who 
loves him, but it is also for himself as the beloved object. In this way. the 
tra ectories of desire always lead back to him, and so he finds himself enveloped j 
within the loving space of the mother's bodily intimacy. This 'loving space' 
that contains both mother and child is instrumental not only for the child's 
emotional and spiritual development, but for his physical and cognitive 
development. In language reminiscent of that employed by eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment philosophes, Wordsworth describes the process by which the 
infant's 'organs and recipient faculties' become refined. The mother as human 
agent still has a crucial role as the love she lavishes on her infant helps to 
structure this process, as the 'organs and recipient faculties' are 'subjected to the 
discipline of love'. The mother's love is expressed through her physical 
interaction with the child and this interaction stimulates the child's senses. But 
there is also a moral dimension to the mother's actions. Wordsworth presents us 
with the 'benevolent mother', whose virtue 'irradiates' her actions, imbuing them 
with a meaning that though expressive of 'goodness' remains enigmatic and 
necessarily inarticulate. The mother's love then produces an aura that envelopes 
the child, protecting and nurturing him: 
Thus, day by day, 
Subjected to the discipline of love, 
His organs and recipient faculties 
Are quicken'd, are more vigorous, his mind spreads, 
Tenacious of the forms which it receives. 
In one beloved presence, nay and more, 
In that most apprehensive habitude 
And those sensations that have been derivd 
From this beloved Presence, there exists 
A virtue which irradiates and exalts 
All objects through all intercourse of sense. (The Prelude, 11.250-260) 
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Following this the relationship between mother and child does become 
more interactive and less of a one-way-street. Wordsworth describes hoýv: 'by 
intercourse of touch, /I held mute dialogue with my Mother's heart' (The 
Prelude, 11,282-283). Wordsworth's description of the 'intercourse of touch* 
that takes place between mother and child has parallels with the Lacanian *mirror 
stage' as it suggests that the infant is beginning to recognise how his behaviour is 
reflected in his mother's actions. The mirror stage involves a moment of self- 
recognition in w, ch the child perceives itself in a mirror. or sees its gesture or 
emotions reflected in another human being. This moment of self-recognition 
produces a sense of jubilation in the child, compelling him to seek further 
reflections of itself in its immediate environment. In this way the mirror stage is 
an important development in terms of the child's spatial awareness, as objects 
and people become imbued with meaning in relation to their reflective 
42 
potential. As a result of this the infant begins to develop rudimentary concepts 
such as self/other and subject/object. These distinctions force the child to 
recognise its own spatial position within its immediate environment, and so it 
becomes aware of itself not just as a subject but also as an locatable object; an 
object that can be the focus of another's attention. 
The mirror stage is an important step towards the eventual emergence of 
an autonomous individuated self In terms of the child's development there is a 
42 Lacan remarks: 'This act, far from exhausting itself ... immediately rebounds 
in the case of 
the child in a series of gestures in which he experiences in play the relation between the 
movements assumed in the image and the reflected environment, and between this virtual 
complex and the reality it rýeduplicates - the child's own body, and the persons and thinos, around 
him'. Jacques Lacan, 'The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in 
psychoanalytical experience', 1ýcrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge 
1995) p. 1, pp. 1-7. For accounts of the mirror stage see: Malcolm Bowie, Lacan (London: 
Fontana Press 199 1), pp. 17-43; Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction 
(London: Routledge 1990), pp. -3 )1 -3 )5,24-49. 
For a fascinating account of the mirror in historN, 
that explores philosophical and cultural questions that 
help place Lacan in historical context, see 
Sabine Me Ich ior- Bonnet, The Mirror: .4 
Historj% trans. Katherine H. Jewett (London: Routledge 
2002). 
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blurring of the point at which the child is totally dependent on its mother - when 
it cannot support its own body weight or move of its own volition - and the point 
at which basic physical independence is achieved; when it can stand on its own 
two feet, free of the bodily scaffolding that its mother provided. 43 In this sense 
independence is not so much achieved as discovered: 'I am standing without 
assistance' or 'I am moving away from my mother' or the more traumatic 'I am 
standing alone and my mother is no longer with me'. 44 During the mirror stage 
the child becomes aware of itself as separate from its mother, but it is only able 
to do this through a process of recognising itself in its mother. In this sense the 
distinction between subject and object, self and other, is somewhat contradictory. 
Moments of maternal absence force the child to recognise that it has always been 
(alone'. in the sense of being other to its mother. Thus one of the outcomes of the 
mirror stage is the experience of alienation. Wordsworth's awareness of his 
mother's withdrawal further links his infantile experiences to Lacan's mirror 
stage: 
From unknown causes. I was left alone, 
Seeking the visible world, nor knowing why. 
The props of my affections were remov'd, 
And yet the building stood, as if sustain'd 
4' The idea of 'mirroring' doesn't quite address the physicality of Wordsworth's infant's 
interaction with its mother. Certainly the infant's actions are reflected in the mother's responses 
to it, but these responses involve a physical intimacy, a sense of being with mother, that cannot be 
reduced to the experience of having one's actions mirrored by an external object that posits the 
subject as a separate being. 
44 In 'Tuch6 and Automaton' Lacan explores some of the ontological questions raised by a child's 
increasing awareness of maternal absence. Lacan uses as his model Freud's observation of his 
grandson playing fort-da with a cotton reel. For Lacan the child is attempting to come to terms 
with his own subjectivity by playing with objects: *This reel is not the mother reduced to a little 
ball by some magical game worthy of Jivaros - it is a small part of the subject that detaches itself 
from him while still remaining his, still retained. This is the place to say in imitation of Aristotle. 
that man thinks with his object ... If 
it is true that the signifier is the first mark of the subýject, 
how can we fail to recognise here - from the very fact that this -ame is accompanied by one of 
the first oppositions to appear - that it is in the object to which the opposition is applied in act, 
the reel, that we must designate the subject' . Jacques 
Lacan 'Tuch6 and Automaton The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis. trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Vintage 1998), p. 62. 
pp. 53-64. 
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By its own spirit! 
(The Prelude, 11,291-296) 
Wordsworth use of the term 'props of affection' has led Cathy Caruth to 
link Wordsworth's description of the emergence of desire with that of Freud's 
and Laplanche's descriptions of the emergence of sexual drives. Caruth begins 
by citing the work of a translator of Freud's Three Essays on Sexuality, Jeffrey 
Mehlman: 'Mehlman offers a new translation for the word Anlehnung, which 
designates the relation of sexual drive to the instinct of hunger. In place of 
, 45 Strachey's "anaclisis", Mehlman suggests the word "propping". - Laplanche, in 
his development of Freud's ideas, describes how the child's first encounter with 
the breast is the result of vital somatic functions, in this case the need for food. 
The emergence of a drive that derives pleasure from the breast distinct from its 
function as a provider of milk 'props' or 'leans' upon its original function, until 
the breast through displacement becomes a sexual object in its own right. 
Certainly in Wordsworth's description the mother's body does appear to function 
as a ýprop' whose constructive significance is only fully realised with her 
withdrawal. However, by drawing parallels between Freud, Laplanche, and 
Wordsworth, Caruth is, I think, going against the spirit of Wordsworth, but this is 
no bad thing. The parallels between Freud and Wordsworth highlighted by 
Caruth can be used as a theoretical bridge that reveals a more surprising parallel 
between Wordsworth and Rousseau. For example, Rousseau in Emile stresses 
the role of the instinct of self-preservation as a guiding force through life that 
ensures our survival. In a crucial passage he describes the importance of self- 
preservation to the development of affection, describing how a child's original 
45 Cathy Caruth, 'Past Recognition: Narrative Origins in Wordsworth and Freud, AfL. N., Vol. 
100,1985, p. 9335. 
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hunger for food transforms over time into feelings for the person who is 
providing the food: 
Self-preservation requires, therefore, that we shaý I love ourselves; we must love 
ourselves above everything, and it follows directly from this that we love what 
contributes to our preservation. Every child becomes fond of its nurse; Romulus 
must have loved the she-wolf who suckled him. At first this attachment is quite 
unconscious; the individual is attracted to that which contributes to his welfare and 
repelled by that which is harinfal; this is merely blind instinct. What transforms 
this instinct into feeling, the liking into love, the aversion into hatred, is the evident 
intention of helping or hurting us. We do not come passionately attached to objects 
without feeling, which only follow the direction given them-, but those from which 
we expect benefit or injury from their internal disposition, from their will, those we 
see acting freely for or against us, inspire us with like feelings to those they exhibit 
towards us. Something does us good, we seek after it; but we love the person NNho 
does us good; something harms us and we shrink from it, but we hate the person 
who tries to hurt us. (tmile, IV, p. 208-209) 
Wordsworth's 'Infant Babe' passage is in part a reaction against 
mechanistic concepts of the genesis of human understanding and desire. 
Wordsworth refuses to unlock the mystery of the human subject's beginnings, 
exclaiming: 'Who knows the individual hour in which / His habits were first 
sown, even as a seed'. Rousseau in attempting to map the genesis of our earliest 
feelings and affections is an example of exactly what Wordsworth is reacting 
against. And yet through a historical irony Caruth is inadvertently associating 
Wordsworth with the type of methodology, Freudian drive theory, whose 
previous historical incarnation in Rousseau, Wordsworth explicitly rejected. 
Wordsworth would have been horrified by Rousseau's functionalist assessment 
of infantile affection as resulting from the instinct of self-preservation. He would 
have been equally appalled by Rousseau's suggestion that the mother's role was 
incidental to the extent that a mother- substitute in the form of a she-wolf might 
be a suitable replacement, and engender the same feelings of love in those she 
cares for. The 'good mother' in Rousseau's view is simply someone who does 
good; Rousseau does not feel the need to present us with any 
higher spiritual 
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motivation for her actions: 'Something does us good. we seek after it: but we 
love the person who does us good. In contrast, Wordsworth imbues the mother 
with a pseudo-religious quality. She is more than just the child's carer: she is his 
spiritua, and moral guardian. 
And yet is the love of a child for its mother as outlined by Wordsworth 
anymore than, to use Rousseau's phrase, love for 'the person who does us good'? 
The mother in The Prelude never appears as a subject in her own right. We learn 
little or nothing about her life, of what kind of a person she was or even what 
kind of a mother she was. Certainly we know she was loving and good, but what 
does this really tell us? The lack of biographical detail is of course partly 
explained by the early death of Wordsworth's mother before he was eight years 
old, and Wordsworth's reification of his mother, and her subsequent 
4 withdrawal' is at least in part Wordsworth responding to her early loss. And yet 
this is an insufficient explanation for her almost complete absence, as the 
withdrawal of the mother in the 'Infant Babe' passage occurs at a time in early 
infancy years before her death. The almost complete absence of the mother in 
The Prelude following the 'Infant Babe' passage suggests that though she does 
not suffer a literal death until Wordsworth is almost eight she does suffer a 
metaphorical one. This is a point made by Andrzej Warminski, who describes the 
maternal body in the Infant Babe passage as somehow 'already dead', as 
Wordsworth's narrative refuses to allow the mother a life of her own: 
[I]t is the story of the disposal of the already dead mother's body: the "props" of 
the child's affections are removed, and yet the building stands (that is, the building 
of the I's passionate relation to the mother which he can transfer by analogy, as it 
were, to Mother Nature). But the prop as prop (that is, the mother) were always 
already removed, their removal was the condition for the construction of the 
building. This means that if Wordsworth's mother dies in this passage, it is not 
because it really happened (Wordsworth's mother died ere he was eight years old) 
I ic necessitv. one o but because, textually speaking, she had to: It is a linguist* fthose 
"necessary accidents" of language (utterlý, random and utterlý determined 
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simultaneously - overdetermined). Or to put it even more directly. Wordsworth's 
mother died so that the Wordsworth Baby could become an T and the Boy 46 Wordsworth could become a poet. 
The withdrawal of the mother takes place after her function as the spiritual and 
physical 'prop' to the infant Wordsworth has been fulfilled, releasing 
Wordsworth into a world beyond the restrictive dyad of mother and child. He is 
liberated, compelled by a spirit that though 'gathered' from the mother, is now 
autonomous and dwells within. The 'death' of the mother releases Wordsworth. 
allowing his development to continue and his story to be told. 47 
The model of growth outlined by Wordsworth, whereby the child continues 
to develop independently following the mother's withdrawal -'as if sustain'd / 
By its own spirit' - can be related to a general shift in the understanding of the 
processes of growth in humans towards the end of the eighteenth century. 
Andrea Henderson traces a shift in the discipline of embryology away from 
4 preformationist' concepts of development towards an 'epigenetic' theory of 
growth. The Preformationists 'understood growth as an increase in size of an 
already complex creature - one whose limbs, organs, and so forth were 
understood to be initially invisible only because of the limitations of the human 
eye'. In contrast the Epigenesists believed 'that the embryo develops and 
becomes more complex in its organisation, that it changes morphologically rather 
46 Andrzej Warminsky, 'Facing Language: Wordsworth's First Poetic Spirits', Romantic 
Revolutions: Criticism and Theory, eds. Keneth R. Johnston et al, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press 1990), p. 36 
47 Mary Jacobus makes a similar point, but with reference to Rousseau's Emile. In Emile the 
mother is given a well-defined and mainly functional role. Once this role has been fulfilled 
responsibility for the child's education passes to the father. Jacobus comments: 'Wordsworth's 
mother really did die early. But Rousseau's 
tmile suggests that if she were not already dead, she 
would need to be killed off, that autobiography comes into being on the basis of a missing 
mother. ' 'Behold the Parent Hen: Romantic Pedagogy and 
Sexual Difference' in Romanticism, 
Writing and Sexual Difference: Essaý, s on The Prelude (Clarendon Press: Oxford 1989). p. 242. 
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than just in size'. 48 Henderson relates epigenetic models of growth to the 
emergence of Romantic concepts of the self as independent and self-orientated: 
'[A]round the turn of the century epigenesis was to triumph definitively over its 
rivals. It offered, after all, the perfect high Romantic model of human 
development: a child is less indebted to its parents and its genealogy than to itself 
for its growth, and to whatever extent the child is not credited with that growth. it 
is understood as the work of a (non-mechanical) nature' . 
49 Henderson's 
description of the part played by nature in epigenetic models of growth has a 
distinctly Wordsworthian air to it. Of course Wordsworth in the 'Infant Babe' 
passage does not describe the growth of a foetus but the development of a child 
after its birth. Nevertheless, as Henderson points out, parallels can be drawn 
between Romantic and Capitalistic models of the self that favour the production 
of autonomous and self-sustaining individuals. Of particular relevance is the 
sidelining of the mother as a contributor to the development of her child: In the 
late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries a child must, of necessity, resist a 
strong connection to its mother in order to establish itself as self-made subject I. 50 
Wordsworth does not exclude the mother from the developmental process. 
However, the early withdrawal of the mother does seem to suggest that he 
believed that if little boys are to grow up truly independent they should not be 
too reliant on their mothers. In this sense the withdrawal of the mother is a 
traumatic but necessary rite of passage. In The Prelude as a whole emphasis is 
placed on the child as the agent of its own 'growth'. 
51 
48Andrea K. Henderson, Romantic Identities: Farieties of Subjectivity] 1- -4-1830 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 1996), p. 31, pp. 11 -37. 
49 Ibid, p. 32 
50 ibid, p. 33 
51 See L. J. Jordanova, ' Gender, Generation and Science: William Hunter's Obstetrical Aflas', 
William Hunter and the Eighteenth-century Medical I Vorld. eds. W. F. BN num and Roy Porter 
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But what, might we ask, would happen if the mother failed to withdraw at 
the 'appropriate' time? Two poems from the Lyrical Ballads. *The Thom' and 
'The Mad Mother', illustrate Wordsworth's anxiety about how a mother's 
persistent presence and/or uncontrolled desire can result in the stifling of the 
emergence from infancy of an autonomous self 
Desiring Mothers 
In his note to 'The Thom' included in the second edition of the Lyrical 
Ballads (1800) Wordsworth makes clear that the reader's attention should be 
focused on the eccentricity of the narrator and not just on the story he narrates. 
Wordsworth describes the narrator as a retired man with time on his hands who 
having moved to an area where he is not a native has become prone to 
superstition and 'credulous and talkative from indolence'. 52 All this of course 
puts into question the reliability of his point of view and deters the reader from 
making too close an identification with him. Nevertheless, despite the distance 
Wordsworth places between himself and the narrator I persist in reading 'The 
Thom' as a poem that reveals much about male anxiety concerning female 
irrationality and the power bestowed on women during pregnancy and 
motherhood. I think that on an unconscious level Wordsworth shared these 
anxieties, but was able, through an act of dramatic displacement, to enact a 
disavowal of them. The narrator of 'The Thom' is undeniably ridiculous, but it is 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985). Shirley A. Roe, Matter, Life, and Generation: 
Eighteenth-century embryologv and the Haller- Ifolff Debate (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversitN 
Press 1981). 
52 William Wordsworth, 'Note to *The Thorn" (composed late September 1800) in Lyrical 
Ballads: Wordsworth and Coleridge, eds. R. L. Brett and A. R. Jones (London: Routledge 199 1) 
p. 285. 
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the imagery of 'The Thom' that arrests my imagination. The imagery of 'The 
Thom' as the product of Wordsworth's poetic imagination perhaps reveals 
something of his unconscious fears. Moreover, these fears are not just expressed 
in 'The Thom' but recur in 'The Mad Mother', a poem that like 'The Thom' 
employs a dramatic persona, suggesting again that Wordsworth felt uneasiness 
with these poems' subject matter. 
'The Thom ý53 begins and ends with the image of a thom bush that *looks 
so old / In truth you'd find it hard to say / How it could ever have been young' 
(1 -3), and yet we are told that the bush is: 'Not higher than a two years' child' 
(5). We learn in the second stanza that parasitic creeping plants are stifling the 
thorn's growth and seem intent on dragging it to the ground: 
Up from the earth these mosses creep, 
And this poor thorn they clasp it round 
So close they say that they were bent 
With plain and manifest intent 
To drag it to the ground - 
And all had joined in one endeavour 
To bury this poor thorn for ever. 
(16-22) 
Beside the thorn bush there is a 'muddy pond' the dimensions of which 
'three feet long and two feet wide', are just big enough for an infant's grave. 
Also contained within the scene is a 'beauteous heap, a hill of moss". The 
narrator of the poem is more explicit about its dimensions, the hill: 'Is like an 
infant's grave in size, / As like as like can be' (52-53). The narrator then informs 
us of a woman who goes to this spot at all times of the day and night crying to 
herself- 'Oh misery! Oh misery! / Oh woe is me! Oh rnisery! '. The meaning of 
this eerie spectacle is not known conclusively even by the narrator of the poem. 
53 'The Thom' ftom Lyrical Ballads (1798) eds. R. L. Brett and A. R. Jones, pp. 70-78. 
Indeed the narrator even attempts to enlist the help of the reader/listener. 
suggesting that they go to the spot: 'Perhaps when you are at the place / You 
something of her tale may trace' (109-110). The narrator then proceeds to tel I us 
what he does know. The story involves Martha Ray, a woman jilted by her lover 
Stephen Hill, whose promise of marriage to her was preceded by his promise to 
marry another. Stephen's abandonment of Martha produces the onset of insanity: 
Poor Martha! On that woeful day 
A cruel, cruel fire, they say, 
Into her bones was sent: 
It dried her body like a cinder 
And almost turned her brain to tinder. 
(128-132) 
The depiction of Martha's body as being dried out as a result of her 
emotional trauma places Wordsworth's poem in the context of eighteenth- 
century medical discourse. In Madness and Civilisation Michel Foucault 
describes how in the eighteenth century the mental disorder of 'mania' was 
associated with a 'drying out' of the sufferer's mind and body: 'The rigidity of 
fibres in a maniac always belongs to a dry landscape; mania is regularly 
accompanied by a wasting of the humors, and by a general avidity in the entire 
organism. The essence of a maniac is desertic, sandy'. 54 Clearly Martha's 
symptoms are characteristic of those of mania. We subsequently learn that 
Martha was pregnant: 'She was with child and she was mad' (13 9). What 
happens to the child, whether it was bom dead, died of natural causes or was 
murdered, no one but Martha knows. But the strongest implication is that an act 
of infanticide has taken place. For the eighteenth-century reader this would have 
54 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation: A Histoty qf Insanity in theAge of Reason, trans. 
Richard Howard (London: Tavistock Publications 1967), p. 127. 
94 
been the most likely conclusion as the image of the thom bush would register 
symbolically in the context of folk and literary traditions which, as Mary Jacobus 
points out, commonly associated the thorn tree with 'illegitimate birth and child- 
murder'. 55 
From the outset of the poem we have a strange intermingling of cultural 
discourses. On the one hand we have the language of folk lore, the ballad 
tradition and oral culture, while on the other hand we have something 
approaching medical discourse, but this discourse is being voiced by 
superstitious villagers and the poem's narrator, whose emotional sensitivity and 
lack of objectivity makes him the very antithesis of 'the man of science'. At the 
centre of all this discursive confusion we have a woman, Martha Ray. It is her 
plight and its cause that fascinates. After all the seepage of language from our 
narrator is an attempt to make sense of 'Martha'. Alan Bewell 'reads' Martha 
and 'The Mad Mother' in the context of eighteenth-century medical discourse 
and sees both women as representative of the figure of the hysterical woman. 
Bewell compares Wordsworth's fascination with the figure of the hysterical 
woman with that of Freud's. Both writers studied hysteria in order to gain a 
better understanding of the nature and operation of the human mind, and in 
particular its relationship to language: 'Just as Freud, a century later, turned to 
'hysterical women' as a scientific point of departure for psychoanalysis, 
Wordsworth also found in these women a medium of speculative argument, a 
means for observing and forcefully delineating, as he notes in connection with 
Lyrical Ballads, the manner in which "language and the human mind act and 
55 Mary Jacobus, Tradition and Experiment in Wordsworth's Lyrical Ballads (1798) (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1979), p. 241. 
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react on each other. " ý56 But, as Bewell acknowledges. it is unlikely that 
Wordsworth would have approved of people reading *The Thom' purely as case 
history. Wordsworth appears uncomfortable with employing medical 
discourse. 57 The narrator, from evidence gathered from local villagers, gives 
voice to Martha Ray's symptoms, but as Bewell points out, the voice we hear is 
more than a little hysterical itself Moreover, reading the poem in the context of 
the discourse of hysteria risks reducing the experience of reading to a diagnostic 
process, and what Wordsworth demands from his reader is an emotional response 
to Martha's suffering. But then why did Wordsworth include traces of medical 
discourse in the poem at all? Certainly he desires his reader to feel compassion 
for Martha, but he does not want them to identify with her, or the narrator for that 
matter, too closely. The 'astute' reader must distance himself form these people, 
he must have compassion for them but identify them as psychologically *other'. 
For Martha Ray is not just a hysterical woman, she is a woman who elicits a 
hysterical response. Hysteria appears contagious, and its mode of transmission is 
language. 
Another means of contagion is the body of the hysteric. In 'The Thom' 
and 'The Mad Mother' we are presented with women who have been pregnant, 
and one who is a mother. The bodies of these women threaten to 'contaminate' 
their unborn or newly bom children. The child in the womb, or in its mother's 
56 Alan J. Bewell, 'A 'Word Scarce Said': Hysteria and Witchcraft in Wordsworth's 
'Experimental' Poetry of 1797 - 1798', ELH, vol. 53,1986, p. 360. 
57 For Bewell, to read Wordsworth in the context of the discourse of hysteria is to go against the 
grain of the text: 'The paradox of Wordsworthian observation is that his eye is attracted to 
specific kinds of marginal individuals for reasons that his poetry will not admit. In examining his 
representation of hysterical women, then, we are in the difficult position of needing to read his 
poetry against the grain, asking questions and reconstructing operant discourses that the poems 
were written to counteract or make irrelevant. Yet by recovering this language, ý% e will be able to 
recognise the revaluation of, and strategical distancing from these women and the medical 
discourse that first represented them% Alan J. Bewell, 'A 'Word Scarce Said': Hýsteria and 
Witchcraft in Wordsworth's 'Experimental' Poetry of 1797 - 1798', p. 360. 
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arms, cannot distance itself from its mother and depends on her body for its 
survival. Thus whereas the reader can identify difference in relation to the 
discourse of hysteria, the presence or more disturbingly the unaccountable 
absence of a child from these poems produces a sense of helplessness and 
anxiety in the reader. For to identify with the child's plight involves 
confronting the fear of being enveloped within the psychic space of the hysterical 
other without recourse to linguistic difference. 
Going back to the Greeks and up to the first half of the twentieth century, 
mental illness in women has tended to be related to the female body and its 
functions. In classical Greek thinking the condition of hysteria was believed to 
originate in the uterus. Theories such as the 'wandering womb' suggested that 
the uterus was capable of wandering around the body and causing disease to 
those organs it came into contact with. In the seventeenth and eighteenth century 
hysteria did not tend to be so directly connected with the womb, but was still 
associated with other female bodily functions such as menstruation. Certainly in 
the eighteenth century the relationship between mind and body was seen to be 
closer in women than in men. The source of Martha's mental breakdown comes 
from outside her body, and so perhaps in the strictest sense she cannot be 
characterised as suffering from hysteria. But the issue is complicated by Martha's 
pregnancy, which might imply the development of puerperal insanity. And yet 
this 'diagnosis' is not straight forward as the narrator's description does not in 
any clear way relate Martha's madness to the fact that she is pregnant. Indeed at 
times the baby in Martha's womb managed to cool her troubled mind: 
Old Farmer Simpson did maintain 
That in her womb the infant wrought 
About its mother's heart, and brought 
Her senses back again; 
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And when at last her time drew near, 
Her looks were calm, her senses clear. 
(149-154) 
Now it is quite possible that the narrator is implying that the moment of 
clarity that came over Martha just before she was to give birth actually gave rise 
to the idea of infanticide. Alternatively we might also see this moment of mental 
calm as a positive outcome of her confinement. After all, pregnancy during this 
period was regarded as the ultimate expression of a female's *natural' purpose. 
From this we might assume that pregnancy would bring about psychological 
balance. The narrator does appear to believe this, describing the presence of the 
foetus as having a soothing influence that momentarily succeeds in bringing 
Martha back to her senses. Thus we might conclude that it is during the post- 
natal period that Martha's mania returns. 
It is not only the effect of pregnancy on Martha's mental health that the 
narrator is concerned with, it is also the effect of Martha's madness on her 
developing child. The narrator expresses concern that the symbiotic relationship 
of the foetus in the womb to its mother might result in the transference of the 
mother's mental state to her child. The narrator expresses concern for the child 
in this scenario,, and for the mother, but he expresses concern for the mother at 
one step removed, adding the interjection 'as you may think': 
Sad case for such a brain to hold 
Communion with a stirring child! 
Sad case (as you may think) for one 
Who had a brain so wild! 
(144-147) 
A clear connection is being made between body and mind in the case of 
female insanity. The female body is sensitive to psychological change, to the 
extent that such changes are communicated throughout the body. To use the 
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language of the eighteenth century, the natural sympathy that exists between an 
expectant mother and her growing child might allow for the transmission of 
mental imbalance. 58 Foucault describes how eighteenth century medical 
discourse conceived of the composite organs of the female body as highly 
attuned and in sympathy with one another: 'The entire female body is riddled by 
obscure but strangely direct paths of sympathy; it is always in an immediate 
complicity with itself, to the point of forming a kind of absolutely privileged site 
for the sympathies; from one extremity of its organic space to the other, it 
encloses a perpetual possibility of hysteria' . 
59 By implication if a woman is 
pregnant then the child in her womb is contained within this hyper sensitive 
organic structure where the possibility of some kind of hysterical eruption is ever 
present. In 'The Thom' the foetus attempts to compensate for and even to 
counteract the impulses of its mother's hysterical body. But though the internal 
battle for the foetus' sanity may have been won, the real threat comes after birth, 
when the child is exposed to its mother's irrationality but is no longer able to 
soothe her troubled mind. 
58 John Mullan illustrates some of the anxieties that eighteenth-century medical men had about 
the effect of a pregnant woman's state of mind upon her developing child. He cites the example 
of Robert James who in his three volume Medical Dictionary (1743-1745) addresses the issue of 
how an expectant mother's imagination can shape the future desires of her child. Mullan 
remarks: 'Under his heading "IMAGINATIO" in his Dictionary, Robert James provides at least t) 
three dozen supposed illustrations, drawn from other medical writings, to support his contention 
that "the ... Desire of the pregnant 
Woman is capable of marking the tender Infant with the Thing 
desired. " The entry in the Dictionary, is, indeed, concerned solely with the dangers to which a 
pregnant woman, always liable to -the Power of the Imagination or Fancy, '" subjects her 
offspring. The improper or volatile "Desire" raised in the woman by reading the wrong books or 
thinking the wrong thoughts intervenes in the process of the reproduction of the social order. ' 
John Mullan, 'Hypochondria and Hysteria: Sensibility and the Physicians', The Eighteenth 
Century, vol. 25, no. 2,1984, p. 159, pp. 141-174. Mullan's point about the risk posed to the 
reproduction of the social order by the flights of fancy of pregnant women is an important one. 
For the symbiotic relationship between a pregnant woman and her unborn child is beyond the 
control of medical men. They could only speculate upon the possible ill effects of 'Improper' 
thoughts. Ultimately medics were out of the loop, unable to intervene and act upon their social 
constructionist tendencies. 
59 Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilisation, p. 153-154. 
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Elaine Showalter in The Female Malady provides us with three Romantic 
archetypes for female insanity: 'The troubling, ambiguous nature of female 
insanity was expressed and perpetuated by three major Romantic images of the 
madwoman: the suicidal Ophelia, the sentimental Crazy Jane, and the violent 
Lucia'. 60 Of these three archetypes Martha most closely resembles Crazy Jane. 
Crazy Jane is 'a poor servant girl who, abandoned by her lover or bereft of him 
through death, goes mad as a result'. 61 Ballads about Crazy Jane date back to the 
1790s with the first being written by Matthew 'Monk' Lewis in 1793. According 
to Showalter Crazy Jane does not pose a threat to the patriarchal order, because 
even though she is abandoned by her male lover she remains psychological ly 
dependent on him: 'Crazy Jane was a docile and han-nless madwoman who 
devoted herself single-mindedly to commemorating her lost lover ... The appeal 
of Crazy Jane is not hard to fathom. What activities could be more feminine and 
respectable, or pose less of a threat to domineering parents and false hearted 
men? For Romantic writers, Crazy Jane was a touching image of feminine 
vulnerability and a flattering reminder of female dependence upon male 
affection'. 62 Martha's insanity, like Jane's, is triggered off by her desertion by 
her lover. But though she sinks back into docility following the death of her 
child, and though her moumful behaviour may appear harmless, Martha, unlike 
Jane, does pose a threat to the patriarchal order. In a subversion of the 'Crazy 
Jane' narrative, Martha does not haunt the places where she and her lover 
courted, but the suspected burial site of her child. Thus a mother's reiationship 
to her child, a relationship whose emotional intensity is sustained by the fact of 
60EIaine Showalter, The Female MalaqY: f Vomen, Madness, and English Culture Is30-1980 
(London: Virago 1985), p. 10. 
61 lbid p. 11. 
62 lbid, p. 13. 
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the child's death, challenges the centrality of the male lover as the single focus of 
female desire. If the repressed violent emotions that Martha felt towards her 
unfaithful lover are redirected towards her child, then Martha"s seeming 
vulnerability disguises potentially destructive impulses. Another of Showalter's 
archetypes is 'Lucia'. Lucia is based on Lucy Ashton from Walter Scott's novel 
The Bride ofLammermoore (1819). Lucy, prevented from marrying the man she 
loves, murders the man she is being forced to marry in a fit of insanity. 
Showalter sees Lucy as representing 'female sexuality as insane violence against 
9 63 men . Perhaps what Wordsworth's Martha represents is the male anxiety that 
seemingly harmless 'Crazy Jane' figures may unexpectedly transform into their 
violent counterparts. 64 
Whether Martha's newborn child is murdered or born dead the narrator is 
unable to say, but he is almost convinced that the hill of moss is its burial site. 65 
The infant haunts this site, but so too does the mother. She is in a permanent 
state of mouming, doomed, like a ghost, to return to the site of her alleged crime. 
Once again, the mother is somehow already dead, as she is unable to move on. 
63 Ibid p. 14. 
64 James Averill notes the significance of the name Martha Ray to the Wordsworth household. 
Martha Ray was the grandmother of the child Basil Montagu who was staying with the 
Wordsworths at Alfoxden around the time of the poem's composition. The real Martha Ray was 
the victim of a crime of passion, and was shot dead by a Mr Hackman in a theatre. Averill makes 
the connection to Erasmus Darwin's description of Erotomania in his Zoonomia, a book 
Wordsworth had read. Darwin cites the case of Martha Ray as an example of the extreme 
consequences that can arise from Erotomania, consequences that can include acts of murder, 
suicide or revenge. Averill identifies Erotomania as a possible model for the mental condition 
depicted in such poems as 'The Mad Mother, 'Ruth', and 'The Thom'. James H. Averill, 
Wordsworth and the Poetry ofHuman Suffering (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1980), p. 167. 
65 It is useful to relate Martha's alleged infanticide and concealment of her child's birth to social 
and medico legal attitudes to such crimes in the eighteenth and nineteenth century. 'The Thom' 
can be seen as a threshold poem in terms of its attitude to infanticidal women. For though some 
among the locals seek retribution for Martha's crime, the overriding attitude of the poem, and 
certainly that of the narrator, is one of cautious sympathy for Martha. For a discussion of the 
emergence of a more sympathetic attitude to infanticide as reflected in legislation and the 
attitudes of j udges and j uries around the turn of the century. see Chapter Seven of Roger Sm ith's 
Trial hi, A4edicine: Insanity and Responsibility in lictorian Trials (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press 198 1) pp. 14-33- 160. Also see Elaine Showalter's discussion of puerperal insanity 
in The Female A4alady, pp. 55-59. 
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Life for her is the repetition of a state of misery that she cannot progress beyond. 
An association is made in the poem between female madness. repetition. and the 
stasis this produces. 
The child does not 'haunt' the spot in the same way as the mother does, 
though his spirit is trapped within its confines. Indeed the narrator is more afraid 
of the unexpected appearanýce of the mother than the presence of the child"s 
spirit. The child does not present himself for inspection but must be looked for, 
It is said that anyone who goes to the pond and stares intently at its surface will 
see the face of the child staring back at them: 
Some say, if to the pond you go, 
And fix on it a steady view, 
The shadow of a babe you trace, 
A baby and a baby's face, 
And that it looks at you; 
Whene'er you look on it, 'tis plain 
The baby looks at you again. 
(226-23 1) 
Jerome Christensen highlights the narcissism of this scene, with the 
search for the child's image strangely mirroring the search for one's own 
reflection: 'Looking for the child is the same act as looking into the pool for 
one's own reflection: looking for the source which would make sense out of a 
world of disorientating suggestive differences is looking for an image that would 
affinn by reflection the integrity of the self. 66 In this instant the onlooker does 
not 'find' his own face but the unfamiliar face of a baby. But, in a sense, this 
face is not unfamiliar, as it represents a stage in human development that we 
have all passed through. So we might say that in a symbolic sense this is the 
66 Jerome Christensen, 'Wordsworth's Misery, Coleridge's Woe: Reading, 'The Thom", Papers 
on Language and Literature, vol. 16,1980, p. 
284. 
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reflection of the onlooker, not the face of who he/she is. but of what he/she ,, vas. 
We might then describe the experience as an uncanny one, what was once 
familiar now appears as unfamiliar. The face of the child is like the resurfacing 
of a forgotten memory. The horror of the scene comes from the fact that the 
child can never breach the developmental gap between it and the onlooker. Its 
constant gaze speaks of his yearning to do just that, as if it is desperately trying 
to recognise something of itself in the human form before it. And yet its 
development has been stunted, rather like the thorn bush whose development 
parasitic plants have held back. The mother's constant mourning for her dead 
child contributes to this sense of stasis, and of course the suspicion hangs over 
the poem that it was her murderous act that prevented her child from reaching 
adulthood in the first place. 
'The Mad Mother' repeats many of the themes of 'The Thom. Like 
Martha, the Mad Mother has been abandoned by a man, in this case her husband. 
The sense of claustrophobia in the poem is heightened as the reader is subjected 
to her monologue. The only perspective offered, but for the first descriptive 
stanza, is that of the Mad Mother. The mother directs her speech to her silent 
child, trying to convince it, and perhaps herself, that she means it no harm: 'To 
thee I know too much I owe, /fI cannot work thee any woe' (19-20). 
67 However, 
we learn that she has been delusional in the past, imagining fiendish faces pulling 
at her breast. The delusional fantasies of the Mad Mother give her a witch-like 
aspect: 'A fire was once within my brain, / And 
in my head a dull, dull pain; / 
And fiendish faces - one, two, three, / Hung at my 
breasts, and pulled at me'(21 - 
67 William Wordsworth, 'The Mad Mother' from L, vrical Ballads (1798) in 
Lyrical Ballads: 
Wordsworth and Coleridge, eds. R. L. Brett and 
A. R. Jones (London: Routledge 199 1) pp. 831 -86. 
RomantiCiSM: An Anthology, ed Duncan Wu (London: 
Blackwe[12001), pp. 244-246. 
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2 68 Nr 4). The child's sucking action is psychological], soothing. and produces a 
moment of clarity in which she is able to recognise the child as her ovN-n and is 
able to feel genuine love for it. James Averill notes the influence of Erasmus 
Darwin on the depiction of breast-feeding in the poem. Darwin in Zoonomia 
describes how suckling a child can have a positive effect on mentally ill mothers 
as the maternal affection it inspires counteracts their insanity: 'the child should 
be brought frequently to the mother, and applied to her breast. if she will suffer 
it, and this whether she at first attends to it or not; as by a few trials it frequently 
excites ... materrial affection, and removes the insanity. 
69 However positive the 
initial effects of breast-feeding were on the Mad Mother, she appears to be 
developing a psychological dependency on it as a means of cooling her mania. 
She is clearly using breast-feeding as a means of regulating her mental state: 
Suck, little babe, oh suck again! 
It cools my blood, it cools my brain; 
Thy lips I feel them, baby, they 
Draw from my heart the pain away. 
0 press me with thy little hand, 
It loosens something at my chest; 
About that tight and deadly band 
I feel thy little fingers pressed. 
68 'The Mad Mother' like 'The Thom', is illustrative of changing attitudes to mentally disturbed 
women in this period. In earlier centuries the mad mother may well have been regarded as a 
witch. However, in Wordsworth's poem she is shown to be displaying classic symptoms of 
mania rather than demon possession. Wordsworth's thinking expresses an enlightened suspicion 
of superstitious explanations for mentally aberrant behaviour. Roy Porter in his A Social History 
of Madness describes how the thinking of the Enlightenment changed the attitudes of physicians 
to the extent that 'so called witches came to be characterised as hysterics or, at a later stage, as 
neurotics' Roy Porter, A Social History of Madness: Stories of the Insane (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson 1989), p. 112, pp. 103-124. See also Alan J. Bewell, , 'A 'Word Scarce Said: 
Hysteria and Witchcraft in Wordsworth's 'Experimental' Poetry of 1797 - 1798', pp. 357-390. 
Such treatment of delusional women was indeed more enlightened than the witch-hunt that 
preceded it. But this development must be seen in the wider context of the Enlightenment's 
antagonism towards the supernatural. Mentally ill women may no longer have been regarded as 
enemies of God, but they would have been in opposition to the new sovereign force in the 
universe, Reason. Thus mentally ill women are other to the dominant discourses of their time 
whether they are characterised as the demonic other, or the post-Enlightenment irrational other. 
This 'othering' provides a pretext for public censure and control, thouc,, h in more enlightened 
times this would have involved loss of liberty rather than loss of life. 
69Erasmus Darwin, Zoonomia, or the Laws of Organic Life (London: J Johnson 1796), p. 360. 
cited in James H. Averil I, Wordsworth and the Poetry of Human Suffering, p. 
156. 
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The breeze I see is in the tree, 
It comes to cool my babe and me. 
(31-40) 
The poem enacts a reversal of the dependency of a child on its mother. 
Here the mother relies on her child for her psychological well being. She is also. 
paradoxically, dependent on the child's dependency: 'The babe I carrY on mY 
arm, / He saves me for my precious soul. / Then happy lie, for blessed am I-/ 
Without me my sweet babe would die' (47-50). The division between self and 
other is forever being blurred in the poem. The mother is clearly projecting her 
own madness onto the child,, sometimes seeing her own insanity in its face: 
'Alas, alas! that look so wild, / It never, never came from me, / If thou art mad, 
my pretty lad, / Then I must be forever sad" (87-90). 
The power of the mother's monologue is that it renders the reader 
powerless. Unlike 'The Thom' the reader has no narrator to mediate and even 
perhaps intervene on the child's behalf. Moreover the Mad Mother believes 
herself to be a good mother; certainly, she is operating outside the normal moral 
spheres of action, but she clearly loves her child. Indeed, it is her overbearing 
love that produces anxiety in the reader and Wordsworth. It is the refusal of the 
Mad Mother to withdraw, as the mother of the 'Infant Babe' passage does, that 
makes 'The Mad Mother' such a disturbing poem. The mother refuses to let go 
of her child. She wishes to be its sole companion throughout its life. The poems 
ends with the mother taking her child to the woods to go in search of her 
husband, where she hopes the three of them can live together forever. 
The Mad Mother feels most at home amidst nature. But her relationship 
to nature is very different from that of the Romantic poet. The Mad Mother is 
less an objective onlooker than part of the wild-life that surrounds her. The Mad 
Mother is reduced to her basic animal instincts. She represents raw motherhood: 
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the unsocialised mother tending to her young. She is regressing away from 
society towards the state of nature. 70 Wordsworth's fear of maternity unbound 
may relate to his anxiety that such a woman's animal instincts may bear too close 
a relation to her imagination. This would produce aberrant desires unmediated 
by the demands of civilization; demands that in other circumstances frame our 
imaginative horizons. Foucault notes the link between madness and animality. 
and recognises in the fear of animal passions the anxiety that 'something' might 
break free from the restraints imposed by reason: 'It is not on this horizon of 
nature that the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries recognised madness, but 
against a background of Unreason; madness did not disclose a mechanism, but 
revealed a liberty raging in the monstrous forms of animality. 71 The real fear for 
Wordsworth is that the liberation that the Mad Mother experiences by connecting 
with her animal instinct provides her with an alternative source of knowledge 
that does not involve her exercising her reason in a socially acceptable fashion: 
Oh smile on me, my little lamb, 
For I thy own dear mother am. 
My love for thee has well been tried; 
I've sought thy father far and wide. 
I know the poisons of the shade, 
I know the earth-nuts fit for food; 
Then, pretty dear, be not afraid - 
We'll find thy father in the wood. 
" in noting the link between animality and madness Foucault comments on how the animal 
passions of the insane gave them an animal-like ability to survive exposure to rough conditions 
and extremes of temperature: 'Animality, in fact, protected the lunatic 
from whatever might be 
fragile, precarious, or sickly in man. The animal solidity of madness, and that density 
it borrows 
from the blind world of beasts, inured the madman to hunger ', 
heat, cold, pain. It was common 
knowledge until the end of the eighteenth century that the insane could support the miseries of 
existence indefinitely. There was no need to protect them; they 
had no need to be covered or 
warmed' (Foucault. Madness and Civilisation, p. 
74). The mad mother certainly matches 
Foucault's description. As Foucault realises madness of this kind was not linked to physical 
feebleness. Moreover. the mental energy displayed in the form of animal passions should make 
us wary of attaching terms as 'feeble minded' to such people. 
For a further discussion of the 
relationship between women and nature 
in Wordsworth' poetry see: Marion B. Ross, 
'Naturalizing Gender: Woman's Place in Wordsworth's Ideological Landscape". 
ELH. vol. 
1986, pp. 3 91-410; pp. 400-40 1. 
71 Michel Foucault, Madness and CA-disation, p. 833. 
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Now laugh and be gay, to the woods away, 
And there, my babe, we'll live for aye. ' 
(91-100) 
The Mad Mother has knowledge of the natural world to the extent that 
she can support herself using natural resources. More than this she is going to 
mediate the experience of nature to her child and take on the role of its teacher: 
'I'll teach my boy the sweetest things, / I'll teach him how the owlet sings' (142- 
143). In The Prelude such 'lessons' are administered by Nature alone. We need 
only think of the Boy of Winander's mimic hootings to the owl. 
In the final stanza the mother's power to sustain life or bring about the 
death of her child is emphasised, as the knowledge she has of naturally occurring 
poisons and sources of food could either be used to prolong life or to end it. But 
whether the child lives or dies the overriding implication of the poem is that the 
child's development will not be allowed to occur freely as it will always be 
subject to its mother's 'irrational' desires. 
Unnatural Teachers 
Wordsworth's anxiety about the extent and influence of maternal 
psychology on a child's development places him within the frame of patriarchal 
discourses that go back to the eighteenth century and earlier. A key figure, once 
again, is Rousseau. Like Wordsworth. Rousseau acknowledges the role of the 
mother as initiator. The love a child bears towards its mother orientates its 
earliest instincts and feelings, directing them outward towards an external 
love- 
object, the mother: 
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The child should love his mother before he knows what he owes her. If the voice 
of instinct is not strengthened by habit it soon dies, the heart is still-bom. From the 
outset we have strayed from the path of nature. (ýmile, 1, p. 16) 
Whereas 'The Mad Mother' expresses the fear that women might revert to 
their animal instincts Rousseau attacks women for becoming too urbane and 
attached to the products of civilisation. As we have seen from our discussion in 
Chapters One and Two, Rousseau was deeply concemed about the changing 
nature of motherhood in his time. Rousseau regarded many modem mothers, 
particularly those who lived in town, as going against 'the sweet task imposed on 
them by nature', and neglecting their children. Women's natural desire had gone 
elsewhere, seduced by the allures offered by urban living. Thus their 'natural' 
desire for their children had been misdirected. Rousseau, as we have seen, chose 
to lay nearly all the problems of his age at the feet of these 'unnatural' mothers. 
But Rousseau does not stop here; he also accuses those mothers who show too 
much love for their children of being a pernicious influence. Crucially, like his 
description of those who neglect their infants, those who lavish too much 
attention on their children are described as tempting 'our feet from the path of 
naturýe', the insinuation again being that such women are unnatural mothers: 
'There is another by-way which may tempt our feet from the path of nature. The 
mother may lavish excessive care on her child instead of neglecting him; she 
I 
MY 7 make an idol of him' (Emile, 1, p. 16). In Rousseau' s view women who 
lavish excessive care on their children soften them up. damaging them by 
protecting them from the hardship necessary for their future health. Rousseau 
always defers to nature as providing the standard 
by which all should adhere. 
Nature is the ultimate counterbalance, the medium by which all human actions 
are to be Judged. Rousseau presents it as neutral, 
but of course Rousseau 
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appoints himself as its interpreter. It is he who judges who has strayed from the 
path. For Rousseau it is difficult for women and mothers to put a foot right. God 
forbid a male child should stay too long in female company and be indoctrinated 
into feminine culture, as women in Rousseau's view make dreadful teachers: 
[T]he child passes six or seven years in the hands of women, the victim of his own 
caprices or theirs, and after they have taught him all sorts of things, when they have 
burdened his memory with words he cannot understand, or things which are of no 
use to him, when nature has been stifled by the passions they have implanted in 
him, this sham article is sent to a tutor. (tmile, 1, p. 18) 
Too direct a parallel should not be drawn between Wordsworth and 
Rousseau. Wordsworth does not condemn mothers in the misogynistic fashion 
that Rousseau does. In poems like 'The Thom' and 'The Mad Mother' 
Wordsworth is sympathetic to the abandoned mother, indeed in 'The Thom' it is 
the absent father that the narrator condemns: 'Oh me! Ten thousand times I'd 
rather / That he had died, that cruel father! '. Nevertheless, poems like 'The 
Thom' and 'The Mad Mother' do display an anxiety about the irrational mother. 
These are not negligent mothers, but mothers whose capacity for love has been 
misdirected, and this misdirection is beyond the control of the mother herself. 
Wordsworth's response to this aspect of human fallibility is to minimise the role 
of the mother. He does this in The Prelude by introducing a maternal substitute 
in the form of Nature. 
The Relationship between Nature and Desire in Wordsworth and Rousseau 
For Rousseau 'true happiness consists in decreasing the difference 
I 
between our desires and our powers' (Emile, 11, p. 52). In other Nvords we are 
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happiest when our desires fall within the sphere of what it is possible for us to 
obtain. For Rousseau man in a state of nature comes closest to achieving 
equilibrium between his powers and his desires, as primitive man's ývishes are 
closest to his needs. His actions, for example the satiation of his hunger. are 
linked to his most basic instincts,, and the necessity for self-preservation. For 
D- 
. Rousseau then, natural man might not provide us with an image of ecstatic joy, 
but he does provide us with the template for a life relatively free of unhappiness: 
'It is only in this primitive condition that we find the equilibrium between desire 
and power, and then alone man is not unhappy' (tmile, 11, p. 52). Modem man in 
contrast is unhappy because of the operation of his imagination that posits 
objects of desire that extend beyond his basic needs. These objects of desire are 
often beyond his grasp, and even when momentarily satisfied, he tends to want 
more. Thus for Rousseau, imagination is in large part responsible for our 
unhappiness: 
it is imagination which enlarges the bounds of possibility for us, whether for good 
or ill, and therefore stimulates and feeds desires by the hope of satisfying them 
Thus we exhaust our strength, yet never reach our goal, and the nearer we are to 
pleasure, the farther we are from happiness. (tmile, 11, p. 52) 
Wordsworth follows in the footsteps of Rousseau by conceiving of nature 
as a place of equilibrium, Of natural balance. However, 
his concept of the 
imagination is a positive one. " He does not conceive of the imagination 
exclusively in terms of object-orientated desire. 
Rather imagination can be 
related to being: to be in an imaginative state of consciousness. 
Rousseau's 
theory of desire stresses time over space. The temporality of 
desire is structured 
72 For a comparative study of Rousseau and 
Wordsworth conception of the imaý, Ination see 
Margery Sabin, 'Imagination in Rousseau and 
Wordsworth', Comparative Literature, ýAII 
1970, pp. 328-345. 
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in relation to the presence or absence of the object of desire, and to the existential 
experience of yearning. Wordsworth in contrast conceives of Nature as a space 
capable of containing and sustaining the imaginative individual. His theory of 
desire stresses space over time in so far as it is expansive. The space of Nature is 
responsive to our imaginings. It nurtures them, allowing them to expand. 
Wordsworth also divorces the imagination from its genesis in instinctual desires 
and physical drives. This in turn allows him to reify Nature as a sacred, self- 
sustaining, spiritual space, a space that transcends the every day battle for 
survival. For Wordsworth Nature provides a 'home' for the imagination. 
It also provides a 'home' for the Infant Babe following the withdrawal of 
his mother. Nature intervenes before the child is fully reconciled to his loss, or 
indeed has fully understood the concept of loss. The presence of Nature allows 
his epistemological development to continue in a state of unbroken happiness: 
All that I beheld 
Was dear to me, and from this cause it came, 
That now to Nature's finer influxes 
My mind lay open, to that more exact 
And intimate communion which our hearts 
Maintain with minuter properties 
Of objects which already are belov'd, 
And of those only. Many are the joys 
Of youth; but oh! What happiness to live 
When every hour brings palpable access 
Of knowledge, when all knowledge is delight, 
And sorrow is not there. 
(The Prelude, 11,296-307) 
Significantly, in the 'Infant Babe' passage the mother withdraws before 
the child identifies its mother as a separate desiring subject. Using a 
psychoanalytical framework. the withdrawal of the mother should signiýy 
that 
her desire is not exclusively orientated towards her child. This posits the 
intrusion of a third ten-n, and in classical psychoanalysis this is the father. But 
the father is not named by Wordsworth in the passage; all Wordsworth leaves us 
with is the rather vague comment that the mother's withdrawal was the result of 
'unknown causes'. It is worth noting that if the mother is 'killed' off in The 
Prelude, the father is hardly present at all. Indeed the most we hear of him is in 
Book Eleven when Wordsworth infon-ns us of his death. In this sense 
Wordsworth is an orphan not only literally but also psychologically. as he gives 
the impression that both his mother and father were absent from his life long 
before their deaths. 
Wordsworth's earliest experiences of Nature are reminiscent of the 
intimacy he experienced before the withdrawal of the mother. The child is 
enveloped by Nature, without the intrusion of any human other, rather like a 
child in the womb. Nature, as omnipresent but ever changing, elides the binary 
of absence and presence. This constant state of flux and change means the child 
is constantly stimulated, without having to cope with the trauma of withdrawal. 
The binary of inside and outside is further blurred by the stress Wordsworth 
places on aurality in the child's communion with Nature. Nature enters the 
child's consciousness through its sense of hearing: 
For I would walk alone, 
In storm and tempest, or in starlight nights 
Beneath the quiet Heavens; and, at that time, 
Have felt whate'er there is of power in sound 
To breathe an elevated mood, by form 
Or image unprofaned, and I would stand, 
Beneath some rock, listening to sounds that are 
The ghostly language of the ancient earth, 
Or make their dim abode in distant winds. 
Thence did I drink the visionary power. 
"30) (The Prelude, 11,321 -3 
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The experience of listening does not spatially define the listener. Sound 
fills space, both the inner space of the mind and the outer space from where it 
reverberates. In contrast, the presence of a spatially locatable image or form 
would posit an outside as it would create a co-ordinate in the form of a fixed 
object in space. This in turn would posit the onlooker as a locatable embodied 
subject with a particular perspective. Wordsworth, by stressing sound over 
vision, can avoid locating himself as a disengaged spectator, and can instead 
have an experience that is 'by form and image unprofaned'. 
Wordsworth like Rousseau conceives of Nature as being an absolute 
standard and an uncontaminated source of knowledge, revealing not only how we 
should live but who we really are. However, unlike Rousseau who in tmile sets 
up a tutor as the interpreter of nature's intentions for his pupil, Wordsworth 
comes close to dispensing with external human agents altogether, choosing 
instead to imbue Nature with an active principle. In Book Five of The Prelude 
Wordsworth opposes Nature as the administrator of the cosmic order, against the 
attempts of educationalists like Rousseau to impose pedagogic order on a child's 
development. However, Wordsworth's philosophy of education cannot be fully 
understood without further reference to his own development into a relatively 
self-sufficient child comfortable in his own company. In Chapter Four we shall 
explore key moments from Wordsworth's childhood from Books One and Two, 
in the belief that an appreciation of the developmental progress of the child 
Wordsworth will help us to better understand the educational beliefs of 
Wordsworth the man. 
II 
Chapter Four 
'Knowledge not purchas'd with the loss of power! ': Self- 
empowerment and the Threat of Authority 
Socialisation and the Use of the Object 
In the 'Infant Babe' passage in Book Two the transition from the comfort offered 
by the proximity of the mother's body as a communicative space of reciprocal 
love, to the comfort, and expanded opportunities for physical, psychological and 
spiritual growth offered by the natural landscape, is related to the sudden, 
somewhat traumatic withdrawal of the mother's body. However, elsewhere in 
The Prelude, in Book One, this transition is expressed in more gradual terms. 
The child is drawn to the natural landscape as a space that offers expanded 
opportunities for play and exploration. But the mother's presence as a fixed 
locus, providing psychological security and a home to return to, is crucial to the 
child's sense of well-being. In his early infancy the knowledge that 'mother is at 
home' appears to have given Wordsworth the confidence to move away from his 
mother and to begin to indulge in autonomous play. 73 This is expressed in the 
passage in which Wordsworth compares himself to a 'naked savage' running 
abroad from his mother's hut: 
Oh, many a time have 1, a five years' child, 
A naked boy, in one delightful rill, 
73 Brooke Hopkins uses Winnicott's essay 'The Capacity to Be Alone' to explore the process by 
which the young Wordsworth develops an independent personal life away from his mother. 
Winnicott argues that in order for a child to achieve independence he/she must first experience 
the security of a reliable and sustaining maternal environment. Such an environment ýN ill give 
the child the confidence to indulge in individual pursuits. See Brooke Hopkins. 'Wordsworth, 
Winnicott and the Claims of the "Real"', pp. 195-196, p. 201. D. W. Winnicott, 'The Capacit, \ to 
Be Alone', The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment (London: Kamac 
Books 1990) pp. 29-3 6. 
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A little mill-race severed from his stream, 
Made one long bathing of a summer's day, 
Basked in the sun, and plunged, and basked again, 
Alternate, all a summer's day, or coursed 
Over the sandy fields, leaping through groves 
Of yellow grunsel; or when crag and hill, 
The woods, and distant Skiddaw's lofty height, 
Were bronzed with a deep radiance stood alone 
Beneath the sky, as if I had been born 
On Indian plains, and from my mother's hut 
Had run abroad in wantonness to sport, 
A naked savage, in the thunder-shower. 
(The Prelude, 1,291- 5 " 04) 
This passage points to Wordsworth's growing independence from his 
mother, but his sense of independence also involves the knowledge that there is a 
maternal environment that he can return to. We might infer from this passage 
that it was not enough for Wordsworth to know where this environment could be 
found, it was also important for him to know that his mother was mindful of him. 
His mother may not be with him, but he knows he is in her thoughts: 'mother is 
thinking of me'. In this sense the 'matemal environment' becomes a fixed 
location both in the sense of it being in a locatable place and in the sense of the 
child imagining his mother to be in a consistently caring and attentive posture. 
However it needs to be pointed out that the materrial environment has a meaning 
that extends beyond the physical presence of the mother. The matemal is 
signified by the mother's hut, not by the actual mother, and Wordsworth is 
conceiving his play in terms of a fantasy scenario, where he plays a naked 
savage, and the matemal presence confers enough familiarity on the landscape to 
allow him to imagine running away. We might compare it to the scenario of the 
infant who runs from his mother in the sure knowledge that she will run after 
him. What Wordsworth is employing is the metaphor of the maternal. He is no 
longer entirely dependent on his mother's literal presence, but is still able to 
deploy the *matemal^ in order to familiarise his environment. 
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In the 'Infant Babe' passage the mother's 'beloved presence' is described 
as irradiating and exalting: *All objects through all intercourse of sense'. The 
mother's presence illuminates the child's immediate environment, rendenng 
objects meaningful, and reflective of the child's emotional state through his 
sensory engagement with them. The child's sensory engagement with its home 
environment, an environment made meaningful by the mothers auratic presence, 
imbues objects with a lifelike quality. Of course an infant's conception of the 
difference between living and non-living objects is limited. 74 But the limited 
nature of its understanding means that it is able to imagine that objects have an 
auxiliary life because of the way that they appear to be orientated towards him. 
We have seen this in relation to the mother's breast and eye, and though these are 
objects attached to a living subject, at an earlier stage in development they appear 
to the child as objects in their own right. We might then say that for the infant 
Wordsworth his relationship to matemal objects in infancy is an important 
foundation that allows for the development of the psychological capacity to 
imbue familiar objects in the home environment with a 'friendly' aspect. In this 
way the feelings of love he expresses towards his mother spreads out, 
transforming his immediate envirom-nent into an emotionally resonant space: a 
space that appears to be sympathetically disposed towards him. At the same time 
the child's increasing environmental awareness suggests a growing independence 
from the mother. The mother is no longer the sole focus of little William ýs 
attention. He becomes aware of a world beyond her. Over time he is able to 
74 Wordsworth fascination with the way children are not ful IN, able to distinguish betNN een the 
living and the dead, and the spiritual significance of this 
is explored in his poem , We are Seven'. 
In the Preface ( 1800) to the L, i-rical Ballads Words,, vorth remarks that the poem , vas intended to 
explore 'the perplexity and obscurity Nvhich in childhood attend our notion of 
death - or rather 
our utter inability to admit that notion' (pp. 
247-248). ýi'rical Ballads. - Wordsworth and 
Coleridge, eds R. L Brent and A. R. Jones (London: Routledge 199 1 ). 
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transfer some of the emotions he feels towards his mother. emotions fashioned 
by the 'discipline of love', to objects in the wider world. 
Wordsworth's stress on the development of the capacity for feeling in 
infancy can be seen as a reaction against Enlightenment rationalism. 
Wordsworth refuses to reduce the child's emotional life to the experience of 
pleasure and pain, or the drive for self- preservation. Rather Wordsworth 
stresses the bond between an infant and its mother as constitutive of its emotional 
outlook. The child') s emotional outlook colours its perception of the world, and 
imbues its sensory engagement with its environment with emotional content. 
However, Wordsworth's stress on sensation, particularly touch, as the means by 
which he becomes attuned to his surroundings, and as a process that facilitates 
physical growth that is independent of the mother, has clear parallels with 
Rousseau's educational model in Emile. 
In Chapter One we discussed Rousseau's emphasis on what he calls *the 
education of things' and his suspicion of the too early socialisation of children. 
Thus Rousseau limits the child's contact with the social world,, and focuses 
instead on facilitating the child's encounter with his surroundings, in order that 
the child might experience the maximum amount of sensations, all of which will 
contribute to his physical growth and practical knowledge. Wordsworth also 
emphasises the importance of physical play and sensory interaction with the 
natural landscape in relation to his own childhood. His 
description of his 
childhood self spending a summer day playing 
in the mill-race, alternatively 
basking in the sun, before plunging into water, is something that Rousseau xwuld 
have approved of, as it provides the child with contrasting sensations of 
hot and 
cold, wet and dry. But Wordsworth 
here is doing more than indulc-)ing in a 
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programme of self-development, and his repetitious desire to plunge himself into 
the water is psychologically more complex than the compulsion to indulge in a 
pleasurable sensation. Unlike Rousseau, Wordsworth's developing spatial and 
envirom-nental awareness begins with his engagement with the mother. The 
mother then is the 'prop' upon which all subsequent development depends. 
Nevertheless, at a certain stage the mother recedes into the landscape, as in the 
image of the child as a 'naked savage' running *abroad in wantonness to sport ý. 
the child must move away. The child's moving away is subsequent to the child's 
experience of the mother's 'withdrawal'. Thus as the child becomes conscious 
of the mother's limitations, and discovering that its mother is not an 
inexhaustible source of love,, sustenance, and sensory pleasure that is constantly 
at his disposal, he begins to enact his own withdrawal. By withdrawing himself 
he gains some psychological control over the mother's earlier traumatic 
withdrawal. Moreover he finds in the natural landscape what he imagines to be a 
limitless realm of sensory delight; a realm that cannot withdraw from him, and so 
smoothes over the sense of separation that accompanies the 'discovery' of 
subject/object relations. The space of nature cannot be reduced to the status of 
an object, and so does not provide Wordsworth with a fixed locatable object 
position that he cannot occupy. Thus, unlike the mother, the natural landscape 
can be given the attribute of always being there, even when the child withdraws 
ftorn it. In this way it more than compensates him for his mother's limitations. 
And yet, Wordsworth's ability to perceive the natural landscape as a 
living environment, containing spiritual 
forces that are attentive to his needs, 
could not have occurred without 
his first experiencing a loving and interactive 
relationship with his mother. 
The feelings that the child develops towards what a 
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rationalist would perceive as inert organic structures and natural phenomenon 
would not have occurred if the child had not developed the ability to 'humanise' 
the world around him. This ability is a by-product of the child's developing 
imaginative potential, a potential that emerged from the imaginary realm the 
ýchild inhabited whilstenveloped in the matemal space of its mother's body. 
Nevertheless, as the child moves away from the mother the original social bond 
that allows for the emergence of the imagination is disavowed. Nature is 
perceived by Wordsworth as an imaginative realm in and of itself, as in the 
description of the river Derwent that 'loved / To blend his murmurs with my 
nurseý s song' (The Prelude 1,272-273), nature is described as having a will of its 
own. Moreover, far from being a passive screen upon which the child projects 
his imaginings, nature plays a constitutive role in the child's developing 
imaginative capacity: 'And from his fords and shallows, sent a voice / That 
flowed along my dreams' (The Prelude, 1,275-276) 
The child Wordsworth makes his world meaningful through play. He 
engages his imagination in order to make seemingly arbitrary events and 
accidental situations appear to be of great importance. This yearning after 
meaning, this need to make the process of living of significance, appears to take 
on an added impetus following Wordsworth's move to his school at 
Hawkshead 
in May of 1779. James Heffernan relates what Wordsworth 
describes as his 
being 'transplanted' to Hawkshead, to the trauma of separation that accompanied 
his mother's death. Wordsworth's mother 
died just before he had reached the 
age of eight, and around a year 
later. 'ere I had seen / Nine summers*, his move 
to Hawkshead takes place. So the two events are close enough 
in time to 
compound the sense of separation 
Wordsworth xN-ould have felt at leaving his 
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childhood home for the first time. And yet as Heffernan points out, the traLima of 
this 'uprooting' is something Wordsworth ýsimultaneously represses and 
expresses'. 75 Indeed the move to Hawkshead is described as liberating, as it 
allowed for the possibility of a wider range of new experiences: 'there were xve 
let loose / For sports of wider range' (The Prelude, 1,305-306). Once again. 
Wordsworth's development is understood in terms of an expansive model, \ý-Ith 
each developmental stage associated with the child's entrance into a wider 
theatre of experience that supersedes and to an extent subsumes the one that 
preceded it. We might describe this process as a kind of spatial overlapping. As 
the child becomes increasingly familiar and secure in his immediate 
surroundings, he also becomes aware of the limitations they impose upon his 
experience, and is compelled to seek new experiences in new surroundings. In 
this way the 'original' maternal space, the space upon which all subsequent 
environmental awareness is 'propped', becomes submerged beneath the psychic 
weight of new experiences. And yet, as Heffernan makes clear, this process of 
submersion is not entirely successful. Heffeman uncovers the repression of the 
experience of maternal loss in the nature of the sports that Wordsworth indulges 
in, for example the acts of theft that he commits directly following his move to 
Hawkshead. Two of these acts of theft involve either birds or birds' eggs, and as 
Heffernan points out, birds in The Prelude typically appear as mothers, as for 
example in Wordsworth's description of his own mother as a parent hen in Book 
Five. It is quite possible then, that in these acts of theft Wordsworth is 
unconsciously searching for his mother. 
75 James A. W. Heffernan, 'The Presence of the Absent Mother in Wordsworth's 
Prelude', 
Studies in Romanticism, vol. 27,1988, p. 260. 
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The idea that the stealing episodes in Book One invoive Wordsworth's 
unconscious desire to search out his mother is a compelling one. But the 
unconscious object of these 'missions' should not distract us from the Nvider 
significance that Wordsworth attaches to them. The child Wordsworth as 
(meaning-maker' elaborates upon events in his young life. reading meaning into 
the seemingly incidental or procedural. For example in his description of the 
egg-stealing episode, in which he plunders eggs from where 'The mother-bird 
had built her lodge', the unconscious motivation may well have been to search 
out the 'mother'; but what becomes significant to Wordsworth is the experience 
he has whilst acting upon this compulsion. Wordsworth retrospectively 
downgrades the original aim of the exercise, to steal the eggs, as being in some 
way mean-spirited and morally questionable, whereas what he experiences whilst 
attempting to steal the eggs is raised up to the extent that its importance supplants 
his original objective: 'Though mean / My object and inglorious, yet the end / 
Was not ignoble' (The Prelude, 1,339-341). What the child experiences is a 
newfound independence: 
Oh, when I have hung 
Above the raven's nest, by knots of grass 
And half-inch fissures in the slippery rock 
But ill sustained, and almost, as it seemed, 
Suspended by the blast which blew amain, 
Shouldering the naked crag, oh, at that time 
While on the perilous ridge I hung alone, 
With what strange utterance did the loud dry wind 
Blow through my ears; the sky seemed not a sky 
Of earth, and with what motion moved the clouds! 
(The Prelude, 1,341-350) 
As Wordsworth hangs upside down above the raven's nest he finds 
himself in a precarious position, being *ill sustained' he must rely upon the 
natural features that surround 
him and his owii bodilv strength to hold him up. 
I'll 
Wordsworth was clearly a physically robust child with an acute awareness of the 
natural world, and he is bringing these attributes to the situation he has placed 
himself in. He is aware that the natural features that are helping to sustain him. 
the 'knots of grass' the 'slippery rock', are not entirely reliable, but their 
unreliability adds another level of meaning to the experience. In a sense 
Wordsworth is confronting their unreliability; he is consciously taking a risk. By 
risk-taking Wordsworth establishes his independence and autonomy of action, 
for by placing himself in a situation where he might lose control and fall, he 
paradoxically takes control by choosing danger and refusing to retreat to a 
position of safety. 
To actively seek the mother is to refuse the passive position that a child 
takes whilst waiting for its mother. The condition of waiting is a condition of 
dependence. To wait is to be left to your own devices, in the expectation of the 
arrival of another. As the infant waits for its mother it is forced to confront its 
bodily limitations, all of which point to its mortality. Adam Philips describes 
this situation: 'It is the infant waiting too long for his mother that is travelling 
towards death because, unattended, he is in the solitary confinement of his 
body'. 76 Wordsworth refuses to wait, and goes in search of the elusive object of 
his quest - the maternal presence. 
But the danger he faces during this quest frees 
him from the state of dependence he originally sought to reinstate. He learns to 
depend upon himself, to support himself free from 
his mother's arms. 77 He 
76 Adam Philips, 'On Risk and Solitude'. On Kissing, Tickling and Being Bored (London: Faber 
and Faber 1993), p. 24. 
77 Wordsworth's action can be interpreted as an attempt to 
find an environment that compensates 
him for the loss of what Winnicott calls the 'holding environment' of eariv 
infancy. Winnicott 
insists that the 'holding environment' should not 
be reduced to the physical act of holding, but 
rather refers to the child's awareness of a secure 
space that contains hI n"her: 'The term 'holding' 
is used here to denote not only the actual ph% sical 
holding of the infant, but also the total 
environment provision ... 
[I]t refers to a three-dimensional or space relationship with time 
gradually added. This overlaps NN 
ith, but is initiated prior to, instinctual experiences that in time 
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learns to rely upon his own bodily strength for support, and thus transforms the 
passive situation of early infancy where the infant's bodý- places him in a 
situation of 'solitary confinement, to one where the body establishes a freedom 
of movement that allows him to take control. Thus though the psychological 
impetus that placed Wordsworth in this situation is likely to have been an 
unconscious desire to seek out the mother, the situation allows him to establish 
his independence from the mother: 'I hung alone. 
And yet, we might ask, would this experience have taken place at all 
without the impetus of the unconscious desire to seek out the mother? Perhaps 
not, but if the egg stealing episode was not just a one off, but is a description of 
an activity that Wordsworth repeated again and again, then the status of the 
(object' of this activity is further complicated, for the child discovers whilst 
searching for company the pleasure of solitude. In this way the 'object' is not 
entirely 'lost', but is gradually emptied of meaning -a signifier without a 
signified. Adam Philips describes the circularity of the situation of the child as it 
waits for its 'object' of desire: 'Through desire the child discovers his solitude, 
and through solitude his desire. He depends upon a reliable but ultimately 
elusive object that can appease but never finally satisfy him. But from the 
78 
beginning, quite unwittingly, he has involved an object'. The object of an 
exercise has a structuring role in relation to desire. Wordsworth in his repeated 
search for the 'lost object' may well have become reconciled to the fact that the 
would determine object relationships'. 
D. W. Winnicott, 'The Theory of the Parent-infant 
Relationship', The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment (London: Kamac 
Books 1990) p. 44. The 'holding environment', though prior to the stage NN 
hen the child can 
I Is distinguish between subject and object, contributes to 
his developing spatial aýý areness and i 
foundational to his subsequent development of object relationships. Words\ýorth attempt to 
find 
an alternative 'holding environment, and 
his deployment of an -object', is instructive of his 
growing sense of independence. 78 lbid, p. 24. 
object of his desire was nowhere to be found . 
79But 
this did not lead him to 
abandon his object altogether, for paradoxically one can always rely more on the 
certainty of an object being absent than the possibility that it might magically I 
appear. So the 'object' becomes the search for the object, but not the object 
itself. This perhaps helps explain the somewhat contradictory lines: 'Though 
mean / My object and inglorious, yet the end / Was not ignoble". 
Wordsworth becomes reliant on his body as a source not just of physical 
but also of psychological strength. His body then, becomes a sanctuary, a place 
of habitation rather than confinement. He need no longer preoccupy himself, as 
an infant must, with the co-ordination of his limbs; he has found his feet. Thus, 
feeling at home in his body he can see beyond it. So secure is he in his motor 
skills and ability to orientate himself spatially that he need no longer be overly 
body-conscious, and can in fact subvert some key developmental concepts. As 
he hangs upside down he sees the world from a new perspective, a perspective 
that questions the idea that there is a right way up. Thus Wordsworth's bodily 
confidence allows him to see the world creatively: 'the sky seemed not a sky / Of 
earth, and with what motion moved the clouds!. His new found confidence in 
his body, means that he can briefly forget that he is at risk of falling, and entrust 
himself to the moment. But, and this is the crucial point, this moment of 
imaginative release, was not what he originally sought, it was not his 'object'. 
What he 'finds' is that beyond the dyad of subject/object, there is 'something 1) 
that endures, that abides in nature. For a brief moment 
Wordsworth abides with 
'it', before returning to himself and to the occupation 
in hand. 
79 Geoffrey Hartman notes as a central argument in 
The Prelude Wordsworth's discussion of our 
I 
ability to transfer our affections 
from the lost object of our earliest affections (the mother) to 
more general object 
love. The Unremarkable IFordsworth (London: Methuen 1987). pp. 21-22, 
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This tantalising moment opens a new vista of spiritual meaning for 
Wordsworth. He begins to have intimations of a spiritual realm that cannot be 
read through a rigid adherence to materialism. In fact the material ity of 'things* - 
something that Rousseau insists a child acquaint itself with, becomes for 
Wordsworth an obstacle to this other world; a world that is forever present but 
not alwaysfelt to be there. Wordsworth is not content to have brief glimpses of 
this other world; he wishes the spiritual forces that inhabit this realm to be 
mindful of him, just as he imagined his mother to be as he ran abroad into the 
thunder-shower. As he hangs above the raven's nest Wordsworth confronts the 
ultimate childhood anxiety: the fear that he might be allowed to fall. And yet 
while confronting this fear he becomes vaguely aware of something *out there' 
that is not prepared to let him fall, as if the wind that blows about him, and 
threatens to knock him off balance, is actually holding him up: 'almost. as it 
seemed, / Suspended by the blast which blew amain'. 
Wordsworth elaborates upon his intimations that the natural world is a 
spiritual realm within which he is safe and secure. Nature begins to develop 
distinctly parental attributes. It is no longerjust a passive presence that 
inconsPicuously 'looks after' him, but an interventionist force that actively 
'looks out' for him. For example, before embarking on a description of the boat 
stealing episode in Book One, Wordsworth describes 
how on occasion Nature 
perfon-ns 'severer interventions' in order to keep 
her 'favord Beings' on their 
preordained paths: 
But I believe 
That Nature, oftentimes, when she would frame 
A favor'd Being. from his earliest dwN'n 
Of infancy doth open out the clouds, 
As at the touch of lightning. seek, ing, him 
With gentlest visitation. not the less. 
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Though haply aiming at the self-same end, 
Does it delight her sometimes to employ 
Severer interventions, ministry 
More palpable, and so she dealt with me, 
(The Prelude, 1.362-3 7 1) 
The boat-stealing episode, is an example of one of Wordsworth's earliest 
expressions of his voluntary will. Such an act of theft transgresses social codes 
of behaviour, and in this sense is the ultimate act of self-possession. The act of 
theft is a stolen moment, as the will succumbs to its desires, rather than acting in 
accordance with the expectation of others. However, in this episode such an 
action is soon subject to a counter-action, for as the young Wordsworth acts upon 
his will 'lustily' rowing his boat, he comes into confrontation with what he 
perceives to be a rival will: 
I dipp'd my oars into the silent Lake, 
Went heaving through the water, like a Swan; 
When from behind that craggy Steep, till then 
The bound of the horizon, a huge Cliff 
Rose up between me and the stars, and still, 
With measur'd motion, like a living thing, 
Strode after me. 
(The Prelude, 1,402-412) 
Thus the one time object of pursuit, the cliff. appears to take on a life of 
its own and to face him down, as the pursuer becomes the pursued. Moreover, 
Wordsworth's voluntary act of stealing the boat, results in the involuntary 
penetration of his mind by images of the sublime: ýhuge and mighty 
Forms that 
do not live / Like living men mov'd slowly through my mind 
/ By day and vvere 
the trouble of my dreams' (The Prelude, 1.425-427). But was 
Wordsworth ever 
in control of events? He remarks retrospectively of the 
incident 'surely I was 
led by her [Nature]'. This would seem to imply that his voluntarý- act was in fact 
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pre-ordained. But if the socially transgressive act of stealing a boat is 
preordained then how can it be transgressive? It would appear that for 
Wordsworth all transgressions are necessary digressions on the road to self- 
knowledge. Thus an event that inspired terror and uncertainty in him is 
retrospectively transformed into an event that confirms his privileged position 
within the cosmic scheme of things, and provides him with a sense of security 
that however terrifying the phenomena he faces might be, his safety is somehov, - 
assured. 
There is something of a trade off here, for though an interventionist 
Nature places restriction on Wordsworth's autonomy of action, it provides him 
with a sense of security that allows him to remain relatively independent of other 
people. Thus as a child Wordsworth appears to have spent a great deal of time 
alone in the company of Nature. And yet, the language Wordsworth employs to 
describe his relationship with Nature has an unmistakably social aspect to it. He 
communes with nature and converses with it, and yet these terms are emptied of 
their origins in human society. Indeed human society is antithetical to the type of 
'communication' that takes place when Wordsworth is alone in the midst of 
nature. Of course in ontological terms the idea of being in the company of 
Nature is a state of mind that reflects the human need to be in the company of 
another. Thus the space of Nature is a social space, as it contains the 
accompanied seýf and the accompanied self is necessarily the product of 
socialisation. Wordsworth then is 
in the company of himself as a socialised 
subject. But by conceptually divorcing the experience of societv 
from human 
community. by experiencing it as a mode of 
being that can be experienced 
without the presence of a human other, 
Wordsworth is able disavow its social 
127 
origins. Indeed, more than this. he is able to see his communion xvith Xature as a 
form of higher society, as it involves a form of spiritual communion that does not 
intrude upon him but envelops him within a sympathetic space rather than 
positing him as an external interlocutor: *solitude / More active even than *best 
society', / Society made sweet as solitude / By silent inobtrusive sympathies' 
(The Prelude, 11,313-316). 
Just as Heffernan describes Wordsworth's trauma at his separation from 
his mother as something that he both expresses and represses, the same might be 
said of Wordsworth's social instincts. The ývoodcock-snaring episode of Book 
One reveals Wordsworth's discomfort in the presence of a collective, v. -hilst 
simultaneously expressing his contradictory desire to be a part of this collective. 
Following Heffernan we might see the woodcocks as symbolically represeiitative 
of the mother, and interpret the episode in terms of Wordsworth's desire to be in 
the company of the mother. Certainly this interpretation should not be dismissed, 
but again we should not let it distract us from the wider psychological 
implications of the episode. Perhaps Wordsworth's initial unconscious impulse 
is to search out the mother, but in the process of doing so he experiences the 
discomfort of an individual who finds himself in the presence of a community to 
which he does not belong: 
I was a fell destroyer. On the heights 
Scudding away from snare to snare, I plied 
My anxious visitation - hurrying on, 
Still hurrying. hurrying onward. Moon and stars 
Were shining o'er mý head; I was alone, 
And seemed to be a trouble to the peace 
That was among them. Sometimes it befell 
in these n ight- wanderings, that a strong desire 
O'erpowered my better reason. and the bird 
Which was the captive of another's tolls 
Became my prey; and when the deed was done 
I heard among the solitary hills tn 
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Low breathing coming after me, and sounds 
Of undistinguishable motion, steps 
Almost as silent as the turf they trod. 
" 17-3 (The Prelude, 1.3 132) 
As in all the stealing episodes, the 'object' of the theft is questionable. 
What Wordsworth confronts here is not just an object he would like to possess - 
a woodcock - but a social practice. Woodcock-snaring was an integral part of 
local customary culture, and would have been one of the many activities that 
went to make up rural community life in the Lakes during this period. Such 
activities may well have supplemented incomes arising from more conventional 
agricultural work. 80 Wordsworth appears to feel himself marginal to the 
community whose activities he is shadowing, the symbolic representatives of 
which are the woodcocks: 'I was alone, / And seemed to be a trouble to the peace 
/ That was among them'. His act of theft is an attempt to entangle himself within 
the social practices of this community. Wordsworth frees the bird, only to make 
it his captive. He also appropriates another's labour: 'the bird / Which vvas the 
captive of another's toils / Became my prey'. On a psychological level by acting 
on his desire, by appropriating someone else's labour, by making their prey his 
prey, he himself becomes the object of desire. By imagining himself as the 
pursued, he becomes embroiled in the rural custom he at first felt marginal to. 
Indeed the fact that Wordsworth imagines hearing, Low breathings coming after 
me, and sounds / Of undistinguishable motion' suggests that his real if 
unconscious desire is to get caught. 
80 For a discussion of customary culture during the period see J. M. Neeson, Common rights, zn 
enclosure and social change in England, 1700-1820 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univers1tv Press 
1993); K. D. M. Snell, Annals of the Labouring Poor: Social Change andAgrarian England 
1660-1900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1985); E. P. Thompson, Customs in Common 
(London: Merlin Press 199 1). For discussions that place Wordsworth's poetry in the social 
economic and cultural context of their time see for example Kenneth MacLean. AgrarianAge. - .4 
Backgroundfor Wordsworth (Archon Books 1970)-, David Simpson, Wordsit-orth's Historical 
Imagination: The Poetri, of Displacement (London: Methuen 1987). 
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Wordsworth's desire to be caught up in the life of a community is 
partially achieved following his move to Hawkshead. Wordsworth develops 
affectionate friendships with his fellow schoolmates, many of ,, \-ho boarded with 
him at Ann Tyson's cottage. In Ann Tyson he finds an affectionate mother 
substitute on whom he could depend. In terms of social class the 'community" 
he becomes a part of is a complex one. His school friends would have been 
middle class, but Ann Tyson was a lower class woman who was very much a part 
of the community in which she lived. Ann Tyson then was more than just a 
maternal figure; she represented a point of connection between the boys and the 
local community, and so was key to the boys' increasing familiarity with the 
customs and characters of the village. The level of cultural crossover that took 
place is emphasised by Wordsworth's close identification with the life of the 
rural peasantry. He describes himself as living in a 'lowly cottage' and for much 
of the year living on a frugal diet, as many of the rural poor would have done: 
No delicate viands sapped our bodily strength: 
More than we wished we knew the blessing then 
Of vigorous hunger, for our daily meals 
Were frugal, Sabine fare-and then, exclude 
A little weekly stipend, and we lived 
Through three divisions of the quartered year 
In penniless poverty. 
(The Prelude, 11,79-85) 
Wordsworth does not appear to regret the 'poverty' of his youth, and does 
not display any ill will towards his landlady for not providing for him. In fact he 
views the frugality of his schooldays as a blessing, taking a distinctly 
Rousseauian line in believing that too much 'delicate' food saps a growing 
child's strength. We might suspect the accuracy of Wordsworth's comparison of 
himself to the rural poor, but what is more interesting is that a boy from a middlc 
class home would make such an identification in the first place. 
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Wordsworth's ability to adapt to the community he finds himself in at 
Hawkshead can in part be explained by the lessening of the ties that bound him 
to his childhood home following the death of his mother. The psychological 
trauma of his 'transplanting' means he is able to quickly adapt to his new 
situation because he no longer feels himself to be psychologically rooted. But all 
this comes at a price, for as we have seen, it is during this period that 
Wordsworth develops a strong sense of independence and self-reliance. So. 
paradoxically, the very psychological trauma that makes it easier for 'W'ordsworth 
to adapt socially also produces in him a wariness of immersing himself too 
completely within the confines of his substitute family at Hawkshead. Finding 
himself a part of a community, he finds himself empowered to draw back from it. 
He clearly values the warmth and security of the home that Ann Tyson provides 
for him, for example describing the home amusements he and his fellow boarders 
indulged in 'by the warm peat fire / At evening' (The Prelude, 1,5 35 -5 3 6), but he 
also delights in drawing back from these home comforts on winter nights: 
And in the frosty season, when the sun 
Was set, and visible for many a mile 
The cottage windows through the twilight blazed, 
I heeded not the summons-, happy time 
It was indeed for all of us, to me 
It was a time of rapture. Clear and loud 
The village clock tolled six; I wheeled about 
Proud and exulting, like an untired horse 
That cares not for its home. 
(The Prelude, 1,452-460) 
Even when in the company of other children one gets the feeling that 
Wordsworth feels himself alone, not in the sense of feeling estranged from his 
playmates. but in the sense of being somehow independent of them. Hoxvever. it 
would be wrong to portray Wordsworth as an antisocial child. in fact he was the 
I ý) I 
opposite. He developed strong relationships NA-ith individual children, as well as 
being able to accommodate himself within a group. Wordsworth clearly drew 
strength from being part of a collective, but one of the things that being part of a 
group strengthened was his ability to be 'at home' in his own companv. it is in 
the company of others that Wordsworth realises the pleasure of solitude. 
However, Wordsworth's love of solitude is not a reaction against his school 
friends. In a sense their acceptance of him, and his fondness for them, sanctions 
his desire to be alone. In Book Two Wordsworth describes a boat race across 
Windermere from which he learns something of the 'self-sufficing power of 
solitude'. 
When summer came 
It was the pastime of our afternoons 
To beat along the plain of Windermere 
With rival oars, and the selected boume 
Was now an island musical with birds 
That sang for ever, now a sister isle 
Beneath the oak's umbrageous covert, sown 
With lilies-of-the-valley like a field, 
And now a third small island where remained 
An old stone table and a mouldered cave- 
A hermit's history. In such a race, 
So ended, disappointment could be none, 
Uneasiness, or pain, orjealousy; 
We rested in the shade, all pleased alike, 
Conquered and conqueror. Thus the pride of strength 
And the vainglory of superior skill 
Were interfused with objects which subdued 
And tempered them, and gradually produced 
A quiet independence of the heart. 
And to my friend who knows me I may add, 
Unapprehensive of reproof, that hence 
Ensued a diffidence and modesty, 
And I was taught to feel - perhaps too much - 
The self-sufficing power of solitude. 
(The Prelude, 11,68-78) 
The rural scenes and rustic objects that the boys see during their racing 
diverts them from their original objective, to be the first over the finish line, and 
makes the experience as a whole the 'object' of their exercise. What the boys 
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also share is the experience of physical exertion. The 'quiet independence of the 
heart' that Wordsworth achieves may in part come from the confin-nation he 
receives in his own physical abilities. Thus we might include the body and its 
physical operations as among the 'objects' that have a tranquillising effect on 
Wordsworth's mind. As he rests in the shade, he can rest assured in his body"s 
ability to sustain him. In describing this collective experience Wordsworth 
underplays the boys' rivalry. Wordsworth describes how the vainglory of the 
boys gradually interfused with 'objects' that subdued and tempered their pride. 
For Wordsworth to admit the element of competition would be to draw a social 
comparison, and he is intent on avoiding this form of individuation. Rather he 
limits his focus to his own subjective experience. What matters is his experience 
of the race, both in tenns of the physical experience of racing and the 
imaginative impact of the 'beauteous forms' he encounters along the way. The 
presence of others is incidental. The passage implies that he would have had as 
profound an experience, perhaps a profounder one, on his own. But unusually 
Wordsworth feels uncomfortable admitting this, and ironically uncomfortable in 
the company of his own argument. Fearing reproof he calls on a friend for 
support. All this, Wordsworth informs us, would be intelligible to someone who 
truly knew him. In terms of his poetry then, the experience of solitude is not so 
self-sufficing after all. Moreover, we might conjecture that the experience of the 
self-sufficing power of solitude is not simply discovered, but is a product of 
Wordsworth's socialisation. Wordsworth needed first to be accepted into a 
community in order to develop the strength to become independent of it, and so 
able to disavow his former social dependency. 
I 
In all the episodes ýdiscussed Wordsworth can be seen to be 
choreographing the experience of 'being William', by representing himself to 
himself through object orientated action. But the ultimate goal of these 
representations is to use the object in order to attain a state of consciousness that 
is independent of the object, to the extent that the object is incorporated into the 
self or into the action that is being performed. Perhaps the best example of this is 
the skating episode in Book One: 
All shod with steel 
We hissed along the polished ice in games 
Confederate, imitative of the chace 
And woodland pleasures, the resounding hom, 
The pack loud bellowing, and the hunted hare. 
So through the darkness and the cold we flew, 
And not a voice was idle. With the din, 
Meanwhile, the precipice rang aloud; 
The leafless trees and every icy crag 
Tinkled like iron; while the distant hills 
Into the tumult sent an alien sound 
Of melancholy, not unnoticed; while the stars, 
Eastward, were sparkling clear, and in the west 
The orange sky of evening died away. 
Not seldom from the uproar I retired 
Into a silent bay, or sportively 
Glanced sideway, leaving the tumultuous throng, 
To cut across the image of a star 
That gleamed upon the ice. And oftentimes 
When we had given our bodies to the wind, 
And all the shadowy banks on either side 
Came sweeping through the darkness, spinning still 
The rapid line of motion, then at once 
Have 1, reclining back upon my heels, 
Stooped short - yet still the solitary cliffs 
Wheeled by me, even as if the earth had rolled 
With visible motion her diurnal round. 
(The Prelude, 1,460-486) 
Wordsworth begins as part of a collective, skating across the ice in 
imitation of the hunt. His identity is subsumed in the collective, his movement 
dictated by the movement of the pack. The object of the exercise is for the 
children to be attuned to one another as *confederates', for though their actions 
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imitate the hunt there is no actual quarry. Wordsworth here achieves the 
experience of social inclusion he unconsciously sought after in the woodcock- 
snaring episode. But the object of social inclusion is not sufficient for 
Wordsworth, and repeatedly he draws away from the group. At these moments 
he pursues an object of his own choosing, pursuing the reflection of a star. 
Again the object itself is not the object of pursuit. The fact that it is not an object 
but the reflection of an object means that he is able to cut across its image. and 
thus incorporate the 'object' into the action. At other times he consciously draws 
back from the action he is engaged in: 'reclining back upon my heels'. At these 
moments it is almost as if he is overtaken by the very experience he is pursuing. 
The action involves falling back, and what Wordsworth falls back on is an 
experience of being that is not reliant on the object, or at least uses the object in a 
negative way by refusing to pursue it. Such moments transport Wordsworth 
from the temporal and spatial strictures imposed by object-orientated action: *yet 
still the solitary cliffs / Wheeled by me, even as if the earth had rolled / With 
visible motion her diurnal round. 
Wordsworth's desire to retreat from social spaces, in order that he might 
be enveloped within the space of Nature, can in part be understood in relation to 
the anxiety he attached to the loss of his original object of affection, his mother. 
Nature, like the mother, is seen to irradiate natural objects with an emotional 
resonance. But unlike Wordsworth's infantile experience no single object is 
alienated from the whole. Whereas the mother becomes objectified, and 
eventually disassociated from the space upon which she conferred meaning, 
Nature incorporates its own objects within an indivisible oneness. In this way 
the feelings that Wordsworth has when alone in the midst of Nature, are not 
1, - 
attached to any one object, and so do not suffer the fate of that object. ýýhich in 
the case of Wordsworth original object of affection was death. Thus for 
Wordsworth the space of Nature allows for a type of emotional gro"Ih that is not 
dependent on locatable and therefore vulnerable objects. Rather Wordsworth 
feelings can spread out over the landscape, giving him the sense of being 
incorporated into an eternal vital space: 
From Nature and her overflowing soul 
I had received so much that all my thoughts 
Were steeped in feeling. I was only then 
Contented when with bliss ineffable 
I felt the sentiment of being spread 
O'er all that moves, and all that seemeth still, 
O'er all that, lost beyond the reach of thought 
And human knowledge, to the human eye 
Invisible, yet liveth to the heart, 
O'er all that leaps, and runs, and shouts, and sings, 
Or beats the gladsome air, o'er all that glides 
Beneath the wave, yea, in the wave itself 
And mighty depth of waters. Wonder not 
If such my transport were, for in all things 
I saw one I ife, and felt that it was joy; 
One song they sang, and it was audible - 
Most audible then when the fleshy ear, 
O'ercome by grosser prelude of that strain, 
Forgot its functions and slept undisturbed. 
(The Prelude, IIý 416-434) 
Wordsworth does acknowledge friends and family in relation to his 
growing up, but by the end of Book Two it is clear that the ultimate accolade 
goes to Nature: 'If in my youth I have been pure in heart, / If, mingling with the 
world, I am content / With my own modest pleasures, and have lived / With God 
and Nature communing, removed / From little erunities and low desires. The gift 
is yours'. (The Prelude, 11,443-448). Strangely then, for Wordsworth the 
mountains and lakes of Cumbria had a greater impact on refining what are 
essentially social attributes than such keN- figures as his mother and Ann Tyson. 
Ultimately, Wordsworth concludes, Nature not human societv is the best 
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incubator for the growth of a poet's mind. The implications of Ikordsworth's 
conclusion result in the marginalizing of human agency in relation to 
developmental processes, the full extent of which is revealed when 'Xordsworth 
touches upon questions of educational philosophy in Book Five. However, 
before discussing how Wordsworth marginalizes the authority of human others in 
relation to his own childhood, and the impact of this on his theory of education, it 
is important to note how the authority of the 'other'. even if it is not perceived as 
a human other, is not completely dispensed with by Wordsworth, and continues 
to haunt his decision making into adult life. 
Anne K. Mellor's reading of The Prelude identifies the Wordsworthian 
self as expressive of Masculine Romanticism's attempt to assert a model of the 
self as 'unified, unique, enduring, capable of initiating activity, and above all 
aware of itself as a self. 81 She relates this to the possessive model of the self 
articulated by Locke that asserts that every man 'has a Property in his own 
Person', remarking of Wordsworth: 
The goal of Wordsworth's epic quest, his 'heroic argument and genuine prowess' 
(111: 183-184), is nothing less than the triumph of the maker of the social contract, 
the construction of the individual who owns his own body, his own mind, his own 
labor as he chooses, the achievement of 'Man free, man working for himself, with 
choice / Of time and place and object' (VIII: 152-153). As Wordsworth enthuses, 
'Now I am free, enfranchis'd and at large, / May fix my habitation where I will' (L 
9_ 10). 82 
Mellor is right in her assertion that The Prelude both responds and 
contributes to the discourse of possessive individualism. Indeed our discussion 
of Wordsworth's use of objects in order to establish his independence and 
autonomy of action addresses itself well to Mellor's formulation. However, one 
81 Anne K. Mellor, Romanticism and Gender (London: Routledge 1993), p. 145. 
82 Ibib, p. 147. 
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of Mellor's quotations, 'Now I am free, enfranchis'd and at large. / May fix my 
habitation where I will', taken from the glad preamble at the very start of the 
poem, may appear to present Wordsworth as a man in charge of himself and his 
destiny, but when placed in a wider context (The Prelude, 1,1-271), 
Wordsworth's assertion becomes fraught with contradictions and anxieties. 
At the beginning of the poem, Wordsworth does indeed present himself 
as a man at liberty, free to dedicate himself to 'chosen tasks' (The Prelude. 1, 
but this sense of freedom has its own attendant anxieties. For if one can proceed 
in any direction and not lose one's way (The Prelude, 1,19), then implicit in this 
assertion of freedom is the assumption that there is no right way to proceed. 
Similarly, if one is able to choose any object or occupation then by implication 
such a choice is arbitrary. But of course this is not what Wordsworth, who 
regarded himself as a 'favor'd Being', believed: he believed his path in life was 
preordained. At points Wordsworth's sense of predestination does indeed give 
him a sense of freedom. He has leamt from childhood to trust in Nature whose 
timely but subtle interventions will keep him on the right path: *1 look about, and 
should the guide I chuse / Be nothing better than a wandering cloud /I cannot 
miss my way' (1,15-19). A parallel can be drawn with, 
ýmile and the idea that 
children should be given freedom in order that they might realise the destiny that 
God, working through nature. intended for them. This presents the somewhat 
paradoxical assertion that we are free in order that we might act within the 
constraints of God's purpose. 
In adulthood, as M. H. Abrams has pointed out. Wordsworth's sense of 
himself as having been chosen or singled out transforms into a belief that 
he is 
I t) 
destined to become a poet-prophet in the tradition of Milton : 83 . poetic numbers 
came / Spontaneously, and clothed in priestly robe / My spirit. thus singled out. 
as it might seem, / For holy services' (The Prelude, 1,60-63). Follo, ýving these 
thoughts Wordsworth acknowledges that he must indeed "choose' to dedicate 
himself to his appointed task. Wordsworth's sense a spiritual vocation 
complicates the idea of him as a man in possession of himself and his own 
destiny. He cannot inhabit the freedom of the present, much as he revels in it, 
for his true preordained place of legitimate habitation is under construction, for 
Wordsworth's 'true' self is his life's work, most notably the monumental project 
of constructing what he hoped would be his poetic masterpiece, The Recluse: 
I had hopes 
Still higher, that with a frame of outward life 
I might endue, might fix a visible home, 
Some portion of those phantoms of conceit 
That had been floating loose about so long, 
And to such being temperately deal forth 
The many feelings that oppressed my heart. 
(The Prelude, 1,127-133) 
By this stage in Book One, the freedom to choose one's occupation or 
place of habitation celebrated in the glad preamble, though expressive of a sense 
of autonomy, is also suggestive of the self as derelict, unable to gather itself 
together so as to fix upon a single purpose or place of destination. Increasingly 
freedom of choice appears as indecision: 'Time, place, and manners, these I seek, 
and these /I find in plenteous store but nowhere such / As may be singled out 
with steady choice' (1,169-171). Wordsworth feels a strong desire to defer 
embarking on his appointed task, but this is no longer a positive choice, for he 
realises that if he is in dereliction of his duty then he cannot inhabit his future. 
83 See M. H. Abrams' Natural Supernaturalism. - Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature 
(London: Norton 1973), p. 19-32; 73-80. 
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More than this Wordsworth begins to fear retribution for failing to live up to his 
promise: 
Far better never to have heard the name 
Of zeal and just ambition than to live 
Thus baffled by a mind that every hour 
Turns recreant to her task, takes heart again, 
Then feels immediately some hollow thought 
Hang like an interdict upon her hopes. 
This is my lot; for either still I find 
Some imperfection in the chosen theme 
Or see of absolute accomplishment 
Much wanting - so much wanting - in myself 
That I recoil and droop, and seek repose 
In indolence ftorn vain perplexity, 
Unprofitably travelling towards the grave, 
Like a false steward who hath much received 
And renders nothing back. 
(The Prelude, 1,257-271) 
In the next section we will continue to look at how Wordsworth favours a 
model of autonomous growth in relation to childhood development, and hoNN- he 
is suspicious of any adult placing themselves in a position of authority over 
children. We might assume from this that in adulthood Wordsworth would feel 
free from the expectations and demands of authority figures and so be able to 
determine his own future. But clearly this is not the case. The feelings that he 
might have attached to a human authority figure have been displaced onto a 
metaphysical Other, who expects to be rewarded for the time and attention He 
has lavished on his 'chosen son' (The Prelude, 111,82). So though little is made 
of earthly mothers past early infancy, and still less of earthly fathers, the 
Heavenly Father, operating through the natural world, a realm of non-human 
otherness, continues to exert an influence. Moreover, in Wordsworth's 
description of himself as a 'false steward' a power relationship is indicated ývhich 
is very much that of father to son, master to servant. Thus in relation to 
Wordsworth it is important to note a contradiction, that while WordsNý orth does 
indeed assert his freedom from adult authority and autonomv of action in relation 
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to his childhood, during his formative years he must also have been Internalising 
a set of expectations that he would come to perceive as external demands 
imposed on him from without. We might then say that for Wordsworth 
'freedom' is not sufficient in and of itself. That the idea of being able to do 
anything and go anywhere gives rise to an existential fear that it does not matter 
where you go or what you do. Perhaps in order to counteract this anxiety 
Wordsworth believed that he had a higher purpose that he was obliged to act 
upon. Paradoxically, this sense of obligation makes the very freedom it denies 
worth having. 
Growing Independent 
In Book Five we see the brief resurrection of the mother in order that she might 
offer a counterpoint to modem pedagogues such as Rousseau. She is presented 
as a 'Parent Hen amid her Brood'. However, as Mary Jacobus points out in a 
remark that reinforces Warminski's observations, Wordsworth's use of the 
mother is sparing and she soon recedes into the background. The overall 
impression that Wordsworth hopes to give is that he and his siblings were self- 
educated, or to use Jacobus' phrase,, their education was 'free-range': 
If we go back to The Prelude passage, the little Wordsworthian brood turns out to 
be self-hatched, and perhaps self-engendered too. The mother must be absent or 
dead in order for the child to be father to the man, and the note of the poet's voice 
satisfýing reiterated and prolonged. 84 
84 Mary Jacobus, 'Behold the Parent Hen: Romantic Pedaooov and Sexual Difference', tý lný 
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Jacobus is right when she describes 'the matemal presence as an 
absence 585 , but the point needs to be made that there is another absence, the 
absent father,, whose role is given even less significance than that of the mother. 
Indeed, when in Book Five Wordsworth goes on to attack over-zealous self- 
appointed tutors, it is illustrative of his reluctance to allow any father-substitute 
to usurp the father's authority through the establishment of an authority in loco 
parentis. It is in these circumstances that he turns to the mother as counterfoil. 
Ironically the mother can be represented as a master practitioner of what 
Rousseau terms 'negative education'. She appears content to leave her children 
well alone so that they might develop at their own pace. The mother is little 
more than a cipher, God fills her breasts with milk and she feeds her children. 
She is described as having a 'virtual faith that he, / Who fills the Mother's breasts 
with innocent milk, / Doth also for our nobler part provide, / Under his great 
correction and controul, / As innocent instincts, and as innocent food' (The 
Prelude, V, 271-255). Interestingly the mother is assigned a passive role and the 
father, this time the Holy Father, an active one. So the father still has a symbolic 
function, even though Wordsworth is reluctant to allow the place of the father to 
be taken up by mere mortals. This metaphysical father gains control over his 
children through the exercising of their natural instincts. Once again 
Wordsworth is able to side-step the issue of the relation between bodily needs 
and instincts by employing spiritual language. For example food is not just 
sustenance, but is described as being 'innocent'. coming from God through the 
mother rather like manna from heaven. In this scenario the mother need only 
allow God to work through her, and so need not fear for the health and ,, vel I 
85 lbid, p. 240. 
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being of her children. She is described as being 'pure / From feverish dread of 
error or mishap' (The Prelude, V, 276-278). 
In contrast to the mother's hands-off approach, modem systems of 
education are accused of leading children 'like a poor man's Heifer / ... through 
the lanes in forlorn servitude' (The Prelude, V, 240-241). The product of this 
type of education is in Wordsworth's view a 'dwarf man' a 'monster birth' 
Wordsworth's accusation against such children is that they are too good to be 
true. Wordsworth satirises them, producing a dizzying list of the 
accomplishment of one such protege. Wordsworth describes how well adjusted 
to society he is, being at home among both the rich and poor and beloved by 
both,, and how he has mastered the arts and sciences. Wordsworth also satirises 
the absurd goodness of such an individual, his unending virtue. James K. 
Chandler identifies Wordsworth's satire on the supposed moral perfection of 
such a protege as central to Wordsworth's argument, and identifies the most 
likely target for his attack as the fictional child of Rousseau's Emile: 
Wordsworth's particulars are intended to recall the overall impression conveyed by 
Rousseau's description of tmile, the sense that, in Wordsworth's mocking phrase, 
"Briefly, the moral part? / Is perfect' (318-319). The chief target is a delusive 
fantasy of moral perfectionism, the notion that virtue can be systematically 
taught. 86 
As Chandler points out there are some discrepancies between 
Wordsworth's satiric description and Rousseau's Emile. For example, 
Wordsworth's description of the model pupil's path as being 'chok'd with 
grammars' (The Prelude. V, 324-325). does not ring true as a description. for as 
86 James K. Chandler, Wordsworth 's Second Nature: .4 Study of the Poetry and 
Politics (Chicago. 
The University of Chicago Press), p-l 12. Chandler also pro,. ides an impressive list of quotes 
from tmile to support his argument, that when read alongside "'ords\North's satiric passage on I 
adds to its comic effect. W`ordsit, orth's Second Nature, pp. I 10- 111 ý 107-116. 
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Chandler points out there is a strong *anti-intellectual strain in Emile -. 87 
Nevertheless, 
' Chandler maintains that the overall effect is suggestive of Emile. 
A far more substantial obstacle to Chandler's conclusion is the fact that 
Wordsworth attacks the vanity of such a protCg6: 
Vanity 
That is his soul, there lives he, and there moves; 
It is the soul of every thing he seeks; 
That gone, nothing is left which he can love. 
(The Prelude, V, 354-357) 
Chandler points out that in Emile Rousseau describes vanity as a negative 
impulse, and thus suggests that Wordsworth use of the term needs to be 
understood in the context of Britain following the French Revolution. Chandler 
describes how Edmund Burke in his Letter to a Member of the National 
Assembly described Rousseau as a "philosophic instructor in the ethics of 
vanity". 88 Thus Wordsworth may well be following Burke in associating 
Rousseau and his writing with vanity. Another explanation is that Wordsworth 
simply didn't understand Rousseau's concept of self-love. 
Wordsworth's accusation of vanity against Rousseau is a clumsy one, 
because vanity is suggestive of amour-propre. For Rousseau, amour-propre is 
the kind of self-love that feeds off social situations in which individuals compete 
in order to establish their superiority among their peers. This striving for prestige 
results in the type of social inequality that Rousseau vociferously condemns. 
The other type of self-love that Rousseau identifies is amour de soi. This type of 
87 lbid, p. 112. 
88 ibid, p. 115; 114-116. 
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self-love is the product of the instinct for self-preservation, and places the needs 
of the individual as paramount. Rousseau recognises this type of self-love as a 
force for good: 
Self-love is always good, always in accordance with the order of nature. The 
preservation of our own life is specially entrusted to each one of us, and our first 
care is, and must be, to watch over our own life; and how can we continuall%, watch 
over it, if we do not take the greatest interest in it? (ýmile, IV p. 208) 
Wordsworth may well be collapsing Rousseau's two types of self-love 
into one another in order to make the broad generalisation that the educational 
outcome of Rousseau's pedagogic project is a self-centred individual. But what 
an extraordinary accusation for Wordsworth to make! There are few writers in 
English literature who have taken a greater interest in their own life than 
Wordsworth. This is a man who regarded himself as being preordained for 
poetic greatness. Thus Wordsworth's criticism of vanity, whether it be directed 
at Rousseau himself or his fictional child, has more than a little of the pot calling 
the kettle black. 
For Wordsworth the central question of who should have authority over a 
child's developing mind is subsumed by his demand that it should be no one who 
might detract or take attention away from the child. Wordsworth's thinking is 
child-centred to the point of isolationism. He attacks those educationalists who 
would impose their will upon children in order to bend theirs future to meet their 
exacting standards. Such men refuse to leave anything to chance, but more 
importantly for Wordsworth they stand in opposition to the providential order: 
These mighty workmen of our later age 
Who with a broad highway have overbridged 
The forward chaos of futuritv. 
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Tamed to their bidding, they who have the art 
To manage books, and th in gs, and make them \ý ork 
Gently on infant minds, as does the sun 
Upon a flower; the Tutors of our Youth 
The Guides, the Wardens of our faculties, 
And Stewards of our labour, watchful men 
And skilful in the usury of time, 
Sages, who in their prescience would controul 
All accidents, and to the very road 
Which they have fashion'd would confine us down, 
Like engines, when will they be taught 
That in the unreasoning progress of the world 
" wiser spirit is at work for us, 
" better eye than theirs, most prodigal 
Of blessing, and most studious of our good, 
Even in what seem our most unfruitful hours? 
(The Prelude, V, 370-388) 
Wordsworth presents his alternative education in the Boy of 
Winander passage. The scene represents a partnership between a child and the 
natural world. Nature is always attentive, and the Boy never coaxed into 
knowledge. What the child does learn he learns through play, and the knowledge 
he does acquire he is only semi-conscious of, he certainly couldn't articulate 
what he has 'leamt' to another: 
There was a Boy, ye knew him well, ye Cliffs 
And Islands of Winander! Many a time 
At evening, when the stars had just begun 
To move along the edges of the hills, 
Rising or setting, would he stand alone 
Beneath the trees, or by the glimmering Lake, 
And there, with fingers interwoven, both hands 
Press'd closely, palm to palm, and to his mouth 
Uplifted, he, as through an instrument, 
Blew mimic hooting to the silent owls 
That they might answer him. - And they would shout 
Across the watry Vale, and shout again, 
Responsive to his call, with quivering peals, 
And long halloos, and screams, and echoes loud 
Redoubled and redoubled; concourse wild 
Of mirth and jocund din! And when it chanced 
That pauses of deep silence mock'd his skill, 
Then sometimes, in that silence, while he hung 
Listening, a gentle shock of mild suprize 
Has carried far into his heart the voice 
Of mountain torrents, or the visible scene 
Would enter unawares into his mind 
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With all its solemn imagery, its rocks, 
Its woods, and that uncertain Heaven, receiv*d 
Into the bosom of the steady Lake. 
(The Prelude. V, 393413) 
The experience of expectation, of waiting. is an experience that 
forces us to confront the temporality of being. But Wordsworth will not allow 
the Boy to experience this form of time consciousness for too long a duration. 
He will not allow the Boy to experience a moment of self-reflection in the gap 
between call and reply: 'I am the "I" that waits'. Rather if the owl's hoot is too 
long in replying it is compensated for by another sound: 'a gentle shock of mild 
suprize / Has carried far into his heart the voice / Of mountain torrents' (The 
Prelude, V, 407-409). Or time is flooded by space as: 'the visible scene / Would 
enter unawares into his mind / With all its solemn imagery, its rocks / Its woods, 
and that uncertain Heaven, receiv'd / Into the bosom of the steady Lake' (The 
Prelude, V, 409-413). Thus as Geoffrey Hartman suggests what Wordsworth 
presents us with is a different mode of expressing the self, a mode that stresses 
the vocal over the visual: 
We find ourselves before a tragic ode to Echo. There is no imago here (to borrow 
the psychoanalytical term), only an imago vocis: a "wandering utterance" that 
cannot be unified or localised. '9 
It is difficult for the reader to picture the Boy of Winander, to imagine his 
face. To extend Hartman's thinking, it is questionable whether the Boy can face 
up to himself After all the *steady Lake' does not reflect his image but that of 
the natural world. It is as if the Boy's image is lost within the scene. For Mary 
Jacobus it is as if Nature is looking away, caught in a moment of self-absorption 
89 Geoff-rey H. Hartman, 'Self Time and History'. The Fate of Reading and Other Essays 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1975), p. 289. 
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that excludes the Boy: 'As echo effects give way to mirror effects (owls! boy. 
boy/nature; sky/lake; poet/grave), supposedly stable distinctions between signs 
and reality, subject and object, become blurred. The Winander Boy (ostensibly 
the subject of the passage) is displaced by nature. seemingly caught in a moment 
of abstraction, as if looking away, orjust self-absorbed, for once the object of her 
own contemplation'. 90 Similarly it is difficult to place the Boy in a social setting. 
Indeed as Hartman points out in another piece, it is the landscape that is called 
upon to remember the boy, not his childhood friends: 'the Boy dies before speech 
makes him known to others. Wordsworth's "ye knew him well" is addressed to 
native cliffs and islands, not to human companions'. 91 Certainly. Wordsworth 
describes the Boy's early death as taking him from his mates, but it is difficult 
for us to conceive of the child as having children of his own age that he talked to. 
The Boy of Winander is condemned to social inarticulacy. Wordsworth, the chief 
mourner, stands beside his grave in mute vigil. Wordsworth's silence demands 
that the only way to mourn for the child is to silently abide: 'I believe that 
oftentimes /A full half-hour together I have stood / Mute - looking at the grave 
in which he lies' (The Prelude, V, 420-422). The Boy of Winander is a model 
child for Wordsworth because he is asocial - the child alone - uncontaminated 
by humanity. We cannot know the child, for in order for the Boy to remain 
forever within the realm of childhood, he must forego the process of acquiring an 
identity. However, the adult Wordsworth who stands beside the grave has 
90 Mary Jacobus, Romanticism 14riting and Sexual Difference: Essays on The Prelude (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press 1989), p. 261. Also see Cynthia Chase's discussion of Paul de Man 'Giving a 
Face to a Name: De Man's Figures' in her Decomposing Figures: Rhetorical Figures: Rhetorical 
Readings in the Romantic Tradition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1986). pp. 
82-112. 
91 Geoffrey H. Hartman, -Was it for this ... 
?" Wordsworth and the Birth of the Gods', Romantic 
Revolutions: Criticism and Theory, eds. Keneth R. Johnston et al, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press 1990). p. 24. 
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acquired an identity. Wordsworth cannot breach the developmental gap between 
himself and the Boy and so is left mute; but, it must be remembered, he is the 
poetic agent of the Boy's stifled development, it is his pen that has brought about 
the Boy's final erasure from the landscape only to be replaced bY the figure of 
the Poet. 
Wordsworth refuses to speculate upon the Boy of Winander's 
development, choosing rather to kill him off than to imagine the type of 
adolescent or young man he would have made. In this way the Boy of Winander 
cannot be unfavourably compared to the young prot6g6s whom he criticises for, 
among other things, their social attributes. Of course to speculate upon the 
growth of a fictional child into adulthood would result in Wordsworth 
resembling the very pedagogues he condemns. And yet why does Wordsworth 
present us with the Boy of Winander at all if such a Boy is doomed to an early 
death? 
Wordsworth's attempt to enter into the debates on education going on 
during his time is beset by his refusal to play by the rules. Wordsworth's refusal 
to think of development in terms of identifiable origins means that he is always 
looking to 'higher' non-human powers in order to explain the growth of a poet's 
mind. Where the human agent enters the picture, as in the case of the mother, 
she is little more than an instrument for exercising the divine will, and is quickly 
dispensed with once her function is at an end. But Wordsworth, despite his 
spiritual mystification of nearly every educational issue he addresses. at points 
goes further than the philosophers he questions. tmile, it will be remembered, 
lives much of his life in social seclusion with only his tutor for a companion. 
Wordsworth goes one step further than this, presenting his childhood self as 
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virtually self-sufficient. The force of nature, a force that plays an important role 
in Rousseau's thinking, plays an even more important role in Wordsworth' s. 
Rousseau tends to fall back on the view that if in doubt trust nature. Wordsworth 
comes close to proposing that we should trust no one but Nature. Wordsworth 
takes the concept of nature from its materialist origins in the Enlightenment. 
reifies it into an ideology, and then denies his source. 
One episode that threatens to 'uncover' the materiality of the human 
subject, revealing the human body's status as a physically definable organic 
structure, is the drowned man episode. Wordsworth, having spotted a *heap of 
garments' on the shore of Esthwaite's lake one evening, returns the next day and 
sees the body of a suicide being dragged out of the water: 'At length, the dead 
Man, 'mid that beauteous scene / Of trees, and hills and water, bolt upright / 
Rose with his ghastly face; a spectre shape of terror even! ' (The Prelude, V, 470- 
473). For a young boy to encounter the naked dead body of an adult male is an 
uncanny experience in the extreme. But however stark the contrast may be 
between the living boy and the dead man, the encounter does involve looking 
upon the human form in its most exposed state, free of its social trappings. As a 
narcissistic encounter with the human form it is deeply troubling, for the 
recognition of resemblance involves the recognition of human mortality. 
Wordsworth encounters a body of his own gender; an adult body whose shape 
reveals the eventual shape his own body will take. 
Despite the horror of the scene Wordsworth manages to conquer his fear, 
by deploying his imagination. his 'inner eye", and seeing the spectacle in relation 
to a more familiar aesthetic register: 
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And yet no vulgar fear, 
Young as I was, a Child not nine years old, 
Possess'd me; for my inner eye had seen 
Such sights before, among the shining streams 
Of Fairy Land, the Forests of Romance: 
Thence came a spirit hallowing what I saw 
With decoration and ideal grace; 
A dignity, a smoothness, like the works 
Of Grecian Art, and purest Poesy. 
(The Prelude, V. 47348 1) 
Wordsworth's 'inner eye' imbues the scene with ý dignity'. but, to state 
the obvious, this is a scene entirely without dignity; a desperate man has ended 
his own life, and what remains of him, a bloated corpse, is on display for all to 
see. So what is Wordsworth dignifying with his aestheticisation of the scene? It 
cannot be the life of the dead man, as Wordsworth's aesthetic imaginings blot out 
the possibility of exploring the man's personality or what might have led to his 
ending his life. Perhaps Wordsworth is attempting to dignify the human form as 
a universal ideal made in the Creator's image. But this also cannot be true, as 
Wordsworth has already allowed his reader to imagine the 'ghastly face' of the 
corpse. What Wordsworth is idealising is the process of aesthetic i sation itsel f. 
92 
Wordsworth disengages himself from this human tragedy. The human body 
before him becomes a prop, a screen onto which he can project his imagination. 
The body becomes a surface, emptied of content, its materiality disembowelled; 
93 
the surface of the dead man's body now has the smoothness of Greek pottery. 
92 See Andrzej Wan-ninski's discussion of the drowned man episode where he links 
Wordsworth's aestheticisation to Paul de Man's concept of *aesthetic ideology' In The Rhetoric 
of Romanticism. Andrzej Wan-ninsky, 'Facing Language: Wordsworth's First Poetic Spirits', 
Romantic Revolutions: Criticism and Theory, eds. Keneth R. Johnston et a], (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press 1990), pp. 47-48. 
93 Cynthia Chase suggests that the Grecian art that Wordsworth would have been most likely to 
have in mind were antique marble statues of the human form. Chase suggests that the 'value' of 
such objects is in part related to the condition of defacement or fragmentation in which theý were 
found. The condition of such objects puts an emphasis on the creativity of the onlooker 'as if 
their effacement empowered the viewer's *inner eye' to recognise its own work of recreation'. 
Cynthia Chase, 'The Accidents of Disfiguration: Limits to Literal and Fi(Turative Reading of I 'In 
Wordsworth's "Books" in Decomposing Figures: Rhetorical Figures: Rhetorical Readings in the 
Romantic Tradition (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press 1986), p. 24, pp. 1 '1-311. 
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The drowned man episode, like so many others in The Prelude, is about 
taking control. The means of empowerment in this instant is literature. The 
school library and the library in his father's house provide Wordsworth xvith a 
resource that can be internalised and converted into a psychological storehouse 
of images and narratives that can be applied to troubling situations. The act of 
reading is an individual act, but it also bespeaks the reader's class. Wordsworth. 
as bourgeois individualist, shares the collective ambition of his class to ýgo it 
alone'. The middle class 'share' the pursuit of knowledge in order to establish 
the myth that they are self-made men. Ultimately then the theme of education in 
Book Five is about empowerment through the acquisition of knowledge. The 
Enlightenment model of the all-knowing tutor is rejected because it would 
involve a loss of power. Indeed, Cynthia Chase suggests that the figure of the 
tutor is not just rejected but 'done-away with', as the drowned man of Book Five 
was inspired by Wordsworth's childhood recollection of the drowning of a local 
school teacher: 'Wordsworth's polemical argument - do away with the 
schoolmasters! - gets transformed in the course of book 5 into an incident that 
literally does away with one. The exemplary educational episode consists in 
seeing a teacher as a dead man. Literary education proves its efficacy in the 
Ill... ability to circumvent mere 'vulgar fear' of the 'ghastly face' of the school master 
risen again'. 94 Unlike tutors, books allow for the acquisition of knowledge 
without demanding submission to another human being. Whereas for Rousseau 
books are the 'curse of childhood' ().; for Wordsworth they are its delight, as they 
set children"s imaginations free and allo-vN- them to pursue their own path to 
94C ynthia Chase, 'The Accidents of Disfiguration: Limits to Literal and Figurame Readina of 
Wordsworth's "Books"', p. 33 
95 See William A. Ulmer, 'Rousseau's tmile and Wordsworth's Drowned Man of Esthwaite', 
English Language Notes, vol. 33-33,1995, pp. 15-19. 
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knowledge: 'May books and nature be their early joy! / And knowledge. rightly 
honor'd with that name, / Knowledge not purchasd with the loss of power! '(The 
Prelude, V, 447-449). Thus Wordsworth is able to deploy the knowledge he has 
acquired in order to establish himself as an autonomous individual. 
But does Wordsworth's presentation of himself as an autonomous 
individual necessarily demand that he symbolically 'dispose" of male authority 
figures who might pose a challenge to him? Is Chase right to see the drowned 
man episode as Wordsworth 'doing away with' the school-master? Another way 
of reading the episode is to see the drowned man not as a representative of 
Wordsworth's triumph over adult male authority, but rather Wordsworth's 
attempt to overcome the loss he experienced at not having a male authority figure 
to triumph over. Moreover, the drowned man might inspire fear, but the fear he 
inspires is not because he poses an immediate threat, but rather that his naked 
body reveals something of human vulnerability; it is his powerlessness that 
terrifies. Wordsworth uses his imagination to cover up the dead man's exposed 
body, to clothe him in his thoughts. 
As has been pointed out, in The Prelude Wordsworth's father is rarely 
mentioned as making any contribution at all to his child's development. By 
asserting his self-sufficiency, by implying that children are better off without 
I men' who attempt to stand in loco parentis, Wordsworth avoids confronting any 
feelings of loss and abandonment he may have felt. Wordsworth may celebrate 
his childhood independence, but this perhaps conceals the sadness that he felt at 
having to be so independent. This sadness is perhaps most strongly conveyed in 
Book Eleven. 
In Book Eleven the experience of loss is linked to the experience of being 
lost and seeking guidance. Wordsworth describes an episode in his childhood 
when he became detached from his guide James, but what is significant is ýN hat 
hefinds when searching for his lost guide. He comes across a spot where a 
gibbet used to be, and because the grass has been cleared away from the spot he 
is able to discern the carved name of the man who was executed. Thus in 
searching for another he encounters a signifier of absence, perhaps revealing to 
him that beneath all experience there is a sense of loss. of times past and people 
gone, that the intensity of the moment cannot quite occupy. The experience of 
6 searching for' can be related to the experiences of waiting and 'looking out for" 
an expected other. This is what Wordsworth, aged around thirteen, remembers 
doing when he and his brothers waited for the horses that would take them home 
for the school holidays. This incident is remembered with real intensity, as it is 
intimately associated with the death of Wordsworth's father a few days later: 
Ere I to school returned 
That dreary time, ere I had been ten days 
A dweller in my father's house, he died, 
And I and my two brothers, orphans then, 
Followed his body to the grave. The event, 
With all the sorrow which it brought, appeared 
A chastisement; and when I called to mind 
That day so lately past, when from the crag 
I looked in such anxiety of hope 
With trite reflections of morality 
Yet in the deepest passion, I bowed low 
To God who thus corrected my desires. 
(The Prelude, XI, 363-374) 
In Book Eleven Wordsworth describes *spots of time' as passages in life, 
particularly those occurring in earl,, - childhood in which the mind asserts control 
over situations that have produced great intensity of feeling: 'Among those 
passages of life in which / We had deepest feelings that the mind 
/ Is lord and 
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master, and the outward sense / Is but the obedient servant of her , vill' (The 
Prelude, XI, 269-272). The drowned man episode in Book Five fits neatly into 
Wordsworth's definition. Wordsworth does indeed use his imagination to gain 
mastery over 'outward sense'. But in relation to the episode in Book Eleven in 
which Wordsworth and his brothers wait for the horses that will take them home,, 
there seems to be a reluctance to gain mastery over the event. 'Wordsworth 
describes his feelings of impatience as he waited for the horses, describing his 
state of mind as 'feverish,, and tired, and restless' (The Prelude, XI. 346). The 
experience of waiting placed him in a liminal space, of being in between places, 
he felt exposed and alone and these feelings are projected onto the landscape: 
'Twas a day / Stormy and rough and wild, and on the grass /I sate half sheltered 
by a naked wall. / Upon my right hand was a single sheep, /A whistling 
hawthorn on my left ... ' (The Prelude, XI, 355 -3 5 9). We might surmise that 
Wordsworth harboured some negative feeling for the man (his father) ultimately 
responsible for arranging the boys' homecoming. These negative feelings come 
back to haunt him following his father's death and carry the psychological 
weight of a chastisement. However. crucially Wordsworth does not attempt to 
justify them, or the righteous indignation that he implies he felt as he waited. 
Indeed, rather than attempt to rise above the situation, to gain mastery over it, he 
submits to it, allowing God to 'correct his desires'. At this point we see 
Wordsworth the orphan, fatherless, motherless and lonely, and facing up to the 
fact. 
This complicates the model of the self that we have identified in which 
Wordsworth presents his childhood development as relatively autonomous and 
celebrates his self-sufficiency. Certainly there is ample evidence throughout The 
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Prelude that the dominant model of the self that Wordsworth subscribes to 
corresponds to the ideology of possessive individualism, but we also have to 
acknowledge that there is an anxiety attached to being your own man that XN, e 
might relate to the fear of being left to oneself Thus while celebrating his 
childhood freedom Wordsworth also acknowledges Nature as a spiritual force 
that is mindful of him and will intervene on his behalf when necessary. The 
anxiety of being left to oneself persists into adulthood and is countered by his 
submission to God's will. For as we have seen, for Wordsworth freedom without 
purpose does not produce a sense of self-possession but of vacancy. In Book 
Five Wordsworth refuses to accept that children should submit to the authority of 
self-appointed tutors, refusing to accept that children should relinquish their 
power and freedom to such men. But the adult Wordsworth fears the 
consequences of being left to make his way in the world without guidance. We 
might relate this to the concept of 'orphanhood'. Wordsworth celebration of 
autonomous growth and the freedom that accompanies it is suggestive of the 
sensibility of an orphan, but when Wordsworth recognises himself as a literal 
orphan he admits his need for company and for guidance, as expressed in his 
poignant address to Coleridge directly following the passage describing his 
memory of waiting for the horses and his father's burial: 'Thou wilt not languish 
here, 0 friend, for whom /I travel in these dim uncertain ways -/ Though wilt 
assist me, as a pilgrim gone / In quest of highest truth. * (The Prelude. XI. 3 89- 
392). Thus, though Wordsworth's fear of being left alone is capable of 
producing a reaction against dependency. at other times it produces a heartfelt 
plea for others to abide with him. 
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Chapter Five 
Is It Man? 
Of what a strange nature is knowledge! It clings to the mind, when it has once 
seized on it, like a lichen on the rock. 
(Frankenstein p. 96) 
The question of what constitutes a human being has concerned 
philosophers for centuries. What separates humans from animals? What is the 
importance of such human attributes as reason and language? What is the 
significance of humanity's relation to God if we are made in God's image? In 
Chapter One we discussed the importance of the figure of 'Man' to the 
Enlightenment project. 'Man' was conceived as a locus of knowledge, and the 
project of 'Man' was understood in relation to the acquisition of knowledge. In 
the following discussion I will address the question of what it means to be human 
in relation to the Creature in Mary Shelley's Frankenstein. My reason for doing 
this is not simply to decide whether the Creature is a human or not. My answer 
to this question is an emphatic yes. What I want to examine is the question itself 
and the ideological assumptions that lie behind it. In order to do this I will focus 
on the Creature's narrative of his life history that he delivers to Victor 
Frankenstein from Part Two, Chapter Three onwards of the 1818 edition. 
Mary Shelley's account of the Creature's first few days of life has much 
in common with Rousseau's view of the newborn in 
tmile. Rousseau's neý, N-born 
has no prior knowledge, but it is capable of learning. All this can be said of 
Shelley's Creature on becoming conscious for the first time. Both Rousseau and 
Shelley are echoing an earlier philosopher, John Locke, whose tabula rasa 
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theory of the human subject in his An Esay Concerning Human Understanding 
resulted in a groundbreaking shift away from Cartesian philosophical thought, 
Descartes, partly as a response to the debate over what distinguishes humans 
from animals,, insisted that humans were bom with innate knowledge or 
principles 'stamped' on their mind by God. In contrast Locke insisted that we 
are born without innate ideas., describing the mind as being like 'white paper void 
of all character' (Essay 11,1,2). Locke, Rousseau and Shelley all emphasise the 
importance of learning to the emergence of human consciousness and 
understanding. So though we may have lost an innate category of 'the human' 
that exists from birth, all three thinkers provide us with a developmental concept 
of a human being, in which learning and education come to define what it means 
to be human. In the following discussion I will focus on the relationship between 
Locke's Essay and the Creature's account of his early life in Frankenstein in 
order to put into question fixed conceptions of what it means to be human. 
Locke in his Essay does not disclaim the concept of innate ideas on 
purely abstract grounds. He gives empirical evidence to support his case, citing 
for example the early life of infants: 
If we will attentively consider newborn children, we shall have little reason to think 
that they bring many ideas into the world with them. For bating perhaps some faint 
ideas of hunger, and thirst, and warmth, and some pains which they may have felt 
in the womb, there is not the least appearance of any settled ideas at all in them, 
especially of ideas answering the terms which make up those universal propositions 
that are esteemed innate principles. One may perceive how, by degrees, 
afterwards, ideas come into their minds, and that they get no more nor no other 
than what experience and the observation of things that come in their way furnish 
them with: which might be enough to satisfy us that they are not original characters 
stamped on the mind. (Essay, 1, IV, 2) 
The connection between Locke's Essaj, and Mary Shelley's Frankenstein 
appears in some of the similarities in Locke's account of the genesis of 
understanding and Shelley's account of the Creature's earlý, life. Like Locke's 
newbom, when the Creature describes his early memories. he recalls 
experiencing warmth, cold, hunger and thirst. It is these early sensations that 
compel him to action. Another observation Locke makes concerning newborn 
children is their reaction to light. He describes how babies 'always turn their 
eyes to that part from whence the light comes, lay them how you please' (Essa-v 
11, IX, 7). Rousseau makes a similar observation concerning newborn children's 
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sensitivity to light in Emile: 'You see his eyes constantly follow the light, and if 
the light comes from the side the eyes turn towards it, so that one must be careful 
to turn his head towards the light lest he should squint. He must also be 
accustomed from the first to the dark, or he will cry if he misses the light' (Emile, 
1, p. 34). Notably, in the Creature's account of his first sensory experiences 
attention is paid to his sensitivity to light and shade: 
It is with considerable difficulty that I remember the original Wra of my being: all 
the events of that period appear confused and indistinct. A strange multiplicity of 
sensations seized me, and I saw, felt, heard, and smelt, at the same time; and it was, 
indeed, a long time before I learned to distinguish between the operations of my 
various senses. By degrees, I remember, a stronger light pressed upon my nerves, 
so that I was obliged to shut my eyes. Darkness then came over me, and troubled 
me; but hardly had I felt this, when, by opening my eyes, as I now suppose, the 
light poured in upon me again. I walked, and, I believe, descended; but I presently 
found a great alteration in my sensations. Before, dark and opaque bodies had 
surrounded me, impervious to my touch and sight; but I now found that I could 
wander on at liberty, with no obstacles which I could not either surmount or avoid. 
The light became more and more oppressive to me; and, the heat wearying me as I 
walked, I sought a place where I could receive shade. This was the forest near 
Ingolstadt; and here I lay by the side of a brook resting from my fatigue, until I felt 
tormented by hunger and thirst. This roused me from my nearly don-nant state, and 
I ate some berries which I found hanging on the trees, or lying on the ground. I 
slaked my thirst at the brook; and then lying down, was overcome by sleep. 
(Frankenstein p. 80) 
At first the Creature's experiences are confused and indistinct, as he is unable to 
distinguish one sensation from another. But slowly particular sensations become 
distinct and unmixed. The Creature describes a period of time marked by shifts in 
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light and darkness, as night follows day. at the end of which he is able to identifý- 
distinct sensations. At this point the speed of his learning appears to accelerate: *The 
moon had disappeared from night and again with lessened form. shewed itself, while 
I remained in the forest. My sensations had, by this time, become distinct, and ni)- 
mind received every day additional ideas' (Frankenstein p. 81). 
In time the Creature begins to take control of his own 'education'. B N, 
reflecting on ideas in context, he is able to begin to order his thoughts and so to make 
use of the flood of sensations he is being subjected to. In this way he is no longer 
subject to sensation but becomes a subject vith sensations that he can manipulate to his 
own ends. This 'learning curve' can be applied to Locke's theory concerning the 
development of understanding. In the case of newborn children sensory input is 
involuntary, but over time the infant's mind becomes more active. 
The Creature's ability to direct his own thought processes and make 
practical use of the knowledge he acquires is illustrated by the episode in kvhich 
he discovers a fire left by some beggars. Locke in the Essay relates the question 
of innate ideas to the discovery of fire, and again makes reference to children. 
doubt not but if a colony of young children should be placed in an island where 
no fire was, they would certainly neither have any notion of such a thing nor 
name for it.. .' 
(Essay, 1, IV, 2). Locke's reference to a colony of children 
challenges the notion of collective knowledge. If no individual in a group has 
experience of something, then that group has no knowledge of it. An individual 
may communicate his knowledge to others but the foundation of kno,,, N-ledge is in 
an individual's experience. True to Locke NA-hen the Creature first approaches 
fire, he has no notion of what it is or its dangers, and so, initially attracted by its 
wan-nth, puts his hand into it and experiences extreme pain. From this 
he bcuyjjpý 
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to gain a notion of cause and effect: 'How strange I thought, that the same cause 
should produce such opposite effects! ' (Frankenstein p. 8 1). His understanding 
of cause and effect is a complex one because it includes the concept of degree. 
He also deduces that the fire is produced by wood, and proceeds to get more 
wood from the forest. However, the wood is wet and will not bum, but he 
discovers that by putting the wood by the fire and drying it out it becomes 
combustible. Finally by observing the effect of the breeze on the fire he 
contrives to make a fan out of branches in order to keep the fire going. From this 
episode we know that the Creature is profoundly intelligent, inquisitive and 
inventive. At this stage in the narrative the Creature has begun to take control of 
his own 'education'. He is able to choose 'amongst its ideas, which it vvill think 
on' and 'pursue the inquiry of this or that subject' (Essay 11, VII, 3). He becomes 
attentive to, and able to direct his own thought processes. 
However, this does not mean that the world around him is seen for what it 
is, but only that he is able to order his senses and so make sense of his immediate 
environment. The perception of a sensation is subjective. Locke makes clear 
that our ideas do not reside in the objects that produce sensation. The sensations 
we receive produce a particular kind of awareness, but this awareness is not 
reality, and cannot claim to fully represent the world beyond the senses. The 
reality of the world beyond the senses will always be the disordered and 
nonsensical world we first perceive it to be. Even in adult life we perceive this 
disordered and nonsensical reality in 'bare naked perception'. but we are not 
aware that we perceive it, though we see it whether we want to or not: * ... in 
bare naked perception, the mind is. of the most part, onlv passive. and what it 
perceives, it cannot avoid perceiving" (Essay. 11. IX. 1). To focus on the vistial. 
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'bare naked perception', what might be called the image of reality. remains 
behind the 'scene' and without it there is no 'scene'. So we make order out of 
reality, but this order does not reside in reality. Rather order resides in our 
awareness, our understanding, of the processes of perception, and the position of 
the self in relationship to these processes, in 'the perception of the operations qf 
our own minds within us' (Essay, 11,1,4). As we gain control over our thought 
processes the understanding we acquire becomes second nature to us, and so we 
confuse it with reality. We believe that what we see is the world as it is, and that 
knowledge is somehow out there. The Creature's narrative emphasises the 
involuntary nature of the early stages of learning. In the above extract where the 
Creature relays his earliest memories he describes how he is 'seized' by a 
4multiplicity of sensations'. Similarly, in Locke's account of a newbom's first 
experience of sensation the infant is little more than a passive recipient of 
sensation indeed sensations force their way into the child's mind: 
But all that are born into the world being surrounded with bodies that perpetually 
and diversely affect them, variety of ideas, whether care be taken about it or no, are 
imprinted on the minds of children. Light and colours are busy at hand everywhere 
when the eye is but open; sounds and some tangible qualities fail not to solicit their 
proper senses and force an entrance to the mind (Essay, 11,1,6) 
In Shelley's account the Creature is forced into being, experiencing a 
multiplicity of sensations all at once. We might liken its experience to the shock 
of diving into a freezing cold lake on a hot summer day. The Creature's response 
to this early trauma is not one of emotional neutrality: he feels pain. The 
Creature is 'oppressed' by light, 'tormented" by hunger and thirst. Life is hellish. 
and the Creature's emotional response to it is one of abject despair. 
It is important to note that the Creature is telling his story in retrospect, and 
is without doubt attempting to elicit the sympathy of his listener Victor 
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Frankenstein by adding emotional details to his narrative. But e,, -en in vie,, N- of 
this the Creature's account does appear to suggest that he was capable of 
emotional sensitivity from very early on in his life. For example, the Creature 
remembers weeping after being compelled to leave Frankenstein's apartment and 
finding himself with insufficient clothing to keep warm and to protect himself 
from the dampness of the forest: 'I was a poor helpless miserable ý, N-retch; I knexv. 
and could distinguish nothing but, feeling pain invade me on all sides, I sat down 
and wept' (Frankenstein p. 80). At this stage in his development the Creature has 
no knowledge of self, of his environment, or of his emotions. But though he may 
not know why he is crying until later in his life, he is nevertheless capable of an 
emotional response to his material circumstances. Clearly, the Creature's 
narrative is designed to elicit parental feelings from Victor Frankenstein, and to 
encourage his guilt for the abandonment of his creation when he needed him 
most. However, the narrative also elicits parental feelings from the reader. As a 
reader I respond to the Creature as I would to a lost child. As readers we may 
feel the desire to alleviate the Creature's suffering, and so feel a sense of 
helplessness at being unable to do so. The Creature's discomfort at being beset 
on all sides by painful sensations echoes Rousseau description of a newborn baby 
in Book One of Emile: 
As man's first state is one of want and weakness, his first sounds are cries and 
tears. The child feels his needs and cannot satisfy them, he begs for help by his 
cries. Is he hungry or thirsty? There are tears, is he too cold or too hot? More tears; 
he needs movement and is kept quiet, more tears; he wants to sleep and is 
disturbed, he weeps. The less comfortable he is, the more he demands change. He 
has only one language because he has, so to say, only one kind of discomfort. In 
the imperfect state of his sense organs he does not distinguish their several 
impressions; all ills produce one feeling of sorrow. (tmile, 1, p. 337) 
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In the above passage Rousseau puts the reader into the position of a parent 
trying to attend to a baby's needs. But of course in Shelley's novel the Creature 
has no one to look after him and puzzle over how his suffering may be alleviated. 
Frankenstein is a novel very much in the tradition of educational treatises of the 
eighteenth century. In many ways it responds to the most influential of these 
works, Rousseau's Emile, but it also serves as a critique of it. What Shelley 
stresses in her novel is that children have a right to love and parental affection 
from birth. By stressing the Creature's suffering Shelley is implicitly criticising 
the way that educationalists such as Rousseau theorised about the needs of 
children but failed to attend to these needs in real life. Victor Frankenstein 
theorises before the birth of the Creature about how a new race of beings will 
'bless' him as their creator, but when faced with the being he has created he 
abandons him and runs away from his responsibilities. Similarly Rousseau's 
abandonment of his own children didn't prevent him from demanding the 
gratitude of his fictional protege at the end of Emile. As James O'Rourke points 
out, Mary Shelley was acutely aware of what she describes as Rousseau's 
criminal act, and went so far as to speculate upon the possible fate of Rousseau's 
children in an entry she made in Dionysius Lardner's Cabinet Cyclopedia: 'Five 
of his children were thus sent to a receptacle where few survive; and those who 
do go through life are brutified by their situation, or depressed by the burden, 
ever weighing at the heart, that they have not inherited the commonest right of 
humanity, a parent's care'. 96 We can draw a clear parallel here with the Creature 
who is both brutalised and weighed down by the psychological burden of his 
96 Mary Shelley, 'Rousseau' in Mary Shelley's Literaiý, Lives and Other Writings, vol. _3 3, French 
Lives (Afolijre to Madame de Sta&I), ed. Clarissa Campbell Orr (London: Pickerm,! and Chatto 
2002), p. 334. For a discussion of Shelleý's response to Rousseau's act of abandonment see 
James O'Rourke, "'Nothing more Unnatural": MarN Shellev's Revision of Rousseau', ELH. ýol. In 
56 (1989), pp. 543-569- 
164 
abandonment. But unlike Rousseau's children, who Shelley rightlY observes 
would have probably died in infancy, the Creature manages to surviN-e against the 
odds, and lives to tell his tale. Mary Shelley's novel poses the question: ,, N-hat if 
an abandoned child was able to remember the pain and desperation that 
accompanied its abandonment? Both Rousseau and Locke treat children in 
earliest infancy as little more than a bundle of sensations, as yet unable to 
remember, or 'read' into the experiences that are happening to them. Mar. N 
Shelley risks accusation of implausibility by having her child remember 
everything. Moreover, again perhaps a little clumsily, she provides the Creature 
with the knowledge, contained in its portmanteau, which will allow him to point 
the finger of blame at his creator. In doing this she challenges the adult 
assumption that children don't bear grudges or that they simply won't remember 
what is done to them. Mary Shelley's child neither forgives nor forgets. She 
rejects mechanistic concepts of child development, and instead insists on the 
importance of children's emotional responses to the experiences they are going 
through. Moreover she reveals how neglect in childhood can shape personality. 
informing the sufferer's sense of who they are. 
Mary Shelley stresses the humanity of children by stressing the importance 
of childhood memory. The traumatic experiences of the Creature leave 
emotional imprints on his mind. These imprints are not imbued with significance 
at the time of their occurrence but are imbued with meaning retrospectively. For 
the Creature they function as key co-ordinates around which he can weave his 
narrative. 
The act of narration is clearly a creative act. The Creature remembers his 
early life with *considerable difficulty'. The story he tells involves him giving a 
165 
narrative order to disordered sensory information, so that he might produce a 
narrative of the self that is meaningful to him. He then retells his story to a 
listener, and we must assume from this that he alters his story in response to his 
audience. So the Creature's narrative builds upon a number of narrative layers. 
but the foundation of these layers of narration are the imprints left by his 
emotional responses to sensory experiences. 
The Creature's narrative allows him to give temporal order to his life. He 
is able to recollect and retell the series of events that led him to the position he 
now finds himself in. But this order is imposed. The trauma that accompanies 
his first entrance into life is never overcome. Moreover, the trauma is heightened 
by the fact that he realises, again retrospectively, how utterly alone he was when 
he was most in need of support. 
To live life, the existential experience of being, and to narrate life, are 
two very different things. The Creature's narrative provides him with a figure, 
himself, that he can identify with, and sympathise with. The self becomes 'other* 
over time. This temporal gap produces a division between the present and past 
selves; this division allows the Creature to develop an emotional intimacy 
towards its past 'self. Memory in this instant is a kind of self-nurture -a form of 
caress. The Creature has a tremendous personal investment in the narrative he 
delivers. He has a psychic dependence on it that is equivalent in intensity to a 
child's relationship with its parent. He takes on the parental role when looking 
back at his past self The recognition in the present of how alone and in need of 
aid he was in the past is the closest he comes to experiencing parental concern. 
However, the Creature's temporal location of himself is problematic. He may 
have begun life like a 'blank sheet of paper", but there is no reason to believe that 
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he is capable of relaying every experience he has had since birth as if he is 
reading from an inscribed sheet containing all that has happened to him. The 
Creature is caught in a loop of self-reflection in an attempt to contain himself *in 
totality' within the confines of his narrative. The Creature. as an alienated 
individual, throws himself back onto himself, constantly remembering past 
experiences and events, in a desperate attempt to hold himself together. 
Locke makes clear in his account of the function of memory. that 
memories in early childhood are lost to adult life: 'leaving no more footsteps or 
remaining characters of themselves than shadows do flying over fields of corn" 
(Essay 11, X, 4). The grand moment of self-recognition that characterises so 
much of philosophical thinking on subjectivity is absent from Locke's thinking. 
In Locke human consciousness is ongoing and expansive; it expands with our 
experience. In this context it would be wrong to think of the self in terms of the 
subject's reflection on a totality that it comes to recognise as *itself. The ability 
to reflect is not the crowning achievement of consciousness. Indeed our ability 
to reflect is founded upon sensory experience. In Locke's schema reflection is 
not so distinct from the five senses. Locke describes it as a kind of sixth sense, 
referring to it as an internal sense: 
This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself, and though it be not sense, 
as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might 
properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other sensation, so I call 
this REFLECTION, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets bý 
reflecting on its own operations within itself By REFLECTION then ... I would 
be understood to mean that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and 
the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations 
in the understanding. (Essay, 11.1,4) 
The self, if it must be defined, is a composite of mental processes and 
operations. But these processes and operations never achie\, e temporal closure. 
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There is a gap in time between our experience of sensation and our reflection on 
it, and though this gap may be as short as the space between ideas , it nevertheless 
means that the articulation of the 'I amý is always an echo of something that wem 
before. 
In early infancy the act of reflection is not something we can control or 
contain. Indeed even as adults we cannot fully control it. though we can impose 
some order on it. Rather we reflect whether we will it or not. In this context, the 
self-act, the articulation of the 'I am', is one act of reflection in a sea of 
sensations and reflections that go on for as long as we are conscious: 
In this part the understanding is merely passive; and whether or no it will have 
these beginnings and, as it were, materials of knowledge, is not in its own power. 
For the objects of our senses do, many of them, obtrude their particular ideas upon 
our minds whether we will or no; and the operations of our minds will not let us be 
without, at least, some obscure notions of them. (Essay, 11,1,25) 
So though in adulthood our minds are active, and to a great extent ,, N-e are able to 
direct our thoughts, we cannot stop our thoughts. Moreover, it is this flow of 
ideas in the mind that allows us to experience the sensation of being: 
For whilst we are thinking or whilst we receive successively several ideas in our 
minds, we know that we do exist; and so we call the existence of ourselves, or 
anything else commensurate to the succession of any ideas in our minds, the 
duration of ourselves or any such other thing co-existing with our thinking'. 
(Essay, 11, XIV, 3) 
The knowledge we have of 'the duration of ourselves' is not a totalised 
knowledge spanning from the beginning of our existence to the present time. 
Rather it is the product of the experience of duration - of being over time. The 
discrepancy between the time it takes to tell a story and the time it took to livc 
in that story. reveals the huge gap between existence and the memorN of haN 
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existed. If we tell another the story of our life, as the Creature attempts to. , vc 
are forced to work within the temporal confines imposed by narration. we are 
constrained by the time it takes to recall and retell. Life is more than the sense of 
self-, it allows for this sensation but it is not this sensation. In Locke a distinction 
is made between the self or selves, as objects of personal history. and personal 
identity: 
But that which seems to make the difficulty is this: that this consciousness being 
interrupted always by forgetfulness, there being no moment of our lives ýN herein 
we have the whole train of all our past actions before our eyes in one view, but 
even the best memories losing the sight of one part whilst theý are viewing another; 
and we sometimes, and that the greatest part of our lives, not reflecting on our past 
selves, being intent on our present thought, and in sound sleep having no thoLight at 
all, or at least none with that consciousness which remarks our waking thoughts; I 
say, in all these cases, our consciousness being interrupted, and we losing the sight 
of our past selves, doubts are raised whether we are the same thinking thing, i. e. the 
same substance or no. Which, however reasonable or unreasonable, concerns not 
personal identity at all: the question being what makes the same person, and not 
whether it be the same identitical substance, which always thinks in the same 
person; which, in this case, matters not at all: different substances, bý the same 
consciousness (where they do partake in it) being united into one person, as well as 
different bodies by the same life are united into one animal, whose identity is 
preserved in that change of substance by the unity of one continued I ife. (Essay, 11, 
XXVII, 10) 
Consciousness provides the self with an identity -a sense of sameness over 
time. But consciousness is not continuous, as it is open to interruptions such as 
when we are asleep, and inconsistencies, such as lapses in memory. However, 
when we return to consciousness, for example after sleep, we do not begin again, 
rather something of the self is carried forward. Michael Ayer's writing on Locke 
describes the link between conscious states as the *intentionality of its successi-ve 
states'. 97 Intentionality can be linked to time-consciousness and the self s abiht, 
to achieve temporal orientation - where I have been. where I am, ý, N here I am 
going. The experience of being conscious provides us with a measure bý which 
97 Michael Ayers, Locke: Epistemology and Ontology, vol. 2 (London: Routledge 1996). p. 26 5 
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we can identify ourselves. We can reflect upon the experience of bein(2 
conscious and see it as an experience common to our individual life. But 
reflection is always a backward glance, and so cannot achieve temporal closure. 
Consciousness goes on during the moment of reflection, as does life, and is not 
contained in the instant of reflection. 
Life, perhaps more than consciousness. may appear to provide us with a 
stable continuum within which the self can be located. Indeed life appears to 
extend beyond the materiality of the body. As Locke makes clear in the above 
extract, the body may undergo substantial changes over time but what unites it is 
ýone continuous life'. In the human lifecycle, for example, we change from a 
child into an adult, and even in adulthood the body undergoes substantial 
changes through the aging process. In relation to corporeality there is no 
synchronic moment that we can dissect in which the body achieves a substantial 
material unity. 
The fact that the body can undergo substantial change while containing 
the same life relates to Frankenstein. The Creature is comprised of a collection 
of body parts. Some of these body parts would have been vital to the person they 
previously belonged to. But what is their status after the death of that person? 
Should they be regarded as dead matter, or as 'belonging' to their original owner 
even though their original owner is no longer alive" Does their status change 
when they become part of another living being, in this case the Creature? 
" One 
answer, and the one that I would subscribe to, is to regard body parts in relation 
to their contribution to the life of the person they are attached to at a particular 
98 Michael Ayer's discusses some of these issues in the context of Locke*s Essqv relatim! them to 
contempory medical practices such as amputation and transplantation. Locke: Epistemoiogv and 
Ontology, vol. 2 (London: Routledge 1996). p. 224-21215. 
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time. In this sense the body is no more than the sum of its parts. Hwwever. it is 
important to stress that life cannot exist without some form of body. So what %ve 
might say, then, is that life is produced by the sum of body parts, and their 
organisation within an individual organism. But life also brings a unity to this 
organisation and contributes to the continuation of the body as a living strticture. 
To return to the question of what makes us human. Clearly any definition 
of the human cannot be reduced to a question of material substance. Neither can 
it be reduced to questions of the form that bodily matter takes. This is not to sav 
that as beings we are not spatially confined. Though it is problematic to put 
spatial boundaries on the self in terms of bodily contours, it is also obvious that 
the human subject is not spatially diffuse. But the spatial and temporal 
confinement of the human subject should not be confused with issues of form 
and physical definition. So far in our discussion of the Creature's early life there 
has been nothing that would exclude him from the title of human. We are left 
then with the issue of the Creature's form. It is interesting to consider whether 
John Locke would have regarded the Creature of Shelley's novel as human or 
not. Certainly, as a Christian Locke may well have had major objections to a 
Creature made by a man being regarded as human. Nevertheless, what I think 
we can assume is that Locke would not have excluded the Creature from 
humanity on the grounds of its form. 
In Book Three, Chapter Seven, of the Essay Locke discusses the issue of 
how we define the 'species" man. Unusually for Locke he becomes quite 
anecdotal in his discussion of this issue. At one point Locke retells a story bý a 
Monsieur Menage about the Abbot of St Martin. The Abbot was bom deformed. 
and the extent of his deformity led to questions being raised as to whether he 
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should be baptised or not. Baptism in this instant can be seen as conferrin, -, on 
the baptised the stamp of the human. as well as initiating children into Christian 
fellowship: 
When the Abbot of St Martins ... was born he had so little of the figure of a man 
that it bespake him rather a monster. It was for some time under deliberation 
whether he should be baptized or no. However, he was baptised and declared a 
man provisionally (till time should show what he would prove). Nature had 
moulded him so untowardly that he was called all his life the Abbot Malotru. i. e. 
ill-shaped ... This child we see was very near being excluded out of the species of 
man, barely by his shape. He escaped very narro'ýýk as he was; and, it is certain, a 
figure a little more oddly had cast him, and he had been executed as a thing not to 
be allowed to pass for a man. And yet there can be no reason given why. if the 
lineament of his face had been a little altered, a rational soul could not have been 
lodged in him; why a visage somewhat longer. or a nose flatter, or a wider mouth 
could not have consisted, as well as the rest of his figure, with such a soul, such 
parts as made him, disfigured as he was, capable to be a dignitary in the church. 
(Essay, 111, VI, 26) 
In this passage, again unusually for Locke, there does appear to be an 
element of humour, we might even say satire. The idea of making judgements 
13'k about what constitutes a man purely on the grounds of physical form is shown to 
be absurd. How can a judgement that can result in the life or death of someone 
be decided on issues relating to the extent of that person's deformity with a 
council of men deliberating over the flatness of a child's nose or the width of its 
mouth. The eventual decision to baptise him and make him a man 
'provisionally' is also absurd in its legalistic attempt to find a compromise. 
Locke seems to be asking, though not explicitly, what right have these men to 
cast judgement on this child? 99 Similarly Mary Shelley in Frankenstein can be 
seen to address the same question - what right have we to judge whether the 
99 Locke goes on to discuss this question in relation to hypothetical beings w, th fantast, c 
forms: 
'Who would undertake to resolve what species that monster was of which is mentioned 
by 
Licetus, with a man's head and hogs body? Or those other which to the bodies of nien 
had the 
heads of beasts, as dogs, horses, etc. If any of these creatures had lived and could 
ha% e spoke. it 
would have increased the difficultý'. Had the upper part to the middle been of 
human shape. and 
all below swine, had it been murder to destroy it? Or must the bishop ha" e 
been consulted 
whether it were man enough to be admitted to the font or no? (Essqv% IIIý VI, 
2 7) 
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Creature is human or not? Indeed we may conclude that this act of Judgernent' 
is self-referential, for implicit in the question 4ý is it man' is the declaration *1 am 
man'). 
The idea of man having a fixed form would have been further 
complicated for Mary Shelley by her reading of Rousseau's Second Discourse. 
The parallel between the Creature and Rousseau's natural man. which has been 
much commented on,, helps to explain the difference in form between the 
Creature and modem man. 100 Using this model, in Victor Frankenstein"s 
creation we see not so much the construction of a 'deformed' man, but the 
excavation,, or rather reconstruction of the original man. In the Second Discourse 
Rousseau accepts that there would have been 'successive changes in the 
constitution of man', taking place over thousands of years, that would have 
physically distinguish natural man from civilised man. 10 1 These changes are the 
result of human beings' adaptation to their environment, for example. as natural 
man 'applied his limbs to new uses, and fed himself on new kinds of food' his 
constitution would have slowly changed in order to conform to the physical 
100 See Paul A. Cantor, Creature and Creator: Myth-making and English Romanticism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984), p. 119-122; David Marshall, The Surprising 
Effects ofSympathy: Marivaux, Diderot, Rousseau and Mary Shelley (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1988) p. 183-184; Anne K. Mellor, Mary Shelley: Her Life, Her Myth Her 
Monsters (London: Routledge 1988) p. 47-50; James O'Rourke, "'Nothing More Unnatural": 
Mary Shelley's Revision of Rousseau', ELH, vol. 56 (1989), p. 543-569; Alan Richardson 'From 
tmile to Frankenstein: The Education of Monsters', European Romantic Review. vol. 2 (199 1) 
p. 147-162. 
10' The idea that some form of physical mutation had occurred in human beings was gaining in 
respectability from the mid eighteenth century onwards. For example Pierre Maupertuls, 
President of the Berlin Academy, believed that mutations had occurred in nature in general. and 
made racial differences in human beings a particular focus for his studies. See P. J. Marshall and 
Glyndwr Williams, The Great Map ofMankind: British Perception of the World in the Age of 
Enlightenment (London: J. M. Dent and Sons 1982), p. 244. Comte de Buffon in his Vatural 
History, General and Particular, also suggested that changes in the human constitution were the 
result of environmental adaption: 'Mankind are not composed of species essentiallý different 
from each other; that, on the contrary, there was originalIN but one species, who. after multlpl% in" 
and spreading over the NN,, hole surface of the earth, have undergone various changes by tile 
influence of climate, food, mode of living, epidemic diseases, and the ml\ture of di"s'Imilar 
individuals' (quoted in The Great Map of Mankind pp. 244-245). 
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demands being made upon it (Second Discourse p. 52). The more human beings 
co-operated and formed social bonds and cultural structures, the more control 
they had over their environment. Thus in time human beings' physical 
constitutions would adapt to an environment that was largely of their own 
making. This would have resulted in a decisive difference in the physical 
constitutions of civilised man and his savage predecessor. Rousseau, while 
accepting that significant changes had taken place in humanity's phN-sical 
constitution, refuses to speculate upon whether, for example, natural man -., vas 
covered from head to foot in hair, or had long talons, or walked on all fours, 
claiming that on these issues he could 'form none but vague and imaginary 
conjectures' (Second Discourse p. 52). To get round this, and for arguments sake, 
Rousseau chooses to regard the human body as having always been as it is now 
(Second Discourse p. 52). But though Rousseau refuses to engage in vague 
imaginings about the appearance of the original man, his very refusal may haw 
encouraged curious readers to engage in such speculations for themselves, and 
one of these readers may well have been Mary Shelley. 
Frankenstein, if read in the context of the Second Discourse, is a novel 
about humanity's inability to recognise who we are in what we were. The 
Creature's form is perceived in relation to the idealism that is attached to the 
human form by a particular culture at a particular time in history. In the case of 
the Creature his perceived deformity does not prevent him from being stronger. 
more agile and more physically robust than modem man (all attributes that 
support the idea that he does indeed represents pre-civilised man). He is 
excluded from society for one reason alone - his form does not fit into 
enlightened Europe's aesthetic register. David Marshall. who relates the thinking 
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of Rousseau to Mary Shelley, picks up on the theme of communal modes of 
seeing and what we might term the tribalism of perception. He remarks on a 
section from Rousseau's Essay on the Origin ofLanguage that has particular 
relevance to Frankenstein. Rousseau depicts a time in which primitive man wa-s 
so cocooned in the social cell of the family that he was unable to regard those 
outside his tribe as fellow men: 
Never having seen anything beyond their own immediate milieu, they did not even 
understand that; they did not understand themseives. They had the concept of a 
father, a son, a brother, but not that of a man. Their hut contained all of their 
fellow men. Stranger, beast, monster: these were all one to them. Apart from 
themselves and their family, the whole universe would count as nothing to them. 102 
As David Marshall points out Mary Shelley appears to complicate 
Rousseau's theory of tribal kinship. It is the Creature, the embodiment of the 
homme sauvage, who is able to feel sympathy and identify with the cottagers, 
whereas the 'civilised' cottagers cannot include him in their idea of man. 
Marshall goes on to point out that the cottagers and Victor Frankenstein's 
inability to recognise the Creature might be put down to their faulty vision. 
What they refuse to see in the Creature is his resemblance to them. His 
deformity is what horrifies; if he was of an entirely different form the fear he 
inspired would be of a wholly different nature. Marshall comments: 
'Frankenstein ... suggests that people might regard the monster as a monster 
precisely because they perceive his resemblance; they might reftise to recognise 
him as a man, a human creature, precisely because they apprehend the extent to 
-) 103 which this monster is the figure of a man . What the Creature's 
defonnity 
reveals is that the concept of idealised form is a cultural product that arises \ý Ith 
102 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Essm, on the Origin ol'Language in On the origin oj'Language, trans. 
John H Moran and Alexander Gode (Chicago: Universiv, of Chicago Press 1986) p., 
', 
103 ibid, p. 208. 
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the development of social formations whose kinship is in part founded upon a 
shared aesthetic ideology. 
In the above discussion I have tended to prioritise time o\-er space in 
relation to the question of what constitutes a human being. I have stressed 
Locke's emphasis on being over time in relation to life and consciousness, and 
Rousseau's and Mary Shelley's refusal of an idealist model that suggests that the 
human form transcends historical transformation. I have done this in order to put 
into question the idea that humans have a stanclardised material form. However, 
in doing this I am not proposing that the self is somehow disembodied. Indeed in 
the case of Frankenstein the Creature's misery is the result of his being trapped 
within a body that others find hideous. 
From our earlier discussion of the learning process, we know that Locke 
stresses the importance of sensory experience to the acquisition of ideas. 
Sensory experience cannot be separated from bodily experience. In Shelley's 
account of the Creature the accumulation of sensory information allows him to 
navigate his way through the forest. In Frankenstein as in Rousseau's ýmile, 
sensory awareness and spatial awareness develop together. Sensory experience. 
though often taken for granted, significantly contributes to the experience of 
living and to our conception of the self. 
Our awareness of our bodies tends to increase when we experience an 
intense sensation. For example, if a person became seriously ill and experienced 
intense physical pain, then the experience of such pain would transform. perhaps 
even come to define that person"s experience of living. If the pain became 
unbearable then it might even induce that person to want to end their life. The 
experience of such pain can alter an individual's consciousness of the passage of 
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time. The duration of the pain would come to signify that person*s continued 
existence. 
The experience of pain charactenses the Creature's life in Frankenstein. 
The pain the Creature experience is emotional pain. Such intense emotional pain 
is not so different from physical pain, and can indeed come to define the 
temporal experience of living. In this way the Creature's experience of 
emotional pain can be linked to his self-awareness. His knowledge that he has 
suffered and is suffering, and is set to go on suffering in the future is another 
illustration of his humanity. Human beings' awareness that their emotional 
outlook is unique to them and informed by their life experiences informs their 
sense of individuality. But this awareness can also produce as sense of emotional 
isolation, of being locked inside one's own mind. Mary Shelley makes an 
important epistemological distinction between two types of knoxvledge, one 
objective the other subjective. The objective form of knowledge is Lockean in 
nature and is founded on sensation and instinctual drives. The Creature becomes 
increasingly nostalgic for this limited form of knowledge: 'Oh that I had for ever 
remained in my native wood, nor known or felt beyond the sensation of hunger, 
thirst, and heat! ' (Frankenstein p. 96). To have feelings beyond the duration of a 
particular sensation, to feel for oneself as the subject of experience, involves a far 
more subjective, a far more human form of knowledge. As his narrative 
progresses it is clear that the Creature begins to feet for himself, but most 
importantly he cannot disentangle himself from the feelings he is having, feelings 
that increasingly come to dominate his entire outlook on life. Unable to 
disconnect the knowledge he has acquired from his emotional outlook. the 
Creature contemplates suicide as a means of alleviating his pain: 'I wi-shed 
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sometimes to shake off all thought and feeling: but I learned that there was but 
one means to overcome the sensation of pain, and that ý, N-as death -a state that I 
feared yet did not understand' (Frankenstein pp-96-97). In a strange way the 
Creature's lack of understanding, his sense of the unknowable, yet again marks 
him out as human. For Mary Shelley a person's humanity is not only understood 
in terms of self-determination - the autonomous individual making his way in the 
world - but by the human capacity to be aware that we are not in total control of 
our thoughts and feelings, that things go on within and without us whether xve 
will it or not. 
The Creature's pain increases with his developing knowledge of his 
circumstances. The Creature cannot stop thinking. He cannot stop the endless 
succession of his thoughts, and the constant expansion of his understanding and 
knowledge. In Frankenstein knowledge is something inescapable. Frankenstein 
is in many ways a book concerning the inability of the human subject to remain 
ignorant. We are 'educated' whether we want to be or not, as we cannot close 
ourselves off to sensation and reflection. If we were to paraphrase the Creature's 
lament it might go something like this: 'I did not ask to be given life and yet I am 
compelled to live, and the more I live the more I learn, though the knowledge I 
acquire is painful to me'. The Creature's 'educational' experience could not be 
more different from that of his creator Victor Frankenstein. Learning for the 
young Frankenstein is a pleasurable pursuit. His aim in life is to push forward 
the boundaries of human knowledge. He is the very model of the enlightened 
subject. whom Adorno and Horkheimer describe as projecting the subjective 
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onto nature. 1 04 The reply to the Sphinx's riddle is taken to its ultimate 
conclusion in Mary Shelley's novel with Frankenstein's creation of a human 
being. But Frankenstein's 'creationý cannot be contained in the field of 
knowledge that Frankenstein inhabits because he does not fit into the mould of 
'Man'. Alienated from the model of knowledge offered by the Enlightenment 
the Creature develops an independent understanding of what it means to be atiý, ýc, 
and what it means to be human. In the Creature we have the figure of the human 
existing outside the ideology of the human. 
104 Adomo, Theodor W. and Horkheimer. Max. Dialectic of Enlightenmem, trans. John 
Cumming 
(London: Verso 1997), p-7- 
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Chapter Six 
Alienation in Language 
Part One 
The first part of this Chapter explores Rousseau's beliefs conceming 
children's language development in Emile, and the influence of John Locke's 
philosophy of language on Rousseau's thinking. What I want to emphasise is the 
anxiety that Rousseau and Locke felt when confronted with the relationship 
between language and socialisation, and how they downplay it in their writing. 
In the second half of the Chapter I shall turn my attention to Mary Shelley and to 
the episode in Frankenstein in which the Creature acquires language. Mary 
Shelley was acquainted with the writings of many of those who influenced the 
Enlightenment including Rousseau and Locke. However. unlike these txýo 
philosophers Mary Shelley addresses the relationship between language 
development and socialisation head on. In doing so she comes close to revealing 
why this issue caused such anxiety for her philosophical predecessors. 
In Chapter One the concept of negative education was established as being 
key to understanding Rousseau's pedagogy. Rousseau's espousal of negative 
education also applies to his theory of the rate at which a child's language should 
develop. The child should not be taught' to speak in a formal fashion, and the 
pace of his development should not be forced or prematurely hastened. Rousseau 
places no order on a child's language development but he does place restrictions 
on it: 'Let the child's vocabulary, therefore. be limited; it is very undesirable that 
he should have more words than ideas, that he should be able to saý more than he 
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thinks' (Emile, 1, p. 47). Rousseau's demand that as close a relationship as 
possible exists between distinct ideas and the verbal signifiers that they refer to, 
echoes the language theory of John Locke. 
In Book Three of the An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. - of 
Words', Locke puts forward a theory of language that views words as signifiers 
of ideas. This is important, because Locke disassociates himself from the then 
commonly held view that words stand for things. When Adam in 'Genesis' 
named the objects around him the orthodoxy demands that the first names were 
divinely sanctioned. Locke at the very least comes from a post-Babel 
perspective. Locke stresses that the relationship between an idea and the word 
that signifies that idea is an arbitrary relationship. 
Thus we may conceive how words, which were by nature so well adapted to that 
purpose, come to be made use of by men as the sign of their ideas: not by any 
natural connexion that there is between particular articulate sounds and certain 
ideas, for then there would be but one language amongst all men; but by a 
voluntary imposition whereby such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of such an 
idea. The use, then, of words is to be sensible marks of ideas, and the ideas they 
stand for are their proper and immediate signification. (EssaY. 111,11,1) 
Following Ferdinand de Saussure. the view that the relationship between 
signifier and signified is arbitrary has become well established. But Locke's 
much earlier conception of the arbitrary nature of this relationship has some 
added complications. Locke emphasises the subjective nature of language. A 
word refers to an idea in an individual's mind: 'ivords, in their primarv or 
I. mmediate signification, standfor nothing but the ideas in the mind of him that 
uses them" (Essay Ill. 11,2). Using a Lockean model of language \ý e cannot 
assume that the word we are using to signiýv an idea in our own mind Nvill 
necessarily signify the same idea in the mind of another. Thus the limits of' 
ISI 
language are the limits of an individual*s acquired knowledge. Locke insists that 
we only use words that are attached to clear ideas in our minds. If xve use a word 
that is not attached to a distinct idea, then that word signifies nothing: 'But so far 
as words are of use and signification, so far is there a constant connexion 
between the sounds and the idea, and a designation that the one stand for the 
other: without which application of them, they are nothing but so much 
insignificant noise' (Essay, 111,11,7). 
Communication for Locke should be a means of conveying ideas from 
one individual to another. Locke considers the * [t]rue end of speech: to be the 
easiest and shortest way of communicating our notions' (Essay 11L VI, 33). 
Clearly it is impossible that the same idea be implanted from one mind to 
another,, but a word must 'excite' in the hearer the same idea as the one in the 
mind of the speaker. For this to happen the person being spoken to must have 
arrived at the same idea independently, through his own experience. in order that 
the idea being communicated might be brought to mind. 
For Locke words are the final link in a chain beginning with sensation. 
Simple ideas reflect upon distinct sensations. When these ideas are articulated in 
the fonn of words there is an opportunity for distortion to take place, and when 
we attempt to communicate our ideas to someone else, there is yet another 
opportunity for misunderstanding. Verbal communication then is a kind of 
'Chinese Whispers'. 
For Locke language is a tool for the conveyance of ideas, and he is 
adamant that this tool should not be misused. Locke clearly has misgivings 
about the 'imperfection that is naturally in language, and the obscurity wid 
confusion that is so hard to be avoided in use of words'. but he also chastises 
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those who 'wilfullyý misuse language (Essay, III, X. 1). Locke identifies a-s 
crimes against knowledge: mistaking words for the things they stand for. using 
words without knowing what they mean and, worse still, using -words without 
anything being signified at all (Essay, 111, X, 2; 111, X, 4). Locke chastises those 
who misuse language, attacking those who pick up Nvords from their neighbOLIrs 
that they don't fully understand, only to spread them around the'r neighbourhood 
so that their meaning becomes obscure: *Men take words they find in use 
amongst their neighbours, and that they may not seem ignorant what tlicý, stand 
for, use them confidently without much troubling their heads about a certain 
fixed meaning... ' (Essay, 111, X, 4). Again, Locke is anxious about what Nve 
might call the 'Chinese Whispers" effect. 
What Locke ignores is the relationship between language and community, 
and the way that particular locallsed groups form their own modes of speech, 
both in terms of dialect and vocabulary. It stands to reason that localised speech 
patterns emerge through cultural dialogue, and this complicates Locke's model 
of words standing for ideas within the minds of particular individuals. At points 
in his argument Locke appears to advocate the standardisation of language. He 
uses a metaphor of language as the conduit through which knowledge is spread. 
The image Locke constructs is suggestive of a Roman aqueduct. These 
imperialist connotations are further heightened by the image of linguistic 
vandals, 'enemies of knowledge", breaking the pipes through which kno%ý ledge 
flows: 
For language being the great conduit , N-hereb,, men con\, e\ their discoveries, 
h reasoning, and knowledge from one to anOt er. he that makes an III use of it, I though he does not corrupt the fountains of knowledge which are in thin, -, s 
themselves, yet he does, as much as in him lies. break or stop the pipes 
here hý It 
is distributed to the public use and advantage of mankind. He that use,, ord, 
IS 
without any clear and steady meaning, %ý hat does he but lead himself and others into error? And he that designed]v does it ought to be looked on as an enem. -v of truth and knowledge. (Essay. 111, X1,5) 
Rousseau's opinion that it is undesirable that a child *should have more 
words than ideas' has clearly been influenced by Locke's theory of the ideational 
basis of language. However, unlike Locke,, Rousseau does not view expressN'e 
sounds as useless or 'empty'. He would not, for example, chastise a c1iild who 
produces sounds that are not attached to ideas. In a telling passage Rousseau 
draws a distinction between natural and artificial language. Artificial language - 
the fixed modes of speech and signification that alloxN us to communicate with 
one another - is a historical construct that has developed over time alom, with 
culture and civilisation. Natural language, in contrast, is an expressive form of 
communication that includes gesture, emotional cries and facial expressions. For 
an example of natural language Rousseau suggests we need look no ftirther that 
the communion that exist between an infant and its nursc: 
All our languages are the result of art. It has long been a subject of 
inquiry whether there ever was a natural language common to all: no doubt there is, 
and it is the language of children before they begin to speak. This language is 
inarticulate, but it has tone, stress and meaning. The use of our oýý n language has 
led us to neglect it so far as to forget it altogether. Let us study children and 'we 
shall soon learn it again from them. Nurses can teach us this lanouage; the% 
understand all their nurslings say to them, they answer them, and keep up long 
conversations with them; and though they use words, these words are quite useless. 
It is not the hearing of the word, but its accompanying intonation that is 
understood. 
To the language of intonation is added the no less forcible language of 
gesture. The child uses, not its weak hands, but its face. The amount of expression 
in these undeveloped faces is extraordinary; their features change from one 
moment to another with incredible speed. You see smiles, desires. terror. come and 
go like lighting; every time the face seems different. The muscles of the face are 
undoubtedly more mobile than our own. On the other hand the eN es are almost 
expressionless. Such must be the sort of signs they use at an age when their onlý 
needs are those of the body. Grimaces are the signs of sensation, the glance 
expresses sentiment. (Emile, 1, pp. -36-37) 
1 
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So, natural language may be a language lost to adulthood, but it does haN ýý 
the status of a universal and originary language. For Rousseau the function of 
language is not only the conveyance of ideas. The acoustic dimension of 
language, for example verbal shifts in tone and emphasis, are an important means 
of expressing emotions. Rousseau genders natural language as feminine and 
infantile, but both these terms have positive connotations for him. 
Rousseau's description of natural language has some interesting parallels 
with Julia Kristeva's description of the semiotic. 105 Kristeva, working Nvith and 
against a Lacanian model of language, designates the semiotic as a pre-Oedipal 
language that occurs before the division of subject and object and the arbitrarN- 
division of signifier and signified that accompanies an individual's entrance into 
the symbolic order. The symbolic order regulates signifying practice and cultural 
exchange by imposing order and structure on all forms of social discourse. 
However, Kristeva stresses the importance of the pre-Oedipal, pre-symbolic 
bond between mother and child. The serniotic involves a form of bodily 
communion between the child and its mother. The as yet undirected 
polymorphous drives of the infant find expression in sound, rhythm and 
impulsive movements -a pre-symbolic language. Rousseau's reverence 
for 
natural language clearly involves a sense of awe for the bond between a child and 
its nurse that occurs before the development of spoken language. 
The type of communication that goes on between infant and nurse involves 
mimesis as sounds, gestures and expression are mimicked and echoed from one 
to the other. Interestingly, Rousseau describes the child"s mind. before it has 
'0' See Julia Kristeva's -Revolution in Poetic Language' in The Kristeva Reader ed. I-oril Nloi. 
(Oxford Blackwell 1986), 'is Sensation a Language? trans. John Lechte in Ifriting and 
Psychoanalysis. -, 4 Reader, ed. John Lechte (London: Arnold 1996). For criticism oI'K. rkte%, a , ee 
Elizabeth Grosz, Sexual Subversions: Three French Feminists ýSydne', ý Allen and Un\% in 1981)), 
John Lechte, Julia Kristeva (London: Routledge 1990). 
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developed speech, as functioning like a mirror: *Their shining, polished brain 
reflects, as in a mirror, the things you show them, but nothing sinks in. The child 
remembers the words and the ideas are reflected back. his hearers understand 
them, but to him they are meaningless' (Emile, 11, p. 85). In Rousseau's model 
the child can echo back the words he has been taught, but these words do not 
sink beneath the reflective surface of his mind and attach themseIN-es to ideas. 
What then is being communicated between nurse and infant? Does the child 
recognise itself and/or its nurse as distinct contributors to a dialogue or are its 
utterances and gestures merely reflexive? 
A comparison can again be drawn with Kristeva. The transitional period 
between the semiotic and the symbolic involves a process of subject formation. 
The symbiotic bond between mother and child is not a period of stasis. 
Interaction between mother and child involves a certain level of recognition and 
response. For example, a child responds to the facial expressions of its mother. 
to the sound of her voice, to her touch. The child's interaction with the mother 
can be related to the Lacanian conception of the mirror stage. with the mother 
acting as mirror to the child. Over time through its bodily interaction with the 
mother, and through the recognition of its own body/image the child comes to 
recognise itself as a unified body distinct from its mother. So from a Kristevan 
perspective we might say that the relationship that Rousseau describes as exIsting 
between a nurse and her infant takes place at a time when the infant is not fullý 
able to distinguish itself from its 'mother'. 
Rousseau"s relationship with his pupil can at times seem to panillel the 
strong physical bond that exists between a mother and child. In an extraordinarý 
passage Rousseau reveals something of his psycluc inN-estment in 
fmile. i le 
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describes how writing about tmile's early bodily sensations and experiences 
makes him feel physically close to his pupil. It is as if Emile's blood is pulsin-,, 
through Rousseau veins: 
[WIhen I think of a child of ten or twelve, strong. healthy, "vell grown for his age. 
only pleasant thoughts are called up... I see him keen, eager, and full of life, free 
from gnawing cares and painful forebodings, absorbed in this present state, and 
delighting in a fullness of life which seems to extend beyond himself ... I watch the 
child with delight ... His eager life seems to stir my own pulses, I seem to liýe his life and in his vigour I renew my own (tmile, 11, p. 146-147). 
The final image in this passage is parasitic. Through his imagination 
Rousseau is able to feed off the blood of his creation. But it is also clear from 
this image that Rousseau's body contains Iýmile - it is an image of pregnancý,. 
D- 
Rousseau is caught in a moment of symbiotic union with tmile. It is a moment 
out of time as Rousseau becomes lost in the temporality of childhood - 'absorbed 
in this present state'. Larry Wolff comments on the erotic nature of Rousseau's 
relationship to Emile as revealed in this passage: 'With the building of an almost 
erotic tension in Rousseau's contemplation, as his own blood wan-ned in 
response to the ardent blood of the child, the consummation came with the 
possessive ecstasy of metamorphosis. Rousseau became the child tmile, became 
young again'. 106 But this ecstatic moment is broken in the following paragraph 
with the intervention of a third term in the figure of a 'stem angry man'. The 
dream becomes a nightmare as the temporality of childhood is invaded by the 
chiming of a clock: 
The hour strikes, the scene is changed. All of a sudden his eý e groýý s dim, his 
mirth has fled. Farewell mirth, farewell untrammelled sports in which he 
delighted. A stem. angry man takes him by the hand, saying graN el%. 'come %ý ith 
106 Larry Wolff, 'When I Imagine a Child: The Idea of Childhood and the Phllosophý, ol'%Iemorý 
in the Enlightenment', Eighteenth- Centuq Studies, vol. 3 1. no. 4 (1998) Pp. 377-40 1. 
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me, sir, ' and he is led away. As they are enterin2 the room, I catch a glimpse of 
books. Books, what dull food for a child of his age! The poor child allows himself 
to be dragged away; he casts a sorrowful look on all about him, and departs in 
silence, his eyes swollen with tears he dare not shed. and his heart bursting with 
sighs he dare not utter. (ýmile, IIp. 147) 
Rousseau's fantasy is transformed, moving from a dyadic structure. the 
fantasy of a symbiotic relationship between adult and child, to a triadic structtire. 
with the intervention of a schoolmaster who leads tmile a,, vay to a classroom. 
We can associate the schoolmaster with the intervention of the syrnbolic order, 
The books he is leading Emile to will teach him to conform to the laws that 
govern signification. The space of the classroom will regulate his time. and 
enforce strict codes of behaviour. The move into the classroom is an inward 
move, both spatially and psychically. tmile is transformed from a boN- whose 
life is so full 'it extends beyond himself, to a boy who must stifle his emotions 
by suppressing his tears, and by repressing his previously *untrammelled' 
desires. The final image is one of total submission as 'the poor child allows 
himself to be dragged away'. 
It is tempting to see the stem angry man as a synibolic father intervening in 
a pre-Oedipal bond. But it is important to note that the scenario is an all male 
fantasy and there is a notable absence of a mother figure. As has been said, 
Rousseau's relationship to his pupil clearly parallels the relationship between 
mother and child. However,, while recognising this parallel the absence of the 
maternal should not be brushed over, nor should the homosocial nature of the 
fantasy be ignored. 
In order to understand some of these issues it is useful to return to 
Rousseau's pedagogical programme in Book Two of 
bnile. Rousseau places 
heavy stress on the need to train the five senses. He goes through each sense one 
I 
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by one devising methods by which it might be developed and refined, -\(-, ain, 
Rousseau's role parallels that of the pre-Oedipal mother whose physical 
interaction with her infant helps order its polymorphous corporeal drives. 
Rousseau's attempt to impose order on the sensations is not unique in the 
Enlightenment. For example, Rousseau's friend Etienne Bonnot. Abbý de 
Condillac, attempted to show how all knowledge originates in the sensations bv 
using the model of a marble statue that he proceeds to imbue xvith all five senses, 
first one at a time and then in combination. Interestingly, just as Rousseau has a 
strong level of identification with Emile, Condillac demands that his reader put 
himself in the place of the statue: 
He [the reader] should begin to live when it does, have only a single sense when it 
has only one, acquire only those ideas that it acquires, contract onIN the habits that 
it contracts: in short, he must be only what it is. 10' 
The statue has a very limited sense of self. The first sensation he is inibued with 
is a sense of smell. At this stage the statue is unable to distinguish itself from the 
odour that he is experiencing. It is only when he is imbued ýý ith a sense of touch, 
and is able to move, that he begins to gain a sense of itself as a physical entity. 
Using touch he explores its own body: 
The statue learns then to recognise its body and to recognise itself in all the 
different parts that make it up because as soon as It places its hands on one of these 
parts the same sentient being responds, as it were, from the one part to the other, 
'this is me'. Let the statue continue to touch itself, and everywhere the sensation of 
solidity will represent two things that are mutuafly exclusive and at the same time 
contiguous, and everywhere also the same sentient being will respond 
from one to 
the other: this is me, this is me again'. The statue senses itself in all the parts of 
its 
body. Thus it will no longer confuse itself with its states. 
10" 
107 Etienne Bonnot, Abbd de Condillac, .4 Treatise on the 
Sensations [Traitj des. wnsations] in 
Philosophical Writings of Etienne Bonnot, Abb6 de Condillac, trans. Frarik-lin 
Philip (\eýk 
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Larry Wolf has pointed out the autoerotic quality of the statue's experience 
of its own body: ýWith movement the statue discovered its stone body, in pursuit 
of pleasure, of "agreeable sensations, " and Condillac described at length a 
process of autoerotic exploration that his reader might also follow as they put 
themselves in the place of the statue. "09 It is important to note that the statue's 
autoeroticism takes place at a time when the division between subject and object 
has not yet been fully established. The statue experiences the sensation of seýf 
'this is me'. it does not yet have a clear sense of what is outside itself, *this is not 
me': 
When the statue comes to learn that it is something solid, I imagine that it is quite 
astonished not to find itself in everything that it touches. It extends its arms, as if 
to look for itself outside of itself, and it cannot yet judge if it wil I not indeed find 
itself there anew; experience itself can instruct it. "0 
The statue,, kept in isolation from beings similar to it. can never fully 
develop a distinct sense of self because it has no concept of that which is other to 
it, beyond a basic concept of material difference. Moreover, without other 
similar beings around it, it cannot develop language, an important stage in the 
formation of the subject. 
We might then ask why do philosophers such as Condillac and Rousseau 
appear to feel most at ease when their project-pupil-creation is in a state of 
speechlessness? Infancy, as Rousseau makes clear at the start of Book Two of 
Emile, has its root in the Latin word infans which means 'one who cannot speak' 
I (Emile 11, p. 48). So using Rousseau 1) s terminology we might describe 
Condillac's statue as an infant, though it has the fonn of an adult male. Ocarly 
109 Larry Wolf, 'When I Imagine a Child', p. 392. 
110 Condillac, p. 234. 
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in the case of both Rousseau and Condillac there is a strong element of 
identification with their creations that seems to have a basis in narcissistic desire. 
Their fictitious creations allow both authors and their readers to return to a child- 
like state. Paradoxically, however, Rousseau and Condillac also achieve a 
certain level of control over and detachment from their creations. It is they who 
impose the rules and parameters that determine the pathway by which their 
'infants' acquire knowledge. In this sense they gain self-mastery by controlling 
the life of sentient beings that cannot talk back to them. 
In this way Enlightenment theories of language complicate the t1wentleth 
century linguistic theories of Lacan and Kristeva. The semiotic in Kristevian 
thought is submerged by the symbolic so that signification can take place in an 
orderly fashion, but the serniotic still has the 'revolutionary I potential to subvert 
modes of signification within the symbolic. Enlightenment thought tums this on 
its head. The pre-symbolic period before the emergence of language is the place 
that philosophers such as Locke, Rousseau and Condillac retreat to in order to 
gain control over and regulate the process of knowledge acquisition. Unlike 
Kristevan thought, it is this pre-linguistic phase of life that offers certainty and 
stability. With the onset of language meaning becomes unstable and uncertain as 
words become detached from the ideas that originally gave rise to them. In the 
case of Rousseau we might say that words also become detached from the bodies 
that speak them. Locke dismisses social discourse as a contaminant that pollutes 
the ideational source from which language draws its meaning. whilst Rousseau 
looks to infancy in order to reclaim a lost language of pure emotional expression. 
Both writers attempt to sever the link between language development and Its 
social context. In the next section we shall tum to Mary Shelley's Franken. sfei? i. 
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and to the process by which Victor Frankenstein's creation finds his voice. We 
shall do this in order to further explore the ideology behind eighteenth-century 
philosophies of language, and more generally to explore the relationship between 
language and socialisation. 
Part Two 
The early life of Mary Shelley's Creature is emblematic of humanity's historical 
development. The Creature, finding himself alone in the midst of nature, traces 
humanity's first steps from hunter- gatherers to civilisation. The description of 
him eating berries from the trees or off the ground, slaking his thirst at a brook 
before finally settling down to rest, echoes Rousseau's description of the first 
man in the Second Discourse HI : 'I see him satisfying his hunger at the first oak, 
and slaking his thirst at the first brook: finding his bed at the foot of the tree 
which afforded him a repast; and with that, all his wants supplied' (Second 
Discourse p. 52). Driven by his physical needs the Creature leaves the woods to 
find food and stumbles on the hut of a shepherd. If we see the shepherd as 
representative of a nomadic herdsman then the encounter symbolises a 
transitional stage in human history before the development of fixed settlements. 
Indeed the Creature, having terrified the shepherd, continues on his way and 
finds himself in an agricultural settlement. This settlement signifies development 
111 See Paul A. Cantor, Creature and Creator: Myth-making and English Romanticism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1984), p. 119-122; David Marshall. The Surprising 
Effects ofSympathy: Marivaux, Diderot, Rousseau andMary Shelley (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press 1988) p. 183-184; Anne K. Mellor, Mari, Shelley: Her Lýfe, Her ýIýVth Her 
Monsters (London: Routledge 1988) p. 47-50; James O'Rourke, -Nothing More Unnatural: 
Mary Shelley's Revision of Rousseau', ELH. vol. 56 (1989). p. 543-569. Alan Richardson 'From 
tmile to Frankenstein: The Education of Monsters', European Romantic Review. vol. 1991 
p. 147-162. 
contemporaneous with Shelley's own time. Her depiction of the histon, of 
civilisation through the Creature's joumey then narrows in its focus. The 
Creature, forced to flee by villagers, conceals himself in a hovel from which he 
can observe the daily life of the De Lacey family. For Rousseau the family is the 
social unit upon which civilisation is founded, and so it is here in the De Lacey's 
cottage that the Creature's civil 'education' truly begins. 
It is through observing the De Laceys that the Creature is able to find his 
voice, and it is this development that I shall focus on in this section. In observing 
the De Laceys the Creature is presented with a complex set of human exchanges. 
The cottagers' emotions and sentiments are expressed as much through physical 
demeanour as they are by speech. Music is another non-verbal form of 
communication used by the cottagers to express their feelings. 112 When the 
Creature does acquire the rudiments of language he listens in on the narratives 
that the cottagers tell to one another, narratives from books or stories about their 
own lives, and when he is fortunate enough to find a leather portmanteau full of 
books and learns to read, he gains further access to narratives that provide him 
with insights into the social milieu he is observing. Thus in finding a voice the 
Creature also develops a cultural accent. 
In view of this it is too simplistic to regard the Creature as marginal to the 
range of cultural signifiers and discourses he observes. Indeed, paradoxically. 
his awareness that he is outside the forms of social life that are presented to him 
112 Peter Brooks detects the influence of Enlightenment debates on the origins of language in 
Mary Shelley's depiction of the Creature's language development. In particular Brooks notes the 
apparent influence of Rousseau's Essai sur Vorigine des langues, in ýk hich Rousseau stresses the 
role of emotions in the emergence of language. See Brooks "'Godlike Science/Unhallo%%ed . -\rts", 
Language, Nature, and Monstroso", in The Endurance of Frankenstein: Essa, ý-ý on. %1,11ý. 
Shell, ýy's Novel, eds. George Levine and U. C. Knoepflmacher (Berkele\ . llnlý crsitý of 
Califorriia 
Press 1982), pp. 205-220, Bo, -ý,, Work: Objects of Desire in Afodern Narrative (\Iassachu,, cittý,: 
Harvard University Press 1993)), p. 204. 
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is the result of his immersion in the very cultural dialogue he is 'excluded' from. 
It cannot be said that the Creature enters into communication -ývlth the family he 
is watching unobserved. However, it is inadequate to portray him as outside 
their social world. To say he is marginal to the life of the De Lace\- household 
might be correct in terms of his spatial location, but it does not adequately reflect 
his psychic location. From the outset the Creature is responsive and sensitive to 
the world he is observing. We might then say that though from the De Lacev's 
perspective the Creature does not enter into communication 'with them. from his 
perspective, and indeed from the reader's perspective, he does enter into a form 
of communion with the cottagers. This communion is instrumental in shaping 
his social consciousness. 
The Creature's communion with the cottagers takes the forrn of his 
increasing attunement to the subtle nuances of their daily lives. He is particularlý- 
sensitive to the emotional states of the cottagers. Increasingly his own emotional 
state comes to reflect the ups and downs of their lives: 'when they were unhappy. 
I felt depressed; when they rejoiced, I sympathised in their joys' (Frankenstein 
p. 89). One of the Creature's earliest experiences of emotional communion ýý ith 
his hosts occurs when he hears the De Lacey father playing a musical instrument. 
It is difficult to tell the impact the music alone has on the Creature. Certainly he 
finds it beautiful: 'sweeter than the voice of the thrush or the nightingale'. but 
what occupies his attention is the effect the music is having on another listener, 
Agatha, who breaks down in tears in response to the mournful air her father is 
playing. In this way the emotional impact of the music cannot be separated frorn 
its social context. 
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He played a sweet mournful air, which I perceived drew tears r% fi om the e es of his 
amiable companion, of which the old man took no notice, until she sobbed audibl% 
he then pronounced a few sounds, and the fair creature, leaving her work, knelt at' 
his feet. He raised her, and smiled with such kindness and affection, that I felt 
sensations of a peculiar and overpowering nature: they were a mixture of pain and 
pleasure, such as I had never before experienced, either from hunger or cold. 
warmth or food; and I withdrew from the window, unable to bear these emotions. 
(Frankenstein p. 85) 
It is interesting to compare Rousseau's depiction of natural language in 
Emile - the non-verbal language of gesture and intonation that takes place 
between a nurse and her infant - with the Creature's experience of social life. 
Similar to Rousseau's infant, the Creature picks up on the tonal quality of the 
sounds the cottagers produce as they speak to one another. For example, before 
the above episode he recalls Felix's words as consisting of 'a few sounds with an 
air of melancholy'. He is also responsive to the physical demeanour of the 
cottagers. He describes Felix's countenance as expressing 'a deep despondency' 
(Frankenstein p. 85). In comparison, Rousseau's infant is responsive to the 
gestures and particularly the facial expressions of its carer. Like an infant the 
Creature may not understand the words that are being spoken to him, but he is 
swept up in the emotional movement that they convey. In terms of his own 
psychology the Creature is enveloped in a community of feeling. For a 
tantalising moment it is almost as if the music that fills the air and the emotional 
movement between the cottagers succeeds in breaching the gap that exists 
between the Creature and his hosts. But at the moment when the Creature's 
feelings are at their most intense., are reaching their emotional crescendo. he turns 
from the scene, and in so doing turns in upon himself 
In our earlier discussion we compared Rousseau's 'natural langua(-Ye 
. \vith 
Kristeva's conception of the serniotic as a pre-symbolic language. Thesenliotic 
as represented in the communion that takes places between a mother and 
her 
jqý 
child occurs at a transitional period prior to the division of subject and object. as 
the child's bodily intimacy with its mother leaves it unable to comprehend \N-here 
it ends and its mother begins. What the Creature witnesses is the operation of the 
serniotic in social life, but the Creature witnesses it from a position of physical 
and spatial alienation. The Creature's alienation arises from the fact that he 
cannot help but participate in, but cannot be seen to participate in. the 
communion of social life. 
The question again arises: what is the position of the Creature in relation 
to the world he is observing? In order to address this question it is useful to 
explore eighteenth-century conceptions of sympathy. David Marshall attempts a 
general definition of sympathy in the eighteenth century: 'sympathy ýý as an act 
of identification in which one left one's own place, part, and person and took the 
place and part of someone else; while representing to oneself the other's feeling, 
one was transported outside of the self. placed beyond or beside the self in a 
moment of self-forgetting'. 113 The Creature's act of sympathy towards the 
cottagers complicates Marshall's definition, because at this stage in the 
Creature's psychological development he has no clear sense of self to forget, or 
any real conception of the social identity of those he is meant to be 'taking the 
part of. Marshall recognises the complex way that Mary Shelley is using 
eighteenth-century conceptions of sympathy, most notably Rousseau's 
conception of sympathy. In an important passage in Rousseau's EssaY on the 
Origin ofLanguage cited by Marshall, Rousseau relates the act of compassion. 
which he regards as being innate to humanity, xvith the rise of -social feeling' 
113 David Marshall, The Surprising Effects of Simpath ' v. - 
Afarivaux. Diderot, RousseallandAlarv 
Shelley (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1988). p. 146. 
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We develop social feeling only as we become enlightened. Although pity is native 
to the human heart, it would remain eternally quiescent unless it were activated bN 
imagination. How are we moved to pity? By getting outside ourselves and 
identifying with a being who suffers. It is not in ourselves, but in him that ýke 
suffer. It is clear that such transport supposes a great deal of acquired knowledge. 
How am I to imagine ills of which I have no idea? How would I suffer in seeing 
another suffer, if I know not what he is suffering, if I am ignorant of iwhat he and I 
have in common. ' 14 
The Creature's experience of sympathy complicates Rousseau's model. 
Rousseau describes the act of transport whereby one takes the position of the 
other as requiring prior knowledge. Now we know that the Creature has 
experienced suffering. He weeps, for example, when confronted with the 
hardship of his early life. But the Creature's response to the cottager's suffering 
is more complex than this. Who is it that the Creature identifies with? Does he 
place himself in the position of Agatha, the person who is most clearly 
experiencing pain, or in the position of her father? Such a question simplifics 
what the Creature is experiencing. What he is responding to is not only the 
suffering of a fellow human being through the imaginative transportation of 
himself into their place but the communication of fellow feeling beliveen human 
beings. What he responds to is the response of someone to another's suffering. 
In this way compassion for Mary Shelley is about more than identifying with the 
other, taking his/her place; it is about the human need to share and communicate 
our feelings. 
Rousseau's model of sympathy locks human beings into themselves. Theý, 
are only able to share in the pain of others through an act of the imagination. 
And even this act of the imagination is restricted by empirical parameters, as ýN e 
can only imagine the pain of others if we have experienced similar pain ourseIN es 
114 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 'Essay on the Origin of Language' in On the Origin, ýI LanguagC, ed". 
John H. Moran and Alexander Gode, trans. John H. Moran (Chicago: Uni, ersit" ot'ChIcat-lo 
Press 1986), p. 322. 
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and so have prior knowledge to reflect upon. In this way Rousseau places a 
gauge on sympathy. 
The concept of social communion breaks down the dichotomy of inner 
and outer life that Rousseau's model depends upon. For example. those listening 
to the music in Frankenstein are experiencing a variety of emotions, and N et they 
are united not so much by the specificity of their emotions, but bý- the human 
capacity to be moved by music. As human beings we recognise in music 
something that is more than sound; we recognise our humanity. Thus the 
recognition of what is human should not be reduced to the recognition of the 
human form as the location of individuated selfliood. 
The meaning that is attached to the human form cannot be divorced froni 
its social context, and yet paradoxically the human form comes to signit'ý' a 
distinct fon-n of conscious life that is separate from the social world in the sense 
of being independent and self-governing. The rise of what Rousseau calls social 
feeling requires that, when we identify with the other, we not only recognise 
fellow-feeling but the social identity of the person having those feelings. This 
requires that we are aware of his or her place in the social order of things. In this 
way we map the social world around us and so become aware of our place and 
role within it. 
As he watches the De Lacey family the Creature begins this process of 
mapping the social space he is observing, by developing an understanding of the 
social roles of the cottagers. Indeed his early language development is 
inseparable from his growing social awareness. as most of the first %vords he 
learns - father, sister. Agatha, Felix - are names that 
identify the cottauers or 
115 This complicates not only eighteenth-century but also twentieth-century theoric, of_, ubje, -: 
I 
formation. most notably Lacanian theory. that relates concepts of the self with the recognition 
ot 
a spatially locatable and totalised body-image. 
I ()s 
refer to their role in the family. The Creature also learns to identiýv the cottagers 
by their day-to-day activities, and so becomes familiar with their indi\-idual 
temporal regimes, and how these integrate into the overall timetable of cottage 
life. This new time regime is very different from Rousseau's Iiiiiited N-Ie, ýN- of 
early man's temporal awareness. According to Rousseau natural man rarely 
thought beyond the present: 'His soul, which nothing disturbs, is wholk wrapped 
up in the feeling of its present existence, without any idea of the future. hoNvever 
near at hand; while his projects, as limited as his views, hardly extend to the 
close of day' (Second Discourse p. 62). In contrast civilised man's time is 
organised around the demands placed upon him by society. 
Over time the Creature becomes aware of the physical labour the 
cottagers must perform in order to subsist. He also becomes aware that these 
labours are often inadequate, noticing for example that Felix and Agatha 
sometimes go hungry in order that their father might eat. In response to this he 
stops taking food from their store, but more importantly he begins to make 
unseen contribution to their labour. The Creature's first contribution is to 
produce firewood. He sees the positive effect of his actions when as a result of 
his labour Felix is able to spend the day 'repairing the cottage and cultivating the 
garden' (Frankenstein p. 88). In time the Creature takes on a number of tasks that 
lessen the cottagers workload. Gradually his daily routine synchronises Nxith that 
of his hosts. 
The Creature's contribution to the economic life of the De Lacey family 
can be linked to his increasing feelings of communion with the cottagers. 
feelings that are fast developing into a more complex sense of comniunity. There 
may be no exchange of words between the Creature and the cottagers. but the C" 
I QO 
Creature is offering his labour. What he gains in return is the opportunity to 
witness the positive effect his contribution makes to the collect've life of the 
cottage. He also gains a name, as the cottagers speculate about the 'good spirit' 
who is acting on their behalf. His is a profoundly human act, a social act that 
impacts upon the material circumstances of his 'companions', but his help is only 
welcomed so long as his material form is absent, and so disconnected from his 
labour. 
In relation to capitalist concepts of economic exchange the Creature is ot- 
course giving his labour for nothing in return. The idea that labour is a 
possession, a commodity to be exchanged, is an idea that Mary Shelley is 
addressing in her novel. C. B. Macpherson, who traces back the concept of 
individualism to seventeenth-century political thought, identifies what he 
describes as the 'possessive quality' that is attached to the concept of the 
individual: 'Its possessive quality is found in its conception of the individual Lis 
essentially the proprietor of his own person or capacities, owing nothing to 
society for them. The individual was seen neither as a moral whole. nor as part 
of a larger social whole, but as an owner of himself .1 
16 Macpherson relates this 
to Locke's Two Treatises of Government in which Locke regards the individual 
as being in possession of his own labour: 'Every Man has a Property in his own 
Person. This no Body has a Right to but himself The Labour of his Body. and 
the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his'. 
117 
The concept of work being the possession of the labourer contrasts N\ ith 
the Creature's relationship to his labour. The Creature does not regarci his laboLir 
116 C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theorj' ol *Possessive Individualism- Hobh(, N to Loc4e 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press 1977), p-3. 
117 John, Locke, Two Treatises ofGovernment, ed. Peter Laslett (Carnbridueý C'ambrjd, -, e 
University Press 1999), p. 287-288. 
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as his possession because he has no clear concept of property. Hi is consciousness 
is suggestive of a time in human history, identified by both Locke and Rousseau. 
in which the earth was held in common, and so the idea of property did not arise. 
However, through the Creature's observations he does begin to conceive of how 
labour can be exchanged as a commodity. He notices, for example. hox\ Felix 
often leaves the cottage for long periods, and the Creature concludes from this 
that Felix is working for a neighbouring farmer. 
Locke relates the emergence of property rights to the act of labour, to 
work a particular stretch of land is to appropriate that land to oneself Locke 
describes how over time the landscape becomes mapped in relation to property 
rights, as children inherit the land that their parents worked upon and appropriate 
more land. The right to property becomes bound through agreements and 
contracts between individuals, communities and nations. This system is further 
cemented by the introduction of monetary exchange. As the Creature develops a 
concept of property, and learns from overhearing the cottagers of the inequalities 
that blight modem society, he expresses in truly Rousseauian. manner his 
abhorrence of the present economic state of society. He also realises that he has 
no place within the economic system as it stands: 
[T]he strange system of human society was explained to me. I heard of the 
division of property, of immense wealth and squalid poverty; of rank, descent, and 
noble blood. The words induced me to turn towards myself. I learned that the 
possessions most esteemed by your fellow-creatures ýý ere. high and unsullied 
descent united with riches. A man might be respected with only one of these 
acquisitions; but without either he was considered, except in verý rare instances. as 
a vagabond and a slave, doomed to waste his powers for the profits of the chosen 
few. And what was I? Of my creation and creator I was absoluteIN ignorant, 
but I 
knew that I possessed no money. no friends, no kind of property. (Frankenstein 
p-96) 
The Creature's act of ýturmng, towards himself is a reflective zict Ofseff- 
possession premised on the realisation of his social alienation. Thus. 
lie gain,, a 
'10 1 
political understanding of 'possessive individualism' by recognising that he i is 
one of the dispossessed. Notably, the Creature's criticism of the centrality of 
property to social organisation anticipates Macpherson's criticism of Locke: 
The core of Locke's individualism is the assertion that eýerý man is naturalk the 
sole proprietor of his person and capacities - the absolute proprietor in the sense 
that he owes nothing to society for them - and especially the absolute proprietor of 
his capacity to labour. Every man is therefore free to alienate his own capacity to 
labour. This individualist postulate is the postulate by which Locke transforms the 
mass of equal individuals (rightfully) into two classes with verý different rights, 
those with property and those without. Once the land is all taken up, the 
fundamental right not to be subject to the jurisdiction of another is so unequal as 
between owners and non-owners that it is different in kind, not in degree: those 
without property are, Locke recognises, dependent for their verý IiýeI ihood on 
those with property, and are unable to alter their own circumstances. The initial 
equality of natural rights, which consisted in no man having jurisdiction oý CF 
another cannot last after the differentiation of property. To put it in another way, 
the man without property in things loses that full proprietorship of his o\ý n person 
which was the basis of his equal natural rights. ' 18 
The Creature's growing social awareness appears to be developing into a 
political consciousness. We might expect from this that he would identiýv with 
the position of the landless labourer or socially dispossessed. But this is not the 
case. As the De Lacey family become more prosperous following the entrancc of 
Safie and the injection of the capital she has appropriated/stolen from her father, 
they become wealthy enough to employ servants, but the Creature far from 
identifying with the servants, continues to identify with and idolise his hosts. 
One of the reasons for this may well be that he wishes to remain within the 
cottagers' discourse. The conversations of the servants. if they take place at all, 
are not included in the Creature's narrative. For if. as Macpherson points out in 
relation to Locke, society is understood as -a series of relations between 
proprietors', then to be without property is to be excluded from social dialOL'LIC 
and the wider commerce of social life. 119 
118 C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theori, of Possessive Individuafism. p-2 "I- 
119 C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theon, of Possessive Individualism. p. 269. 
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The Creature has become bound up in the politics of identification. I le 
has even developed an aesthetic sense founded upon his increasing faniiharity 
with the cottagers: 'I saw few human beings beside them: and if any other 
happened to enter the cottage, their manners and rude gait only enhanced to nie 
the superior accomplishments of my friends' (Frankenstein p-89). The 
Creature's sense of beauty is of course class encoded and considering his own 
form and economic status, highly ironic. However. the Creature cannot fully 
comprehend the cottager's own investment in the ideological form of their world. 
By maintaining modes of seeing that define their fon-nal inclusion while 
excluding those whose presence deforms their cultural perspective. they maintain 
an aesthetic vision that places them centre stage. The Creature displaces his o%%n 
perspective, in order to take up theirs, and in so doing sees himself as other: 
I had admired the perfect forrns of my cottagers - their grace, beauty, and de I icate 
complexions: but how was I terrified, when I viewed myself in a transparent pool 
At first I started back, unable to believe that it was indeed I who was reflected in 
the mirror; and when I became fully convinced that I was in realit\ the monster that 
I am, I was filled with the bitterest sensations of despondence and mortification. 
Alas! I did not yet entirely know the fatal effects of the miserable deforrnitý 
(Frankenstein p. 90) 
The Creature's tragedy is that his cultural imagination reflects the verý 
ideology that must exclude him. The forms of the cottagers inhabit his 
imagination whether they are literally before his eyes or not: , When I slept. or 
was absent, the forms of the venerable blind father. the gentle Agatha, and the 
excellent Felix, flitted before me" (Frankenstein 91). His daydreaming continues 
as he imagines the scene in which he reveals himself to his hosts. Hc deludes 
himself that the cottagers, though at first disgusted by the sight of hirn, will 
eventually be able to overlook his deformitý'. He hopes to tran, ýIorin himself ii, 
their eyes through the power of his speech. By revealing to them that tht: ý share 
:0 
a common language. What this reveals is something of the relationship bet%veen 
cultural discourse and its ideological form. The Creature has moments of 
rationality when he realises that he is excluded from the social Nvorld he is 
observing, but the power of its visual form keeps the dream of his inclusion ali% c. 
In order to shed some light on these contradictions it is useful to turn to the 
theories of the twentieth century Russian linguist %. N \'olo§inoN-. \'olo§ino% 
sees the development of consciousness in an individual and his 'her IcN el of 
semiotic awareness as indivisible. As modes of signification take place within a 
wider community then it follows that an individual's conscious mind is not a 
self-contained, self-referential totality. Volo§inov argues that the ideolog-, of a 
given community inevitably becomes interwoven into the consciousness of its 
members: 'Consciousness takes shape and being in the material of sigiis ci-eated 
by an organised group in the process of its social intercourse. The Ind'vidual 
consciousness is nurtured on signs; it derives its growth from them: it reflects 
their logic and laws. The logic of consciousness is the logic of ideological 
communication, of the serniotic interaction of a social group. ' 
120 Voloýi 1IM., S 
theory may appear to have a negative aspect to it in that it suggests that it is 
inevitable that an individual becomes entrapped by ideology. as all modcs of 
communication are structured in relation to it. but this would be to suggest that 
ideology is fixed and unchanging, and Volo§inoN- does not believe this. Rather 
ideological transformation can be brought about through social interaction, and 
the inner life of the individual. his/her inner speech", has a part to play in this. 
The consciousness of an individual is not entirely passiN, e. but is part ofa wider 
120 V. N. Volo§inov, Afarxism and the Phl, josop4j, of trans. 
Lt, fi,; la,,, Matejkaxid I K, 
Titunik (New York: Seminar Press 1973). p. 13. 
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social dialectic, a fluid exchange between self and world that involves constant 
renewa . 
121 
To reiterate, clearly the Creature is not an autonomous indi% idual whose 
inner speech exists outside social intercourse, neither I us im-, ail is it correct to sa. v, 
eighteenth-century model of sympathy, that he is transported outside himself ii-ito 
the place of the other. Volos'inov offers us an alternative model. Using his 
theories we might say that the Creature is in-between *places: "Bv its verv 
existential nature, the subjective psyche is to be localised somevvliere between 
the organism and the outside world, on the borderline separatiiig these two 
spheres of reality. It is here that an encounter between the organism and the 
outside world takes place, but the encounter is not a physical one: the organism 
and the outside world meet here in the sign'. 122 VoMinov"s theory r-eveals that 
the Creature's 'position' in relation to social dialogue is not that different from 
that of the cottagers. But the most startling revelation of all for the reader, is that 
the Creature's position in relation to social dialogue reflects his/her own. Thus. 
the insiders have been outside all along, or rather, the dichotomy het, ývecn inside 
and outside does not exist as we thought it did. 
VoloS'inov's theory makes an interesting contrast with Locke's philosophy 
of language. The possessive individualism identified in relation to the Two 
121 Peter Brooks, using Roland Barthes' concept of 'narrative contract' also emphasis %larý 
Shelley's stress on the social nature of language in Frankenstein. Brooks uses the episode in 
which the Creature finally engages Victor Frankenstein in conversation to explore hoýý narration 
involves a form of contract that points to the fact that all language necessarilý extends beý'ond the 
individual: 'The narrative contract, like the psychoanalytical transference. is based on and iniphes 
the intersubjective, transi nd ivi dual, cultural order of language. Language b\ its ý er\ nature 
transcends and preexists the individual locutor; it implies, depends on, and necessitates that 
network of intersubjective relations from which the Monster protests he has been e\cluded- That 
is, in becoming the narrator of his story. the Monster both dramatizes his problem and pro%-Ide, a 
model for its solution, the solution implicit in the discursk e interdependence ofan A, and a 
'thou' in any interlocutionary situation. ' Peter Brooks, BodY WOrk: Objeclý or'De-ýirc 
in lfodcrn 
Narrative (Massachusettts: Harvard University Press 199-3), p-220-2- 
122 
V. N. Volo§inov, A4arxism and the Philosophy of L4jtIgIIIIQL'. p. 26- 
Treatises of Government can be related to Locke's theorv of language in An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding. As has been discussed, Locke ý iews 
words as signifiers for ideas that arise in an individual's mind. These ideas 
belong to the individual as he has acquired them through his own sensoný I 
experience. Language is a functional tool by which ideas can be engendered in 
the mind of another individual. Locke comments on the difficulty of re- 
establishing the relationship between words and ideas once they have become 
obscured through dialogue: 'it being all one to go about to draw those men out of 
their mistakes, who have no settled notions, as to dispossess a -vagrant of his 
habitation who has no settled abode' (Essay 111, X, 4). Locke is dismayed at the 
way cultural dialogue can obscure meaning, as words, detached from the ideas 
they signify become 'homeless'. 
In contrast VoloS'inov confines neither ideas nor language to individual 
consciousness. We are all lodgers within the serniotic and ideological 
superstructure: 'Individual consciousness is not the architect of the ideological 
superstructure, but only a tenant lodging in the social edifice of ideological 
signs, ' 123 We may think we have acquired a discourse of the self that is unique to 
us, and that this provides us with a social identity that belongý to us and confers 
on us a position in society, but both our position in society, and the discourse that 
supports our position, though internalised, are products of an external ideology 
that we submit to. But ideology, even the ideology of *possessive 
individualism', cannot eradicate or disguise the ongoing communion of social 
life. It is this social communion, a communion that exists at the base ofall 
signification, that offers the very real potential for a revolutionarv transibmiation 
12 3 lbid, p. 13 
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of society. But in order to realise this potential we must be dispossessed of the 
idea that social discourse is the 'rightful' property of a cultural elite. 
The Creature, however, is unable to fully dispossess himself of this idea. 
His strongest identification tends to be with those people who 'possess' the most 
'knowledge' of contemporary culture. The Creature comes to identiýv Felix as a 
man from whom he can learn the ways of the world. This is because Felix. 
following Safie's arrival in the cottage, takes on the role of teacher and cultural 
guide to his wife-to-be. Felix sets about the task of teaching French to the 
Arabian Safie. The Creature uses this as an opportunity to become 'master' of 
the cottagers' language. It is a matter of pride for the Creature that he is able to 
learn the language quicker than his fellow pupil: 'My days were spent in close 
attention, that I might more speedily master the language; and I maý- boast that I 
improved more rapidly than the Arabian, who understood very little, and 
conversed in broken accents, whilst I comprehended and could imitate almost 
every word that was spoken' (Frankenstein p. 95). The Creature, coming from an 
indefinite social situation has fewer cultural barriers to overcome than Safie who 
already has a language that she is fluent in and who comes from a very different 
cultural background from her adopted family. The Creature also learns of the 
'science of letters' as it is being taught to Safie, and so gains access to the books 
he is fortunate enough to have discovered in a portmanteau in the forest. He also 
becomes acquainted with another text, Volney's Ruins of Empire, that Felix uses 
in order to teach Safie about world history. 
In Frankenstein the message of Volney's Ruins is conve-Yed through 
sweeping generalisations about race, culture and history. 124 Thus, along xvith 
acquiring the rudiments of language Safie consumes a distinctly white European 
ideology. The Creature and Safle learn of: 'the slothful Asiatics; of the 
stupendous genius and mental activities of the Grecians; of the wars and 
wonderful virtue of the early Romans' (Frankenstein p. 95). We might ask Nýbom 
Safie is supposed to identify with in relation to this ideological narrative. Is she 
supposed to see herself as one of the 'slothful Asiatics'? This question can be 
answered in relation to Safie's cultural background. The Creature conveys 
Safie's story at length, and we learn from this that Safie's mother was a Christian 
4 seized and made slave by the Turks' who taught her daughter 'in the tenets of 
her religion, and taught her to aspire to higher powers of intellect, and an 
independence of spirit, forbidden to the female followers of Mahomet" 
(Frankenstein p. 99). Thus Safie has a double identity that allows her to identify 
with European Christian culture, while at the same time being racially other to 
this culture. And yet it is Safie's racial othemess - Felix calls her his beautiful 
Arabian - that is central to her appeal. Felix has no problem with her form, what 
he wants to modify through education is her cultural 'content. Indeed the form 
she takes, as a female and an Arabian, conveys her passivity in relation to 
European culture, both positive attributes in the light of Felix's educational 
125 
programm . 
124 For discussions that analyse Frankenstein in the context of Colonialism and Orientalism see, 
Elizabeth A. Bohls, 'Standards of Taste, Discourses of Race and the Aesthetic Education of a 
Monster: Critique of Empire in Frankenstein', Eighteenth- Century Life, vol. 18,1994, pp. 23-36; 
Joseph W. Lew, 'The Deceptive Other: Mary Shelley's Critique of Orientalism in Frankenstein', 
Studies in Romanticism, vol. 30,1991, pp. 255-283, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, 'Three 
Women's Texts and a Critique of Imperialism'. Critical Inquiry vol. 12,19U. pp. 243-26 1. 
125 It is important to be alert to the fact that Mary Shelley may also haN e had an ideological 
investment in the racial and class stereotypes she portrays. For example, Anne K. Mellor points 
out the racist content in Mary Shelley's History of. 4 Six Weeks Tour through a part of France, 
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The Creature's education takes place alongside Safie"s. 126 Indeed he 
begins his education more 'ignorant' than she is. From this we might expect that 
he would identify with her more than any of the other cottagers. We might have 
expected that her racial otherness would have a strong resonance with him 
considering his own physical difference. To an extent the Creature does identify 
with his fellow pupil but in time he more and more comes to resemble his 
'teacher'l Felix. 
One episode in particular conveys the Creature's transformation from pupil 
into would-be teacher. Following his final rejection by the De Lacey family, and 
most importantly his brutal beating by Felix, the Creature heads off in search of 
his creator/father Victor Frankenstein, following a trail that begins with the 
discovery of Victor's notebook in the pocket of his clothing. The episode begins 
with the Creature, having reached the environs of Geneva, stopping for a rest that 
develops into a 'slight sleep' in a rare moment that is 'free from the pain of 
Switzerland, Germany and Holland, with Letters descriptive of a Sail round the Lake of Geneva 
and of the Glaciers of Chamouni (1817). Mellor comments on how Shelley 'feels entirely alien 
to the starving peasants and more prosperous burghers of France, Switzerland, and Germany'. At 
one point Shelley describes French peasants as being 'squalid with dirt, their countenances 
expressing every thing that is disgusting and brutal'. Mellor remarks of this: 'Here we must 
recognise Mary Shelley's deep aversion to the lower classes and the racist chauvinism implicit in 
her condemnation'. Anne K. Mellor, Mary Shelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters 
(London: Routledge 1988), p. 25. Safie's life story in Frankenstein is riddled with racial clich6s, 
many of which have been borrowed from Shakespeare. Safie's father is little more than a pale 
imitation of Shylock. He is money-grabbing, devious and loathes 'the idea that his daughter 
should be married to a Christian' (Frankenstein p. 100). The character of Safie is suggestive of 
Shylock's daughter Jessica, while Felix is a Bassanio figure prepared to 'hazard' all for the 
woman he loves. 
126 Alan Richardson suggests that Mary Shelley's engagement with issues relating to pedagogy 
implicitly involves a critical response to Book Five of Rousseau's tmile in which Rousseau 
addresses the question of female education. Richardson notes the parallels that exist between 
Felix and Safie and tmile and Sophie, pointing out the similarity in the two women's names. 
tmile like Felix sets out to educate his fianc6e giving 'her lessons in philosophy. physics. 
mathematics, history and everything else' (tmile, V, 465-466). Richardson notes in the 
relationship of Felix and Safie a power relationship that keeps Safie, like Rousseau's Sophy. in a 
subordinate position. This suggests that Mary Shelley's representation of Felix and Safie is 
intended as a critique of the female conduct book tradition, a tradition criticised by her mother 
Mary Wollstonecraft. See Alan Richardson, Literature, Education, and Romanticism 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1994). pp. 206-212. 
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reflection'. The Creature's day-dreaming is interrupted by the approach of a 
'beautiful boy' running towards him 'with all the sportiveness of infancy'. The 
appearance of the boy inspires the Creature with an idea: "Suddenly. as I gazed 
on him, an idea seized me, that this little creature was unprejudiced, and had 
lived too short a time to have imbibed a horror of deformity. If, therefore. I 
could seize him, and educate him as my companion and friend, I should not be so 
desolate in this peopled earth' (Frankenstein p. 116-117). The boy, however, 
turns out to be articulate in his prejudice, calling the Creature an 'ugly wretch' 
among other things. The boy also turns out to be well aware of his social status, 
warning the Creature that his father is a Genevan Syndic. The boy is of course 
Victor's brother William,, and when he reveals this fact the Creature decides to 
murder him. 
The initial educational potential that the Creature perceives in the boy is 
not all that different from the potential Rousseau sees in his fictional child Emile. 
What the Creature has become aware of is the power of pedagogy to shape young 
lives. But the Creature realises, as does Rousseau, that in order to maximise his 
influence on the child he must remove him from the realm of social discourse. 
As far as possible the Creature hopes to create an unbroken dyad consisting of 
pupil and teacher. Perhaps the Creature sees in the boy a younger version of 
himself We might then say that like Rousseau and Condillac in relation to their 
'infants' there is a narcissistic element to his educational ambitions. The 
Creature's request that Frankenstein create a mate for him can be seen in a 
similar light. Influenced by the relationship of Felix and Safie the Creature 
wants not only a mate but also a potential pupil. The Creature leaves the 
De 
Lacey cottage with nothing, his only *possession' is the education he has 
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acquired, an education that results in him finding a voice through the articulation 
of the cultural discourses he has overheard. But, as Volo§inov has taught us, 
these discourses do not belong to him but are borrowed from the very ideology 
that excludes him. 
III 
Chapter Seven 
Victor Frankenstein, Citizen of Geneva 
The city of Geneva in Mary Shelley's novel functions as more than just a 
backdrop to Victor Frankenstein's childhood. In Frankenstein the intellectual 
life of the city plays an important role in the formation of Victor's character. 
Geneva in the eighteenth century was a city grappling with the ideas of the 
Enlightenment. The city had historical connections with Voltaire, Montesquieu 
and itself produced Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Mary Shelley's portrayal of Victor"s 
education appears to have been greatly influenced by Rousseau. Victor's father's 
teaching style has much in common with that Proposed by Rousseau in tmile. 
But there are some aspects of Victor's personal ideology that do not owe their 
origin to the Enlightenment. Victor displays classic symptoms of what Max 
Weber in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism describes as the 
Protestant work ethic. These tendencies reveal themselves when Victor works 
night and day to animate dead matter during his student years. Victor also 
displays a strong sense of a 'calling' that irresistibly compels him towards his 
P-. 
fate. Most importantly Victor displays signs of social alienation and 
psychological isolation that appear at odds with Geneva's stereotype as a sociallý, 
cohesive community. The intellectual antecedents of these characteristics can be 
traced back to another important figure in Genevan history, Jean Calvin. This 
Chapter explores the ideological interchange between Calvinism and Rousseau's 
philosophy in Frankenstein. 127 It shall do this in the context of Genevan social 
127 For a reading of Rousseau's political writing that stresses Rousseau's Gene,,, an roots, and 
reads Rousseau in the context of Genevan economic, political and social history see Helena 
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history, stressing the role of culture as a means of ideological dissemination. 
Now it needs to be stressed that I am not claiming that Mary Shelley had an 
intimate knowledge of Geneva's social history from the time of Calvin onward. 
though neither was she ignorant of Geneva's political and religious significance 
in the context of European history. I will explore Geneva's social history in the 
sixteenth century not in order to provide a purely historical context for 
Frankenstein, but to provide an interpretive model that stresses the dynamic 
between cultural transformation and ideological consolidation. In particular the 
way that ideologies can survive their social and historical genesis and be adapted 
to new modes of cultural articulation. There is no better example of this than the 
Protestant work ethic, an idea that has been robbed of its religious content but 
persists to the present day as an ideological imperative. Frankenstein provides 
us with an interpretive moment in which Mary Shelley inserts herself into the 
history of an ideology, and produces some remarkable insights and analysis. By 
beginning my analysis with a look at Calvin's Geneva I hope to go on to 
highlight just how profound her insights were, and how they have a continuing 
relevance beyond the historical moment of their articulation. 
Geneva and Calvinism 
At the height of his powers Calvin attempted to shape the people of Geneva into 
a social totality, a body of believers, who submitted to the authority of God 
through their adherence to the doctrine of the Reformed Church and their 
obedience to the religious and civil authorities whose job it was to order their 
Rosenblatt's Rousseau and Geneva: From the First Discourse to the Social Contract, 1749-1762 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1997) 
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moral and social conduct. 128 Calvin's aim was not to centralise authority, but to 
disperse it among the community. Protestant Geneva prized the Word as the 
means of achieving this dissemination. The didactic sermonising of preachers 
was passed from the church to the homes of the congregation. In the homes of 
the faithful religious doctrine filtered through a domestic hierarchy and was 
internalised by the individual members of the household. In accordance with St 
Paul wives were instructed to be subject to their husbands: 'For the husband is 
the head of the wife just as Christ is the head of the church'. 129 In return wives 
could expect to receive their husbands' love and religious instruction, so as to be 
washed clean by the Word. 130 Children were instructed to obey their parents, but 
parents were obliged not to provoke their children to anger, and to bring them up 
in the 'discipline and instruction of the Lord'. 131 Servants were expected to obey 
their masters not only outwardly but internally, 'not only while being watched, 
and in order to please them, but as slaves of Christ'. 132 In return for this they 
could expect their master's kindness, and escape undue severity. 
In a sense Calvin wanted to transform Geneva into a weeklong Sunday 
school, in which religious teaching embedded itself in the structures of authority 
present in people's everyday lives. In doing this he attempted to construct a 
Christian community whose spiritual and social cohesion most closely resembled 
that of the early church. Of course all this does not make Calvin unique among 
128 See William J. Bouwsma, John Calvin: A Sixteenth-Century Portrait (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 1989), Part 5, pp. 191-229; Gillian Lewis, 'Calvinism in Geneva in the Time of 
Calvin and of Beza (1541-1605)', International Calvinism 1541-1715, ed. Menna Prestwich 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press 1985); E. William Monter, Calvin's Geneva (New York: John Wile%, 
and Sons 1967); R. H Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (Harmondsworth: 
Pelican 
1964), pp. 111-139; Mark Valeri, 'Religion, Discipline and the Economy in Calvin's Geneva', 
Sixteenth Century Journal, 3 4, ! (1997), pp. 123 -142. 
129Ephes. 5.23 (N. R. S. V. ) 
130 Ephes. 5.25-27 
13 1 Ephes. 6.4 
132 Ephes 6.6 This passage origmal]y referred to the treatment of slaves. but following the 
abolition of the trade in white Europeans it was adapted to include the treatment of serý ants. 
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Christian leaders. What does make him unique is the authoritarian means he 
employed in his attempt to build his Christian commonwealth, and the way 
Calvin attempted to adapt his teaching to fit the economic realities of the modem 
world. 
Calvin's authoritarianism manifested itself in the constitution of a 
religious police force, the Consistory. 133 The Consistory's job was to enforce 
uniform religious practice, to uphold public morals and stamp out antisocial 
behaviour. The Consistory concerned itself with every aspect of human conduct 
demanding that all those within the walls of Geneva conform to its social and 
religious standards. It was aided in its work by those among the citizenry whose 
love for their neighbour extended to prying into their private affairs. The 
Consistory also functioned as an involuntary counselling service attempting to 
reconcile broken marriages, neighbourly disputes and family quarrels. As Max 
Weber suggests, Calvinism represented the institutionalisation of brotherly love. 
In the name of Christian brotherhood it imposed its teaching and moral 
pronouncements on the 'ungodly', not so as to secure their salvation, as the 
doctrine of predestination made clear that this was not in their gift, but so as to 
perform their own religious calling as society's moral guardians. Weber 
remarks: 
Brotherly love, since it may only be practised for the glory of God and not in the 
service of the flesh, is expressed in the first place in the fulfilment of the daily tasks 
given by lex natura, and in the process this ftilfilment assumes a peculiarly 
objective and impersonal character, that of service in the interest of the rational 
organisation of our social environment. "4 
133 See Robert M. Kingdom, *The Genevan Consistory in the Time of Calvin', Calvinism itl 
Europe 1540-1620, eds. Peter Pettegree et al (Cambridge: Cambridge Universit\ Press 1994) 
134 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. trans. Talcott Parsons (London 
Routledge 1992), p. 64. 
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In attempting to bring to order Genevan society, Calvin did not bring about 
a social revolution, but rather demanded the conservation of existing class 
hierarchies. Calvin conceived of social status as being divinely ordained. 
Whether you were rich or poor did not determine your position in heaven, but it 
revealed God's will for you upon this earth. Calvin believed it was the duty of all 
to labour within the confines of their social standing, and in so doing to 
contribute to a harmonious social order. Calvin believed that the rulers of the 
world, be they good or bad, had been divinely ordained. In the light of this it was 
the duty of Christians to submit themselves to their rule. Sixteenth-century 
Geneva was ruled by an aristocratic elite of established families. Calvin 
favoured this form of oligarchic rule above monarchy. He saw the magistrates of 
Geneva as representatives of the authority of God having received 'a commission 
from God, that they are endowed with divine authority, and that they in fact 
represent his person; acting in a certain sense in his place'. 135 As God's 
representatives, it was the duty of magistrates to bring down God's wrath on the 
unrighteous: 'for they are God's ministers to execute his kNTath and wreak 
vengeance on evil-doers'. 136 Paradoxically, however, as Christians those who 
were the vehicles of God's judgement were not allowed to experience feelings of 
vengeance themselves. They acted on God's behalf in order to secure the public 
good: 'armed with power, to repress malefactors, whose wickedness disturbs and 
troubles the public peace". 137 So alongside the Consistory's 'brotherly" 
instruction and 'neighbourly' advice, came a civil authority with the power to 
135 Jean Calvin, 'On Civil Government', trans. Harro H6pfl, in Luther and Calvin on Secular 
Authority (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 199 1), p. 5 1. 
136 Jean Calvin, 'On Civil Government'. trans. Harro Hopfl, in Luther and Calvin on Secular 
,4 uthorio, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge Universitý Press 199 1). p. p. 61 
137 Jean Calvin, 'On Civil Government', trans. Harro Mpfl, in Luther and Calvin on Sccular 
.4 uthority 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 199 1), p. 60. 
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fine, banish, torture and execute those who transgressed the laws of God and his 
state. Thus behind Calvin's rhetoric of communal love, existed the authoritarian 
means to enforce Christian 'togetherness'. Max Weber thesis in The Protestant 
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism understands Calvinism to be the intellectual 
ancestor of bourgeois individualism. However Calvinism, at least in its rhetoric, 
appears to contradict Weber's thesis by subsuming the indivi r dual beneath the 
needs of the wider community: 
God has joined and united us together so that we might have a community, for men 
should not be separate. It is true that our Lord had ordained la police so that each 
may have his household, his family, his wife, his children, so that each one will 
have his station, but in such a way that no one may be excepted from the 
community so that he can say, I will live for myself alone. That would be to live 
worse than a beast. What then? We should know that God has obligated us to one 
another to help each other; and at least, when we see anyone in need, although we 
cannot do him the good we would like, that we treat him humanly. 138 
However, Weber's theory should not be dismissed on the evidence of 
Calvin's commitment to the building of a Christian community. It is Calvinism's 
influence on economic affairs that constitutes the basis of Weber's thesis. 
Geneva in the sixteenth century and beyond experienced an influx of migrants, a 
large proportion of whom came from the newly emerging middle class. Calvin 
welcomed these migrants, many of whom were enthusiastic supporters of the 
Reformed faith. His attitude to the trade and commerce these new comers 
brought to Geneva was not one of enthusiasm but tacit acceptance. Calvin did 
not approve of excessive wealth, or of decadent life-styles founded on such 
wealth. Neither did he associate poverty with ungodliness, as he recognised the 
place of the poor in Christ's mission. But he did recognise in commerce and 
trade a form of community -a means of social interaction, of communication: 
138 Calvin Sermon No. 71 on Job, in William J. Bouwsma, John Calvin: A SLYfeenth-Centurl 
Portrait (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1986). 
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Those who use to advantage what God deposits with them are said to trade. For the 
life of the godly is aptly compared to business, since they should deal among 
themselves to maintain fellowship; and the industry with which each man 
prosecutes the task laid on him, and his very vocation, the ability to act aright. and 
the rest of the gifts, are reckoned as merchandise, since their purpose and use is the 
mutual communication among men. "' 
Calvin believed that economic activity should be useful and socially 
responsible. Those involved in economic activities should treat it as a calling, 
and should labour in their vocation for the glory of God and the benefit of 
society. Calvinism in Geneva attempted to order the flow of capital for the 
benefit of the community. Unlike Medieval Christianity's distaste for usury. 
Calvin saw nothing wrong with money lending as long as the interest rate was 
n'k reasonable. In order to insure this, interests rates were regulated within the 
confines of Geneva, and those making excessive profits through exploitation 
could be brought to the courts. In Weberian terms Calvinism was not capitalist 
because it loved money (it did not) but because it attempted to control its flow, 
as well as to regulate labour and order production. It resembles the spirit of 
capitalism in that it demands of its adherence that they may seek profit as long as 
, 140 they do so 'rationally and systematically . 
At the heart of Calvinism then, there is a contradiction. On the one hand, it 
is socially authoritarian, appearing to prize community above all else, while on 
the other hand it stresses individualism in its conception of the 'calling' as 
something that extends into the secular world. In addition, as Weber points out. 
139 Calvin's Commentary on Matt 25.20, the parable of the five talents. Calvin's Commentaries. 
A Harmony of the Gospels Matthew, Mark and Luke, vol. 11, trans. T. H. L Parker (Edinburgh- The 
Saint Andrew Press 1972), p. 288. 
140 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans Talcott Parsons (London 
Routledge 1992), p. 27. 
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its adherence to the belief of predestination left individuals spiritually isolated 
and unable to take control over their destiny: 
In its extreme inhumanity this doctrine must above all have had one consequence for the life of a generation which surrendered to its magnificent consistencý. That 
was a feeling of unprecedented inner loneliness of the single individual. 141 
Despite the strength of Weber's argument as a psychologically astute 
reading of the Protestant mind-set, it is wrong to characterise Calvinism as an 
ideology that produces socially alienated individuals. Calvinism's commitment 
to the idea of community is indisputable. However, Weber's theory is instructive 
when viewed in relation to a post-Calvinist world where some of Calvinism's 
key concepts continue to 'haunt' modernity, all be it in a form emptied of their 
original religious content. In the following discussion I hope to show how the 
ghost of Calvin haunts Mary Shelley's Frankenstein, shaping the lives and 
characters of the novel's central family. 
The Frankensteins and Geneva 
The figure of Alphonse Frankenstein may at first sight appear to be the very 
model of the enlightened citizen, but on closer inspection his enlightened outlook 
has a distinctly Calvinist edge to it. The Frankensteins are members of Geneva's 
political elite. They are an "old' family whose ancestors have a history of public 
service as counsellors and syndics. Alphonse Frankenstein carried on the fami Iy 
tradition. Victor speaks with pride about his father's public service describing 
141 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, trans Talcott Parson. ý (Londorl 
Routledge 1992), p. 60. 
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him as having 'filled several public situations with honour and reputation* 
(Frankenstein p. 18). The language used to describe Alphonse's public work is 
characteristic of the language of 'the calling' or vocation that is so central to 
Calvinism. Alphonse is described as having displayed an 'indefatigable attention 
to public business' (Frankenstein p. 18). His labour is spoken of in terms of a 
work ethic that involves self-sacrifice and self-discipline. His labour is an end in 
itself To use Weber's language, he is constantly *restless' in his work and is 
described as being: 'perpetually occupied by the affairs of his country" 
(Frankenstein p. 18). What is immediately noticeable in Victor's articulation of 
his father's sense of vocation is the absence of religious rhetoric. Alphonse is 
not described as working for the glory of God but for the public good. 
Alphonse's secular ideology reflects significant changes in the nature of 
belief across Europe in the eighteenth century. 142 In the case of eighteenth 
century Geneva, the language of theology began to echo the language of the 
Enlightenment. Liberal theologians such as Jean-Alphonse Turretin and Jacob 
Vemet proposed that the Christian faith be seen in the light of reason. In the 
Academy of Geneva liberal theologians began to find common ground with 
Deists and even Atheists. As a consequence of the plurality of voices entering 
the debate the doctrinal unity of the Church began to unravel. The Calvinist 
model of the Church as a social totality, a community of faith representing the 
body of Christ, was no longer viable. Individual believers armed with their own 
142 We might relate this to Mary Shelley's father, William Godwin, who was brought up in an 
austere Calvinist family, and whilst away at school in Norwich became a follower of an extreme 
form of Calvinism known as Sandemanianism. Indeed Godwin was so devout in his faith that he 
spent a great deal of his early twenties seeking a position as a minister. In his mid to late mentic" 
Godwin underwent a crisis of faith, and is now remembered for his atheism. and as one of the 
most significant contributors to British Enlightenment thought. Thus the life of Mary Shelley's 
father may well have dramatised for her, in a N7er\ personal Ný ay, hoýN- the influence of the 
Enlightenment was challenging, and in the case of her father, replacing. older beliet's" ý, tems. For 
a discussion of Godwin's early years see Peter H. Marshall's William GocAvin (New Haý en: Yale 
University Press 1984), pp. 1-76. 
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reason, were pursuing their own route to God. As a consequence the Church no 
longer provided the social cohesion and sense of common purpose it once had. 14 1 
For many of Geneva's political elite, influenced by the political writing of 
the philosophes, most notably the Genevan Rousseau, the aspiration of creating a 
Christian commonwealth had been superseded by the project of creating an 
enlightened republic. But while Calvinism demanded that the whole community 
work together and congregate for Christian worship. the rhetoric of the 
Enlightem-nent allowed its ideological practitioners to work for the 'Public' 
without necessarily rubbing shoulders with the populace. As a consequence 
cultural distinctions between classes became more pronounced, and society more 
atomised. 
For all Alphonse's rhetoric of public service the family he constructs 
around him is remarkably insular and inward looking. Having pursued a political 
career he turns his attention to his perceived obligation to produce children. He 
sees it as his civic duty to bestow 'on the state sons who might carry his virtues 
144 
and his name to posterity' (Frankenstein p. 18). From Victor's narrative , it 
is 
143 See Linda Kirk, 'Eighteenth-Century Geneva and a Changing Calvinism', Studies in Church 
History, vol 18 - 'Religion and National Identity', ed. Stuart Mews, (Oxford: Blackwell 1982). 
Martin 1. Klauber, 'The Eclipse of Reformed Scholasticism in Eighteenth-Century Geneva: 
Natural Theology from Jean-Alphonse Turretin to Jacob Vemet', The Identity of Geneva: The 
Christian Commonwealth 1564-1864, eds. John B. Roney and Martin 1. Klauber (Connecticut: 
Greenwood Press 1998); Timothy R. Phillips, 'The Dissolution of Francis Turretin's Vision of 
Theologia: Geneva at the End of the Seventeenth Century', The Identity of Geneva: The Christian 
Commonwealth 1564-1864, eds. John B. Roney and Martin 1. Klauber (Connecticut: Greenwood 
Press 1998). 
144Like Alphonse, Godwin in Political Justice rationalises procreation, believing that it should be 
treated as the civic duty of reasonable men rather than as an act arising from sexual desire: 
'Reasonable men then will propagate their species, not because a certain sensible pleasure is 
annexed to this action, but because it is right the species should be propagated; and the manner in 
which they exercise this function will be regulated by the dictates of reason and duty' (Political 
Justice, p. 105). In view of this there is perhaps a strong temptation to see Alphonse as a Godwin zlý 
figure, but it is also important to note how in other ways Alphonse's beliefs and actions 
contradict Godwin's philosophy. For example, unlike Alphonse, Godwin disapproved of 
procreation as a means of establishing one's name for posterit\, even going so 
far as to advocate 
the abolition of surnames. Godwin also disapproved of the establishing of 
bonds of obligation 
between parents and children. Moreover. in many xN ays Frankenstein is a Godwinian noý el. ýis 
clear that Alphonse chanced upon his wife through an act of altruism. Alphonse 
goes in search of his close friend Beaufort. Beaufort we learn. is a failed 
merchant who left Geneva because of the shame he felt at his loss of public 
esteem. 145 Unperturbed by his friend's fall from grace Alphonse seeks him out, 
finding him in Lucerne. By this time his friend, having been ground down bY 
poverty, is close to death. Following his death Beaufort's daughter Caroline is 
left an orphan and a beggar. Caroline has already impressed Alphonse býý the 
duty she displayed towards her father, and the industry she employs in the *plain 
work' she undertakes to keep her and her father alive. As an act of charity as 
much as of love Alphonse takes her in and she becomes his wife. Acts of charit. y 
and of public benevolence are made much of in Victor's narrative of his father's 
early life. Elizabeth is taken under the wing of the Frankenstein household, as is 
Justine Moritz who becomes their servant. Thus bonds of gratitude and 
obligation are central to the social fabric of the Frankenstein clan. 
The obligations that underpin relations within the household are spoken 
of using the language of mutual respect rather than that of social deference. This 
is brought into sharp focus in the case of Justine. Justine, though a servant, is 
treated with great warmth and affection. In a letter to Victor, Elizabeth expresses 
her admiration of Geneva's social system and its enlightened attitude to the lower 
orders. The opinions she expresses have clearly been leamt by rote, and reveal 
an emergent discourse of bourgeois patronage: 
most forcibly illustrated in Shelley's treatment of the mockery ofjustice that is Justine's trial. 
Nevertheless, there are aspects of Alphonse's rationalism and utilitarianism that have a distinctly 
Godwin-like edge to them. See Book VIII of An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice[ 17931, 
'On Property'. Godwin's Political Justice: A Reprint ofthe Essay on Proper0% ed. H. S. Salt 
(London George Allen and Unwin 1949). 
145 Many of the Frankensteins' friends and associates are men of business. True to Weber's 
analysis, business as avocation is more than just another job. The fact that Beaufort, haý ing 
failed in his 'calling', would rather face destitution for himself and his dau,,, lIter than ask his I friends for assistance and face the social stigma of failure, bears testimoný to this. 
The republican institutions of our country have produced simpler and happier 
manners than those which prevail in the great monarchies that surround it. Hence 
there is less distinction between the several classes of its inhabitants; and the lower 
orders being neither so poor nor so despised, their manners are more refined and 
moral. A servant in Geneva does not mean the same thing as a servant in France 
and England. Justine, thus received in our family, learned the duties of a servant, a 
condition which, in our fortunate country, does not include the idea of icnorance. 
and a sacrifice of the dignity of the human being. (Frankenstein p. 46) 
The faýade of mutuality expressed by Elizabeth's rhetoric is set aside when 
Justine is accused of theft and murder following the discovery of William's 
body. Of course the real culprit is Victor's creation, but almost the entire 
community perceive Justine to be the guilty party. Even among the Frankenstein 
household, where Victor and Elizabeth are convinced of her innocence, there are 
those who presume her guilt. Alphonse Frankenstein, for example, makes the 
extraordinary remark that he would rather have remained in ignorance of the true 
identity of his own child's murderer than learn of the *depravity and ingratitude 
in one I valued so highly'(Frankenstein p. 59). Alphonse has revealed Justine's 
true crime in the view of Genevan society - ingratitude from a social inferior to 
her social superiors. When Victor insists to his father that Justine is innocent, his 
father does not take the proposal seriously but in a remark worthy of Calvin, 
insists that the family place their faith in the wisdom of the judges: 'If she is. as 
you believe, innocent, rely on the justice of our judges, and the activity ý, vith 
which I shall prevent the slightest shadow of partiality' (Frankenstein p. 61). 
In the 'mockery of justice' that follows Justine is sentenced to death. the 
jury having been convinced of her 'blackest ingratitude'. As a servant she failed 
to know her place. and to be inwardly grateful for the patronage she was 
receiving. But her anguish does not end with the passing of the death sentence. 
She is badgered by a priest demanding from her a confession: 'Ever since I was 
condemned, my confessor has besieged me; he threatened and menaced. until I 
almost began to think that I was the monster that he said I ývas- He threatened 
excommunication and hell fire in my last moments. if I continued obdurate' 
(Frankenstein p. 66). Justine's confessor may well be a Catholic priest (Justine's 
mother was a Catholic) but he has a strong resemblance to one of Calvin's 
Consistory, and he certainly appears to have the same ideological function. 
Excommunication was a sanction favoured by the Consistory. It meant more 
than just exclusion from religious worship and communion, it implied exclusion 
from the wider community. The important thing in the case of Justine, is that it 
is not enough for her to be found guilty, she must intemalise the prohibitive 
taboo on the crime she is alleged to have committed. Mary Shelley's own 
attitudes to Calvinism and Geneva are made clear in her entry under 'Rousseau' 
in Dionysius Lardner's Cabinet Cyclopedia. Here she describes Rousseau as 
having been 'brought up in a bigoted calvinist city'. 146 She goes on to describe 
Rousseau's leaving for Paris after having returned to his native city in adulthood 
as an attempt to escape the 'inquisitorial and pedantic tone [that] reigned in 
Geneva', a tone 'clothed in the garb of virtue and reason'. 
147 
The cruelty, barbarity and heavy handedness of Justine's court 
case is suggestive of the actions of the civil courts at the time of Calvin. This 
unsubtle means of assuring social order is seen as distasteful by the younger 
members of the Frankenstein family who have been brought up with a more 
enlightened conceptions of civil justice. But the social function of the trial. to 
punish the transgressor, and so teach others to know their place in the social 
146 Mary Shelley, 'Rousseau' in Mary Shellej-'s Literarj, Lives and Other lf`rmnQ. ý. ý ol. 33, Frowl? 
Lives (Mol&re to Madame de Sta&l), ed. Clarissa Campbell Orr (London: Pickering and Chatto 
2002), p. 325. 
147 lbid, p. 339. 
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order has the same ideological aim as Alphonse Frankensteinýs benevolent rule 
over his household. The aim is that everyone should know their place and keep 
to their appointed tasks. Alphonse is not a disciplinarian. He achieves his 
authority through the process of educating his children and dependents. In doing 
this he achieves their respect and admiration, but most importantly their 
gratitude. Alphonse is representative of a new type of father/tutor. He has a 
striking resemblance to the tutor Jean-Jacques in Rousseau's tmile. 
In Emile Rousseau advocates kindness and friendship towards children as 
a means of establishing one's authority over them. In this way you achieve their 
obedience not through fear and threats but through their willing submission to 
your rule: 'But see what fresh chains you have bound about his heart. Reason, 
friendship, affection, gratitude, a thousand bonds of affection speak to him in a 
voice he cannot fail to hear' (Emile IV, p. 336). In Frankenstein Victor is very 
well aware of the debt of gratitude he owes his parents: 'No creature could have 
more tender parents than mine ... My -improvement and 
health were their 
constant care' (Frankenstein p. 19). He feels particular obligation towards his 
father. The reason for this can be traced back to the Calvinist concept of the 
'calling'. Like Rousseau, Alphonse views his role as educator as a full time 
vocation, a vocation that is distinct from the biological fact of his paternity. 
Victor and his siblings are made aware of the significance of his father's 
undertaking and the time and effort involved in his new employment: , When mý, 
father became a husband and a parent, he found his time so occupied by the 
duties of his situation, that he relinquished many of his public employments. wid 
devoted himself to the education of his children. ' (Frankenstehi p. 19). The 
private world of home and family is coming to resemble the adult %ýorld ofwork 
and responsibility. Familial roles such as father, mother. brother. sister are 
becoming rationalised and institutionalised. Victor comes to realise that he is the 
product of his father's labour of love, and that he has his own duties awaiting 
him in later life: 'I was the eldest, and the destined successor to all his labours 
and utility' (Frankenstein p. 19). Alphonse has managed to instil in his eldest 
something akin to a'Protestant guilt complex'. The *Protestant guilt complex' 
might be surnmarised as follows: 'because I have laboured on your behalf you 
are obliged to obey me'. Notably Rousseau recommends using guilt as a means 
of manipulating youngsters when they become old enough to rebel against adult 
rule: 
I will say to him: 'You are my wealth, my child, my handiwork, my happiness is 
bound up in yours; if you frustrate my hopes you rob me of twenty years of my life, 
and you bring my grey hairs with sorrow to the grave. ' This is the way to gain a 
hearing and to impress what is said upon the heart and memory of the ) oung man. 
(tmile, V, p. 344) 
The type of psychological control advocated by Rousseau and illustrated in 
Frankenstein can only work on a small social scale, ideally within the framework 
of the family. It is the hope of men like Alphonse that the individual brought 
under his instruction will contribute to the general good of all by first recognising 
his obligation and duty towards his nearest and dearest. This view echoes 
Rousseau who viewed the home and family as the pillar of the state: 'Can 
patriotism thrive except in the soil of that miniature fatherland. the home? Is it 
not the good son, the good husband, the good father, who makes the good 
citizenT (tmile p-390). 
Those bom into the upper echelons of European society like Victor 
Frankenstein, whose parents had a mission in mind for him before 
he Nvas even 
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born, must have had the sense that they had a preordained path theý were 
destined to follow. Once again we see the shadow of Calvin's theory of 
predestination, but again robbed of its religious content. Moreover. whereas 
Calvin's pilgrims might have expected to experience Christ-like suffering and 
hardship as they carried their crosses, children like Victor could expect to 
experience relative 'freedom' and happiness, particularl-, - during their childhood 
years. In theory children born to 'enlightened' parents would, on coming of a( , e. 
have been free to choose their own destiny. In practice many had been 
psychologically programmed to 'choose' exactly what their parents intended for 
them. 
Alphonse begins to build Victor's future around him while he is still a 
small boy. He adopts a 'playfellow' for Victor in the figure of his cousin 
Elizabeth,, who Victor's mother soon detennines would make an excellent future 
wife for her son. Elizabeth has strong parallels with Sophy, Emile's fianc6e in 
Rousseau's text. Her attributes confonn to Rousseau ideals of femininity. She is 
said to be 'gentle', 'affectionate', 'docile' and good'. In Elizabeth's attitude to 
authority we see the repetition of the same formula we have witnessed in relation 
to Victor and Justine. She is given relative liberty, but is programmed to be 
psychologically submissive: 'No one could better enjoy liberty. yet no one could 
submit with more grace than she did to constraint and caprice* (Frankenstein 
p. 20). Victor is quite aware of Elizabeth's subordinate place in the pecking order. 
and his talk of her reflects this: 'I loved to tend on her. as I should on a faNourite 
animal. ' (Frankenstein p. 21). 
In Emile Jean-Jacques plans his pupil's future betrothal. filling his pupil's 
imagination with tales of his future xvife*s virtue and rustic simplicity in order 
" 
that he might draw a negative comparison with *lesser' fernales. He names his 
ideal of femininity Sophy. Unbeknown to Emile Sophy has already been 
'discovered'. Through a 'chance' meeting and Jean-Jacques' skill as 'the 
confidant of these two young people and the mediator of their affections . the two 
fall in love and become devoted to one another. In a sense Alphonse 
Frankenstein's manipulation of his son is far less subtle, Victor realises from an 
early age that his parents expect him to marry Elizabeth, 148 but the logic of 
manipulating a child so that his longings and desires match with its adult carer is 
the same. Rousseau expresses this logic when he defends his right to influence 
his pupil's marital future, though he is only Emile's adopted father: 'it is I who 
am really Emile's father; it is I who have made a man of him. I would have 
refused to educate him if I were not free to marry him according to his own 
choice, which is mine. ' (Emile, V, p. 442) 
Victor describes his childhood as a happy time. His education, in 
accordance with Rousseau's conception of negative education, is not forced but 
allowed to happen at a natural pace. Alphonse is an unobtrusive parent, who 
guides his children without being domineering: 'Our studies were never forced; 
and by some means we always had an end placed in view, which excited us to 
ardour in the prosecution of them' (Frankenstein p. 21). Victor seems genuinely 
to appreciate his father's enlightened teaching methods, not merely because theý, 
are less authoritarian than established practices, but because they allow for the 
joy of leaming. 
148 It is worthy of note that Rousseau describes having considered bringing Emile and 
'-, ()I)hv up 
together but rejected the idea: 'I meant to train a helpmeet for 
tmile, from the ver% first, and to 
educate them for each other and with each other. But on consideration I thou, -, 
ht all these 
premature arrangements undesirable, for it was absurd to plan the marriage of two children 
before 
I could tell whether this union in accordance NN ith nature and ý%-hether they NN, ere reallý suited 
to 
each other' (ýmile, V, p. 441). So Alphonse does indeed outdo even 
Jean-Jacques in his attempts 
to influence his children's future! 
So what goes wrong in Victor's education? On a practical level there Is 
nothing wrong with Alphonse's teaching methods as Victor is transformed into 
an enthusiastic scholar. Moreover, it is too easy to blame Victor's ruin on the 
intrusion of alien knowledge from a less enlightened age in the fonn of Comellus 
Agrippa's occultism. Indeed Victor does not blame Agrippa for leading him 
astray, but rather his father's attitude to his reading Agrippa, ý, vhich forces him to 
pursue his new found interest in secret. Victor stresses his father's dismissive 
response to Agrippa who he describes as a 'waste of time' and *sad trash'. 
Victor clearly feels resentment at the breakdown in communication betýveen hill, 
and his father. This break down in communication is based on more than 
Victor's rationalisation that his father should have exPlained to him that 
Agrippa's theories had been exploded by advances in modem science. Perhaps 
what Victor is reacting to is his father's utilitarianism. His father's steadfast 
belief that all that he does, every human encounter he enters into, must be useful, 
must have a clear purpose, or else be deemed a waste of time. 
Victor's continued pursuit of knowledge unsanctioned by his father may 
well be a rebellious response to his father's control over his life. The works of 
Agrippa, Paracelsus, and Albertus Magnus are seen by Alphonse as being 
redundant to the modem age and so of no use to Victor's future. It is strange to 
think that under Calvin Victor's activities such as attempting to raise ghosts or 
devils through the recitation of incantations might have seen him prosecute for 
witchcraft. In the more enlightened eighteenth century his interest in the 
supernatural, if discovered, would have been dismissed as irrational nonscnse. 
And yet in Victor's pursuit of the supernatural Nve see the desire to resurrect a 
dead religion. Both Calvinism and the Enlightenment attempted to erase the 
persistence of folk religion and magic. In the case of Calvinism. Weber sees its 
resistance to superstition as an attempt to repudiate an alternative method of 
salvation: 
That great historic process in the development of religions, the elimination of 
magic from the world which had begun with the old Hebrew prophets and, in 
conjunction with Helenistic scientific thought, had repudiated all magical means to 
salvation as superstition and sin, came here to its logical conclusion. The genuine 
Puritan even rejected all signs of religious ceremony at the grave and buried his 
nearest and dearest without song or ritual in order that no superstition, no trust in 
the effects of magical and sacramental forces of salvation, should creep in. 149 
Victor's interest in magic can be seen as an attempt to resurrect the idea of 
salvation. But it is salvation in a secular world as Victor seeks the 'elixir of life' 
in order to 'banish disease from the human frame'. Victor's 'magic" has no 
connection with any residual folk culture. Victor sees no cultural meaning in the 
rituals he performs, they are simply a means to an end. He goes further than 
Weber's Puritan who refuses to perform burial rituals, as Victor does not even 
respect the sanctity of the grave. Victor, while reacting against his father's 
utilitarianism, has begun to display aspects of it in his attitude to life and death. 
The attitude of the Frankensteins to death and bereavement is revealing of 
the pervasiveness of their utilitarian ideology. The greatest misfortune to afflict 
the family before Victor's departure to the university of Ingolstadt is the death of 
Victor's mother. Victor does not go into the specifics of his experience of urlet' 
because he regards grief as something that is universally experienced: 'ý, vh\- 
should I describe a sorrow which all have felt, and must feel' (Frankenstein 
p. 27). Even on her death bed Caroline is preoccupied with insuring that her 
aspirations for the future go ahead, and that the vacancý- she leaves xvill be filled 
by Elizabeth both as Victor's future xvife and her children's guardian. The logic 
149 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. p. 6 1. 
of this might be summarised as follows: If roles within a family are perceived in 
terms of occupations or situations, then when a situation is vacated, for exarriple 
when its occupant dies, reason demands that the vacancy should be filled by a 
suitable replacement with the right temperament and skills for the job. In this 
way the class ideology of the Frankensteins is perpetuated bý- a pragmatism that 
places the collective survival of the family unit above the emotional needs of its 
individual members. 
Following Caroline's death excess grief is described as an "Indulgence'. 
and emphasis is placed on carrying on as normal: 'My mother was dead, but xý e 
had still duties which we ought to perforrn, we must continue our course with the 
rest, and learn to think ourselves fortunate, whilst one remains whom the spoiler 
has not seized' (Frankenstein p. 37). Victor's career is curtailed no more than 
necessary, with a three-month grieving period before he sets off for Ingolstadt. 
Alphonse does not allow bereavement to get in the way of his son's destiny. But 
it is only on returning from Ingolstadt, following the animation of Victor's 
creation, and William's murder, that we discover the full extent of Alphonse's 
utilitarian rationalism. Victor. weighed down by guilt for the deaths of William 
and Justine is no longer able to control his grief In response Alphonse delivers 
his rationale for the repression of emotion: 'is it not a duty to the survivors, that 
we should refrain from augmenting their unhappiness by an appearance of 
immoderate grief? It is also a duty owed to yourself, for excessive sorrow 
prevents improvement or enjoyment, or even the discharge of dailý, usefulness. 
without which no man is fit for society' (Frankenstein pp. 69-70). In response to 
his father's remarks Victor retreats into himself in order to conceal his fcelin, -, s 
So though Alphonse's remarks are intended to produce a greater a\ý areness of the 
feelings of others in his son, his remarks show a distinct lack of awareness of 
what his son is going through. The result is that Victor retreats into himself 
becoming increasingly more isolated and lonely. 
We might turn again to Emile in order to understand the basis of 
Alphonse's position. In a rather bizarre episode in tmile Jean-Jacques. after 
having encouraged Emile's love for Sophy, asks his pupil: 'What,, vould you do 
if someone told you Sophy were dead? (tmile, V, p. 486). Naturally tmile is 
horror stuck at his tutor's remarks, but after he has calmed down Jean-Jacques 
assures him that his fiancde is still alive. The purpose of Jean-Jacques remark is 
to prepare his pupil for the inevitability of bereavement and loss. It is also to 
encourage in him a sense of self-reliance and self-preservation founded on self- 
love: 'Self-preservation requires, therefore, that we shall love ourselves. ýN, e must 
love ourselves above everything, and it follows directly from this that ýýe love 
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what contributes to our preservation' (Emile p. 208). ' 0 The logic of Rousseau's 
remarks might help to explain Victor's monumental egotism, but it also explains 
the basis of the Frankensteins' love for one another. Theirs is a love based upon 
their mutual interest in their collective preservation. After psychologically 
preparing his pupil for the inevitability of loss and the importance of self- 
reliance, Jean-Jacques informs his pupil that he must temporarily leave Sophy in 
order that he mi ht travel and experience the world. 
151 Similarly Victor, shortIN, 9 
after losing his mother sets off for the University of Ingolstadt. Victor might 
have attended the world renowned Academy of Geneva, but Victor's father has 
150 For a discussion of the concept of self-love in the context of Genevan Cak 111 ism and t1w 
influence of this on Rousseau see Helena Rosenblatt's Rousseau and Geneva: 
From the First 
Discourse to the Social Contract, 1-49-1-62 (Cambridge: Cambridae UniýersitN, Pre"s 1997). 
pp. 66-68. i be 15 1 This parallels Victor's courtshiP of Elizabeth. After becomn,, 
formalk cn, _, ýIged to El, za th 
Victor embarks on two years of travel before marriage. I I- 
already decided upon Ingolstadt, seeing the process of leaving home as an 
important rite of passage: *my father thought it necessarNý for the completion of 
my education, that I should be made acquainted with other customs than those of 
my native country' (Frankenstein p. 26). Thus in Frankenstein as in 
human relations and emotions are not allowed to get in the way of a young tiiaii's 
education. 
Victor Finds His Calling. 
As Victor makes his way towards Ingolstadt it suddenly dawns on him that this is 
the first time in his life that he has been truly alone. He realises that he must 
attempt to make new friends and acquaintances in Ingolstadt but he is also aN\arc 
of how uncomfortable he is around strangers: 
In the university, whither I was going, I must form my own friends, and be my own 
protector. My life had hitherto been remarkably secluded and domestic; and this 
had given me invincible repugnance to new countenances. I loved my brothers, 
Elizabeth, and Clerval; these were 'old familiar faces'. but I believed myself totally 
unfitted for the company of strangers' (Frankenstein p. 28). 
When Victor reaches Ingolstadt, the human need for company is unable to 
conquer his repugnance to new faces, and he sinks into a self-imposed isolation 
retreating into his 'solitary apartment'. Victor's main points of human contact 
are with the professors who aid him in his scientific work. and though he 
develops a particular liking for one of his teachers, Waldman, these relationships 
are undoubtedly judged in terms of their utility. 
In Ingolstadt Victor finds his 'calling' as he searches for a means 
which to animate dead matter. The way that Victor talks about his newly 
discovered vocation is of significance. At first he treats his ý\ ork- with the same 
attitude that his father treated his civic responsibilities. and regards his studies as 
a duty involving self-discipline and resolution, but over time his labours beconie 
less an occupation and more a mode of being: 'That application, Nvhich at first 
had been a matter of duty and resolution, now became so ardent and eager. that 
the stars often disappeared in the light of morning whilst I was yet engaged in my 
laboratory' (Frankenstein p. 32). Victor's ceaseless labour has a strong 
resemblance to Weber's description of the Protestant work ethic. In accordance 
with Weber model of the 'rational ethic of ascetic Protestantism' Victor is 
disciplined, inclined to abstinence and is wholly devoted to his work. He also 
has a systematic response to the task in hand and a strong sense of procedure wid 
process. But Victor goes beyond even Weber's description of the Protestant 
worker. For Victor the work ethic is more than an ideology that guides one 
through life; it is life. Victor is all but dead to the physical as ýý ell as the social 
world, becoming unaware of the changing of the seasons or of his familý back in 
Geneva. As Judith Wilt suggests, he is'dead' both in terms of-a Lockean model 
of sensory deprivation and in terms of a Christian model of spiritual death: I 
seemed to have lost all soul or sensation but for this one pursuit' (Frankenstein 
p. 36). 152 Normal 'life signs' are replaced by the impulse to labour at a single 
occupation, it is this spirit that animates Victor. Victor even comes to resemblc a 
corpse: 'My cheek had grown pale with studý,, and my person had become 
emaciated with confinement' (Frankenstein p. 36). Victor does not labour under 
the ideology of the Protestant work ethic, he has intemalised its values to the 
point of being indistinguishable from them. We see in Victor^s 'frantic 
impulse' 
152 Judith Wilt, 'Frankenstein as MN'sterý, PlaN' The Endurance ql'Frankxn. ýtcin: 
Es, ýqvs on kfarý- 
Shelley's Novel, ed. George Levine and U, C. Knoepflmacher (Berkeley: 
UmN erit)ý ot'Cafifornia 
Press 1979) p. 38. 
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to complete his labours the ardour of the faithful, at one point he describes 
himself as being 'animated by an almost supernatural enthusiasm'(Franken. s 1,, ill 
p. 33). Victor is not faithful to a Christian God, nor does he fear external 
supernatural forces. His father, after all, has taken the *greatest precautions' that 
his mind is not 'impressed with supernatural horrors'(Frankenstein p. -3 3 3). -1 But 
though Victor is not concerned with the spirits of the dead he is, as Weber puts it. 
haunted by a dead ideology: 'the idea of duty in one's calling prowls about in our 
lives like the ghost of dead religious beliefs'. 154 For Victor the spirit that he 
needs to exorcise dwells within. 
Whilst at Ingolstadt Victor is a deeply antisocial individual. and ý-ct the 
aim of his labour is to create a community in the form of a species of beings %N ho 
will bless him 'as its creator and source' (Frankenstein p. 36). Victor wants to 
create an alternative society because he is unwilling to take part within existing 
social structures. We see in Victor the figure of the social engineer who hopes to 
construct a world that fits his social vision. We see in Victor the reflection of his 
. 
C'-. ý 
tather. Like his father, Victor expects to 'claim the gratitude of his child', but 
unlike his father he is not prepared to put in the psychological ground work in 
order to attain such gratitude. Victor's conception of societY is an abstract one as 
he is unable to see society as a complex web of human relations. 
In our discussion of Genevan history we have seen a historical shift from 
the unified society of Calvin in the sixteenth century. to the middle class model 
of atomised nuclear families in the eighteenth century as epitomised by the 
113 Judith Wilt also relates Victor's lack of squeamishness with his Genevan education remarking- 
'In the grisly study of worm and waste, of rot and decay, he is checked bý no natural or 
supernatural repugnance, having had a thoroughlý republican pragmatic education. 
* Judith %k 111ý 
'Frankenstein as Mystery Play', p. 38. 
154 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit ofCapitalism, trans Talcott 
Par. ýon. % (London 
Routledge 1992), p. 124ý 
Frankensteins. In Victor Frankenstein creation we see a further progression with 
the production of a socially alienated individual. Victor works within the 
confines of scientific reason in order to create life. but his labours become 
morally dubious because of Victor's failure, itself a product of his childhood. to 
display unconditional love to the being he has created. The failure of Victor 
Frankenstein to recognise the humanity of his creation can be related to Calvinist 
ideology and the institutionalisation of brotherly love. Victor loves people onlý- 
after he has recognised their role and function in relation to himself. 
Creating Employment 
The revolt and terror that Victor experiences when he finally comes face 
to face with his creation rids him of any desire to return to his 'calling'. Thus 
with the culmination of his labour it initially appears that the *work ethic* that 
has possessed Victor for so long has finally been exorcised. The arrival in 
Ingolstadt of Victor's childhood friend Henry Clerval further encourages 
Victor's resurrection from the death-like state he has been labouring under: "I 
was unable to contain myself It was not joy only that possessed me, I felt niý 
flesh tingle with excess of sensitiveness,, and my pulse beat rapidly' 
(Frankenstein p. 42). 
Despite Victor's high spirits the mental exhaustion and sleep depriý ation 
that have accompanied his work over the previous weeks and months finallý take 
their toll and Victor sinks into a comatose state that lasts for several months. 
However, on returning to consciousness Victor does not regress into antisocial 
behaviour but is reawakened to social life. He makes enqUiries ot'ClcrN al 
2 
concerning his family and looks forward to returning home to Geneva. He also 
rediscovers a love of nature, taking a two-week walking tour ýý-ith Clen-al around 
the environs of Ingolstadt. The experience of nature transports him back to 
childhood when 'happy, inanimate nature had the power of bestowi ng on me the 
most delightful sensations' (Frankenstein p. 5 1). 
The work ethic provided Victor with a mode of being: a structure of 
sensation organised around the demands of his labour. In rejecting the Creature, 
the product of his labour, he rejects this mode of being. For a very short time 
Victor appears to replace the ideology of the work ethic with an altemative 
ideology - Romanticism. However, Victor the -Romanticist' is never alloixed to 
fully express himself in the novel. Mary Shelley will not allo,,, N- Victor to escape 
his responsibilities towards the being he has -given life to, and it is from this that 
the central black comedy of the novel unfolds. Shortly after Victor has 
renounced the work ethic,, the product of his past labours, the Creature returns to 
demand that he return to work, this time involuntarily. 
The consequences of the Creature's actions, the murder of William. the 
execution of Justine, results in Victor returning to a death-like state: -solitude 
was my only consolation - deep, dark, death-like solitude' (Frankenstein p. 
69). 
The Creature is determined to prevent Victor's sensate self from expanding in 
new directions. He does not want Victor's imagination to attach itself to neNý 
objects of interest. At those moments at which Victor"s life might be taking on a 
new direction away from his 'appointed' task. the Creature's appearance reminds 
him of his responsibilities. Victor's first encounter with the Creature i'611owing 
7 thý: sunirnit his abandomnent of him is an example of this. Victor is approaching 
of Montanvert and is experiencing a moment of the sublime: *MN 
heart. N\hich 
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was before sorrowful,, now swelled with something like j o. N-* (Frankens-teni p. 76). 
It is at this moment that the Creature appears to him. 
The pact made between Victor and his creation on Montanvert leads in 
time to Victor returning to his labour on a remote Scottish island. But whereas 
before Victor treated his labour rather like a capitalist entrepreneur treats a 
business venture, marvelling in the new innovations that applied science can 
produce, Victor is now firmly in the employ of another. Removed from self- 
employment, Victor now finds his work an unpleasant chore. He vearris for 
moments of leisure and recreation when he can escape from his toil, but is then 
driven to return to his occupation with fresh ardour in order to meet his 
obligations. In this way he resembles the industrial worker of the nineteenth 
century. Victor has become alienated from his labour: 
As I proceeded in my labour, it became every day more horrible and irksome to 
me. Sometimes I could not prevail on myself to enter my laboratory for several 
days; and at other times I toiled day and night in order to complete rný work. It 
was indeed a filthy process in which I was engaged. During my first experiment. a 
kind of enthusiastic frenzy had blinded me to the horror of my emploý ment; my 
mind was intently fixed on the sequel of my labour, and my eyes were shut to the 
horror of my proceedings. But now I went to it in cold blood, and my heart often 
sickened at the work of my hands. (Frankenstein p. 137) 
The Creature's presence, like that of a nineteenth century factory owner, is felt 
even in his absence. He is the 'unseen eye' watching over proceedings: 
I grew restless and nervous. Every moment I feared to meet m.,, ' persecutor. 
Sometimes I sat with my eyes fixed on the ground, fearing to raise them test theý 
should encounter the object which I so much dreaded to behold. (Frankenstein 
p. 137) 
The model of Victor as -industrial worker^ with the Creature as -overseer 
can only be taken so far. The class status of the Creature is a comple\ onc. and 
is hard to define in relation to historical models of social class. The 
Ci-eiture-, 
physical strength and stature suggests that he represents a new t\ pc ofworkcr 
ideally suited to industrial labour. However, his earlý- life is spent in the 
countryside, and the subsistence life he leads and his homeless status is 
suggestive of the lifestyle of a landless agricultural peasant. In addition to this 
the Creature is also suggestive of a time in human history that pre-dates 
hierarchies of social class as he has a close resemblance to Rousseau's natural 
man. Just to add to the confusion, in terms of culture. education and eN en 
manners the Creature is middle class, having been exposed to the middle class 
ideology of the De Lacey family. All that we can conclude from this is that tile 
Creature's class is indeterminate. He seems to embody transition in relation to 
both history and society, and this in part helps to explain the anxiety he produces 
in readers. He symbolises an element in historical change that is unpredictable 
and de-stabilising. In the case of Victor, the Creature brings about the loss of 
one of his most prized possessions - his intellectual independence. Victor's loss 
may well represent an anxiety felt by Mary Shelley"s o wn cI ass, the I -- uropean 
intelligentsia, that in the coming decades of the of the nineteenth centUry they too 
would have their intellectual pursuits managed and controlled by *others'. 
Victor is his own grave-digger. not onlý because he produces his nemesis, 
but also because the being he produces is not wholly *other' to him. If we return 
to Victor and the Creature's encounter on Montavert, we find that Victor is "-on 
over to the Creature's request by the reasonableness of his argument. The 
Creature and Victor share a common mode of discourse and structure of thought 
- the discourse of reason. The Creature is calm and restrained, 
far calmer than 
Victor. His argument is structured, and he is convInced of its rIghtness: -You are 
in the wrong ... and 
instead of threatening, I am content to reason with % ou' 
(Frankenstein p. 119). The Creature makes constant Integections. stressing 
that 
his request that Victor produce a mate for him is 'reasonable* and 'moderate*. 
On the rare occasions when his passion flares up the Creature is aware of the 
need to restrain himself as such 'excess' of passion is counter productive to his 
argument and his mental well being. The Creature's argument has an intemal 
logic to it. The Creature is an outcast from all mankind, and so why should he 
love those who would destroy him? He concludes: 'Shall I not hate them who 
nil., abhor me? (Frankenstein p. 78). His solution to this dichotomy, that xN-111 both 
compensate him for his alienation and prevent him venting his anger upon Z-- 
mankind, is that Victor produce for him a female companion. The Creature's 
reasoning persuades Victor of the justice of his argument and Victor feels for the 
first time the obligation he has towards his 'child'. 
In the Creature's argument we encounter the same social constructionism 
and moral relativism that characterises Victor and his father Alphonse's social 
vision. Victor finally acknowledges his responsibilities to his creation, but at no 
point hypothesises concerning the duties he would owe towards the female he is 
to produce. Just as Elizabeth was presented to Victor as his 'playfellow", so 
Victor offers to create for the Creature another living being to compensate hini 
for his loneliness. The Creature employs the political rhetoric of the 
Enlightenment, claiming that he has a 'right' to a companion: 'I demand it of you 
as a right which you must not refuse' (Frankenstein p. 1 18). Butwhatrights 
would the female being Victor agrees to create have? Such a woman is viewed 
as having no independent life of her own,, she is produced to compensate for an 
emotional lack in the life of her mate. She is the mirror that will recognise and 
respond to the Creature's emotional state. fulfilling his narcissistic desirc to have 
his thoughts and feeling reciprocated: *Let me see that I excIte the s\ mpathy of 
some existing thing' (Frankenstein p. 120). The function of her life is to reassure 
the Creature that he is not alonýe. 
The destructive force that runs rampant in Frankenstein is not Victor's 
creation, but his ideological inheritance, an inheritance he passes on to his 
'offspring'. Victor and the Creature share the same utilitarian. mechanistic logic 
that understands human life in terms of functionality. But this logic. ý, vhile 
deploying the discourse of reason, masks an inner loneliness born of repressed 
emotion 
The discourse of reason used by the Creature allows him to rationalise his 
yearnings and desires, and transform them into specific demands. But the 
passion that drives the Creature is only barely repressed and threatens to spill out 
as destructive rage. The Creature hopes the dyadic structure of male-to-female 
will redirect his emotional drives containing them within a self-sustaining loop of 
reciprocal sympathy. It is this logic that wins Victor over to the Creature's 
demand. However, the reason that Victor finally refuses the Creature's demand 
arises from his speculation that the body under construction might develop into a 
'thinking and reasoning animal' with a will of her own. One of Victor's fears is 
that she might break free from the self-sustaining dyad proposed by the Creature 
and become a destructive force. All Victor's anxieties arise form his inability to 
control causality - from his inability to establish ratio, order, and self-sustaining 
balance. And yet, paradoxically, the rationale behind the Creature's original 
argument is that it would re-establish order and balance, that by a further act of 
creation Victor would be able to neutralise the potential for destruction latent 
within his first act. Mary Shelley's understanding of causality is a complex one. 
Actions when done cannot be so easily undone. Causality. when 
it conies to 
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human life, cannot be rationalised, for the consequences of an action. particularly 
in relation to human psychology, cannot be fully mapped. 
Mary Shelley complicates the idea that reason functions as an objective 
standard. She forces us as readers to ask the question: where does reason reside? 
Does it dwell within as an innate principle that structures cognition? Or does it 
dwell without, as an organising principle that governs the natural order of things? 
Victor Frankenstein explodes the latter proposition by conceiving the natural 
order to be a dynamic structure, a generative process that holds the potential for 
transformation. The form of life that Victor produces challenges the idea of 
transcendent form: the idea that nature always unfolds itself in the same patterns. 
Victor applies his reason to nature and produces 'defon-nity'. He reveals 
humanity to be subject to unpredictable natural forces that exist within and 
without the human frame. In doing this he displaces 'Man' as the reasoning 
centre of the natural order. In this way the human subject loses his objective 
distance - the basis of his claim to superior reason - and is revealed as hopelessly 
caught up in the machinery of life. 
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The former proposition, that reason resides within the mind and structures 
cognition is complicated by Mary Shelley's presentation of the Creature's mode 
of reasoning. The Creature is not driven by reason to reach the conclusions that 
he reaches but by passion. He describes himself to Victor Frankenstein as: 
I consumed by a burning passion which only you can gratify" (Frankenstein 
p. 118). He uses his reasoning to direct his passions towards a fixed attainable 
ob ective, but he also uses his reasoning in order to structure his desires. and -so j 
"' For adiscussion of some of these issues see: Theodor W. Adomo and Max Horkheimer, 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. trans John Cumming (London: Verso 1997); Gene', ieN e Llo% d, The 
Man of Reason: Afale'and 'Female'in Western Philosophy- (London: Routledge 1993): Nlar-N 
Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Trans c ulturation (London: Routled, -, e 1992) 
make them communicable to another. His reasoning then functions as avehicle 
for his passions but has no originary status. Mary Shelley*s conception of reason 
has a strong resemblance to that of David Hume's. Hume in A Treatise of 
Human Nature challenges the age-old philosophical orthodoxy that passion and 
reason function as counter balances to one another, and debunkes the established 
view that 'suppos'd [the] pre-eminence of reason above passioni. 156 Hume 
stresses the functionality of reasoning, demanding that it has no 'original 
influence' on our thought or actions. The passions on the other hand do have a 
powerful influence over our conduct, and so Hume concludes: 'Reason is, and 
ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to anýr other 
office than to serve and obey them. ' 157 Perhaps Hume's most startling assertion. 
and one with particular relevance to Frankenstein, is the separation he makes 
between reason and morality. Again, the established orthodoxy tended to 
associate reason with virtue and 'excess' of passion with vice. Hume refused to 
accept the equation of reason with moral judgement: 
Where a passion is neither founded on false suppositions, nor chuses means 
insufficient for the end, the understanding can neither justify nor condemn it. 'Tis 
not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching 
of my finger. 'Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to prevent 
the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. 158 
If we examine Hume's statement in terms of the Creature's proposition 
then we discover that his demands are 'reasonable' in so far as they are not based 
upon false suppositions, and because the means exist in order to secure their 
achievement. In terms of morality, in a similar way to Hume's example of the 
man prepared to destroy the world to prevent the scratching of his finger, the 
156 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1978) 11,111,111, p. 41 3. 
157 A Treatise ofHuman Nature, IIýI 11,111, p. 415. 
158 A Treatise of Human Nature, 11,111,111, p. 416. 
Creature is prepared to unleash untold destruction unless his emotional pain is 
alleviated. He remarks to Victor that if his demands are not met: 'not only you 
and your family, but thousands of others, shall be swallowed up in the 
whirlwinds of ... rage' (Frankenstein p-78). The passion generated by the 
Creature's social alienation is powerful enough to override his felloN\ feeling. but 
it does not override his ability to reason. Indeed his threat to cause destruction is 
a product of his reasoning, as it is designed to encourage Victor to submit to his 
demand. 
For the Creature reason is clearly the slave of his passions, but might not 
the same be said of Victor Frankenstein? If we re-evaluate Victor's time at 
Ingolstadt it becomes clear that his tireless labour is not motivated by reason. 
Victor clearly goes to his work with a passion. We know Victor's rationale for 
his labour, he sees himself as a scientific pioneer, on the brink of making a 
groundbreaking discovery that will secure his position as the benefactor of 
mankind. But given Mary Shelley's complex conception of reason kve can 
assume that the passion that motivates Victor originated before the rationale that 
is used to justify it. 
We know the most traumatic event to occur in Victor's life before he goes 
to university is the death of his mother. We also know that the Frankenstein 
family's cultural response to mouming is one that demands the repression of 
4excessive' emotions. Victor's sense of loneliness and social alienation as he 
makes his way to Iglostadt also indicates that he has not fullýý come to tenns vvith 
the loss of his mother. Victor's scientific enquiries might then be motivated 
by 
displaced passions arising from matemal loss. 1ý9 From this we can conclude that 
Victor's 'use' of dismembered body parts is not simply an objective exercise in 
scientific enquiry. Victor's mental state, his being oblivious to changes in day 
and night, his description of himself as having lost ail *soul or sensation' 
suggests a period in human development before the emergence of the unified 
subject. The process by which human beings arrive at self-awareness is 
brilliantly described by Mary Shelley through the Creature's narrative of its earlý- 
life. Victor, using a Lockean model, is regressing to an early stage of this 
process, a stage at which sensation and reflection have not occurred to a 
sufficient degree to produce self-awareness. In psychoanalytical terms Victor's 
activities might also have a narcissistic element to them. Victor's use of 
dismembered body parts is suggestive of the autoerotic period in infancy ýý hen a 
child becomes aware of the limits of its own physicality through its sensual 
engagement with its own body and the body of its mother. Thus in retreating into 
his laboratory Victor is regressing back to a time of relative safety, but in doing 
this he is not facing up to the reality of his loss. Victor is responding to his grief 
by losing himseýf in his work. Victor's employment of the rhetoric of the work 
ethic may well disguise the fact that he is engaged in a form of 'infantile' play. 
But whether Victor is engaging in work or play it is clear that, like Weber's 
Protestant worker, he is driven by a deep inner loneliness bom of alienation. 
Victor's creation is also motivated by passions arising from deep inner 
loneliness. The desolation that the Creature inflicts on Frankenstein's loved ones 
begins to take on the status of a calling, a sense of vocation, following Victor's 
159 Victor's unconscious desires for his mother are suggested b,, the 
dream he experiences after 
the Creature has been given life. Victor dreams he sees Elizabeth walkim-, the streets or 
Ingolstadt. But on embracing her and *attemptin-, to imprint the first 
kiss on her lips' her features 
change and Victor imagines he is holding the corpse of his 
dead mother. (Frunkenýtcin p. -',, )) 
refusal to provide him with a female companion. The Creature does not unleash 
destruction on all mankind as he originally threatened he would. he is systematic 
in his labours, murdering Victor's friends and relatives one at a time until Victor 
is finally alone. However, it would be wrong to assume the Creature gains a 
sense of satisfaction or ftilfilment from his 'work'. We gain a psychological 
insight into the Creature's state of mind through his conversation with Walton. 
We learn from this that the Creature did not always take pleasure froni inflictim-, 
pain on his victims. He remarks to Walton: 'Think ye that the groans of Clerval 
were music to my ears? My heart was fashioned to be susceptible of love and 
sympathy; and, when wrenched by misery to vice and hatred. it did not endure 
the violence of the change without torture' (Frankenstein p. 188). We also learn 
that the emotional pain he inflicted on Victor produced no long-term satisfaction: 
'For whilst I destroyed his hopes, I did not satisfy my own desires. They were 
forever ardent and craving ... ' 
(Frankenstein p. 189). Thus the object of his 
employment', to inflict psychological pain on his 'enemy', ý, vas not in any 
straightforward way the motivation for his actions, rather it was the vchicle for 
his passions: 'I was the slave, not the master of an impulse, which I detested, yet 
could not disobey' (Frankenstein p. 189). The last remark might have been 
uttered by Victor at the height of his fervent labours at Ingolstadt. for he like the 
Creature blinds himself to the horrors of his occupation. As the novel progresses 
it becomes increasingly clear that Mary Shelleý-'s interest is not sirnplý, in the 
form that a pursuit or vocation takes but what impulse or drive compels 
individuals forever onwards in their endeavours. 
In stripping Victor of his friends and relatives the Creature also stnips 
him 
of his social identity. In a telling episode Victor speculates, 
before the death of 
246 
Elizabeth on her wedding night, about what would become of him if he defeated 
the Creature and was left alone with his bride. Victor of course assumes that fie 
will be the object upon which the Creature will vent his furý- and not his,, N-Ife-to- 
be. Victor imagines that by defeating the Creature he will achie, % ea sense of 
freedom. He compares this freedom to the 'liberty' experienced bý, a landless 
peasant: 
If he were vanquished, I should be a free man. Alas! What freedom" such as the 
peasant enjoys when his family have been massacred before his eýes, his cottage 
burnt, his lands laid waste, and he turned adrift, homeless, penniless, and alone, but 
free. Such would be my liberty, except that in Elizabeth I possessed a treasure; 
alas! Balanced by those horrors of remorse and guilt, which would pursue me until 
death. (Frankenstein p. 159) 
The Creature grants Victor his Ireedom', but not before taking from him 
his last possession, Elizabeth. The freedom that Victor outlines IS Of Course the 
freedom that the Creature experiences every day of his life. It is a IiNing hell. 
Freedom in this instance is cultural disorientation. The sense of having no one 
who belongs to you or to whom you belong. The Creature reduces Victor to this 
state of being, even making his home town Geneva, the place that provided him 
with one of the most distinct cultural identities in eighteenth-century Europe, 
hateful to him: 'my country, which, when I was happy and beloved, was dear to 
me, now,, in my adversity, became hateful' (Frankenstein p. 17 1). Victor's 
first 
resolution following the completion of the Creature's carnage 
is to leave Gene,,,,, a 
forever. 
From this day forth Victor's sole obsession in life is the pursuit of the 
Creature. By the closing pages of the novel the idea of pursuit in the sense ot'a 
vocation, a calling, as something to be laboured at, 
has been pared down bý- Marý 
Shelley. Now, pursuit is a futile activitý': to be compelled on"vards. 
to labour 
towards. The purpose of Victor's life thus far has becn to reach a 
fixed 
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destination, and to achieve attainable objectiý-es. Now Victor*s destination keep,,, 
moving, and even if he reached his destination and met the Creature in ph-.,, -slcal 
combat the Creature's physical prowess would ensure his destruction. 
Through his labour of desolation the Creature has become the focal point 
of another's pursuit, becoming the object of Victor's hatred and so the sole 
obsession of his life. It is now Victor's life that is marked by suffering and 
physical hardship. Victor, unlike the restless activities of his student daN, -s now 
longs for rest, but he cannot rest from his labour for fear of failing behind, e\ en 
though the object he pursues is compelled to movement precisely because he is 
pursuing it. Thus the passion that motivates Victor has become its own spur. 
But, we might ask, has the situation ever been any different? Victor's fiiial 
pursuit with the aim of destroying his creation is, on an existential le'vel. not so 
far removed from his original pursuit that aimed to bring it to life. In 
Frankenstein Mary Shelley reveals the spiritual emptiness that lies at the heart of 
the Protestant work ethic. She also shows how the work ethic tirelessly attempts 
to fill the emotional void it has helped to create. 
Chasing the Horizon 
Frankenstein concludes as it begins with the figure of the explorer 'A"alton 
trapped in the ice facing possible destruction. Walton contemplates Ný hether he 
should, provided he escapes from his present predicament. contInue with 
his 
voyage and risk the possible destruction of himself and his crew. or retum 
homc 
and bear the stigma of having failed at his vocation. 
"4's 
In Walton Mary Shelley presents us with ýýet another middle class male 
who is entirely caught up in a single occupation that has come to define his 
purpose in life. Once again, the emotional drive that compels Walton ever 
onwards is the product of alienation and the experience of inner loneliness. 
Unlike Victor, we learn from Walton's letters to his sister that he did not have a 
close relationship with his father during his childhood, and was effectivelv 
allowed to run wild until the age of fourteen. Walton ý'earns for friendship. 
Notably the language he uses to express his need for companionship resembles, 
that of the Creature, but for the fact that Walton seeks a male companion: A have 
one want which I have never yet been able to satisfy; and the absence of the 
object of which I now feel as a most severe evil. I have no friend ... I desire the 
company of a man who could sympathise with me; whose eývs WOUld replý, to 
mine' (Frankenstein p. 8). At first it might seem odd that Walton, who is 
surrounded by his male crew day and night, feels the want of male company, but 
Walton claims he will find no friend among 'merchants and seamen'. Walton 
clearly seeks a companion from a similar class to his own. He seeks a man who 
is older and wiser than him who can make up for his lack of education and 
support him in his endeavours. With the appearance of Victor Frankenstein on 
his vessel Walton believes he has found such a man. 
Walton and Victor are both Iettered male Europeans', men whom %I ary 
Louise Pratt identifies as embarking on a project during the eighteenth century to 
systematically map the 'unknown' world and so reveal it to the 'sight' of 
European structures of knowing: 
One by one the planet's life form were to be drawn out of the tangled threads of 
their life surroundings and reNNoven into European-based patterns of global univ, 
and order. The (lettered, male, European) e\ c that held the sý stem cou 
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familiarize ("natural ize") new sites/sights immediatek upon contact, b. \ incorporating them into the language of the system. ""' 
The bond that emerges between Victor and Walton is founded on their 
shared mode of perception. As in the case of Pratt's gentlemen explorers, 
Walton and Victor attempt to produce order by projecting onto nature a pre- 
existing schematic structure that organises the natural world. NotablY, in the 
case of the Victor's creation, his form is so 'unsightly' that it cannot be 
incorporated into this schematic structure. What this reveals is the limits of this 
mode of perception. The explorer scientist may be driveii by an anxietýý of the 
unknown to transform the world into familiar territory. but in doing this he places 
himself at risk of encountering 'something' that refuses to be incorporated into 
his field of vision. Moreover, the further his vision extends, the further away 
from 'home' he travels, and the more perilous his journey becomes. Thus ý, ve 
encounter Walton on the brink of possible destruction on the threshold of the 
'known' world. 
Walton may like to imagine himself as a man alone in the face of 
adversity, but he is not alone, he is surrounded by his crew. The only way that he 
is alone, at least until the arrival of Victor, is that he is unable to share %ý ith his 
crewmates the dream of discovery that is compelling him onwards. There is then 
a division of labour, between the mental labour of the ship's captain and the 
physical labour of the crew. Theodor Adomo and Max Horkheimer explore just 
such a division of labour in their analysis of book XII of Homer's 0dj-s, sey in the 
Dialectic ofEnlightenment. 
160 Mary Louise Pratt, Imperial Eyes: Travel 10-iting and Transculturation (1, ondon: Routledge 
1992) p. 3 1. 
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In Book XII of the Odyssey Odysseus binds himself to a mast in order 
that he might experience the song of the Sirens without sur end r cring to t and ,o 
securing his ruin. Odysseus insists that his crew fill their ears with ývax so that 
they can continue their labour without being distracted by the Siren's song. 
Adorno and Horkheimer comment of the oarsmen's labour: "The laborers must 
be fresh and concentrate as they look ahead, and must ignore xN-hatever lies to one 
side. They must doggedly sublimate in additional effort the drive that iinpels to 
destruction'. 161 The oarsmen are pursuing Odysseus* desires, but in order to do 
this and not become distracted from their labour they must be oblivious to the 
nature of his desires. The same might be said in relation to \Valton and his crew. 
Walton is alone, consumed by his desires and imaginings, but he cannot fulfil his 
desires without the labour of others who do not share his dreams. Moreover, 
like Odysseus, Walton must bind himself to his purpose in order to arTive at his 
final destination. Walton, in order to succeed must be disciplined. for to 
surrender to his impulse would result in his destruction, though this self-same 
impulse compels him to his calling. 
In Adorno's and Horkheimer's view the image of Odysseus bound to the 
mast is symbolic of the bourgeois individual's attempt to sustain a coherent sense 
of self, and not succumb to the destructive impulses latent within civilisation: 
'The strain of holding the I together adheres to the I in all stages; and the 
temptation to lose it has always been there with the blind determination to 
maintain it. " 62 The strain of holding the I together is comparable to the kind of 
self-disciPline required by Weber's '. ethic of ascetic Protestant'sm". Walton 
clearly fits the stereotype of the Protestant worker. Before embarking on 
his 
16 1 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans John 
Cummiing 
(London: Verso 1997), p. 34. 
162 Dialectic, ofEnlightenment, p. 3-33. 
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voyage he gains experience of the sea by accompanying whale-fishers on their 
expeditions. He describes himself as 'voluntaril-, v [enduring] cold famine. thirst 
and want' and as 'often [working] harder than the common sailors' 
(Frankenstein p. 7). At night he describes himself as retreating to his cabin to 
study 'mathematics, theory of medicine. branches of physical science' 
(Frankenstein p. 7). We might assume from this that, like Victor. \Nralton's seiisc 
of self is defined in relation to his vocation, and so in order to maintain a stable 
identity he has to remain committed to his calling. Once again, this conforms to 
Adorno's and Horkheimer's description of Odysseus: '[T]he hero to whom the 
temptation is offered has reached maturity through suffering. Throughout the 
many mortal perils he has had to endure. the unity of his own life, the identitý of 
the individual, has been confirmed for him. 163 In Walton's case it is necessarý 
to remind ourselves that he is not labouring alone, and that ý, vithout others he 
could not accomplish his task. What the bourgeois individualist falls to 
acknowledge is the debt he owes to those who labour 'for' him. In the case of 
Walton this unconscious debt is revealed by his crew"s threat of mutiny. What 
the crew cannot realise is that to turn back does not just threaten IvValton's 
purpose but his entire sense of self. The threat of mutiny and rebellion inspires 
in Walton the same anxiety experienced by Victor Frankenstein when he 
becomes the Creature's employee - it is the fear of the loss of intellectual 
independence. And yet, paradoxically. this independence is dependent on the 
(. co-operation' of others. ' 64 
163 Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 32. 
164Paul O'Flinn stresses how the presence of the creNý places a check on ýk alton's 
deýtruct,, 
ambitions. The Crew by threatening mutiny force Nk'alton to turn 
back, but also force hirn to 
confront the fact that his voyage of discovery is dependent on the 
labour of other, 0* 1 linn 
contrasts Walton to Victor Frankenstein: 'Scientific de%elopment subject to somc 
form of 
democratic control - even in the violent form of mutin% -- can a\ ert 
the dangers its recarclicrs 
For Walton, as for Victor, the pilgrimage to the promised latid. a place of 
supposed self-fulfilment, only enslaves the pilgrim to his purpose. forcing him 
into a mode of existence that is the very opposite of the existence he craN-es. 
Paradoxically, he binds himself in order that he might one day find salvation and 
be 'set free' from his vocation. Walton couches his desires in the langLia(-, c of 
scientific enquiry. He believes he is sailing into the future, and that by 
discovering new lands he is ushering humanity into a new age. In realitý-. 
however, his dreams take the shape of the mythical past. Walton is not driven to 
discover a new world but to return to a mythical Eden: 
My day dreams become more fervent and vivid. I try in vain to be persuaded that 
the pole is the seat of frost and desolation; it ever presents itself to m\ imagination 
as the region of beauty and delight. There ... the sun is forever visible: its broad disk just skirting the horizon, and diffusing a perpetual splendour. There ... snow 
and frost are banished; and sailing over a calm sea, we may be wafted to a land 
surpassing in wonders and in beauty every region hitherto discovered on the 
habitable globe. (Frankenstein p. 5) 
Adorno and Horkheimer describe the allurement of the Sirens as the 
possibility of 'losing oneself in the past. ' 65 The past that allures us is 'mythic 
prehistory'. 166 Victor and Walton both unconsciously attempt to 'return* to an 
idealised past. Victor's labours at Ingolstadt involve a return to an imaginary 
realm before the emergence of the historical subject. Walton yearns to return to 
a mythical paradise, a place that holds out the potential of historical redemption 
as expressed in the hope of a new beginning. Thus in forging a path into the 
future, both men become further entangled in the ideology of the past. T is 
encounter and save human beings from the possibly fatal consequences of those researches. 
That 
is Walton's story. But scientific advances pursued for private motIN es and ýk ith no reinin" and 
directing social control or sense of social responsibilitý leads 
djrectlý to catastrophe. That is 
Frankenstein's story'. Paul O'Flinn, 'Production and Reproduction: 
The Case of Frankell. \Iel .n 
Frankenstein. - Marl, Shellei-, ed. Fred Botting (Hampshire: 
Pal! Zra\, e 2002. ) pp. 27-28. 
165 Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 3 ) 2. 
166 Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 32. 
ideology takes on the form of a secularised religion, with Victor attempting to 
construct a new Adam and Walton attempting to discover a ne%\ Eden. 
"'54 
Conclusion 
At the end of Frankenstein Victor has been reduced to the status of a literal 
orphan having lost both his mother and his father and all those he held dear. He 
is also a cultural orphan, no longer able to feel at home in Geneva and forced to 
travel from place to place in pursuit of the *son' he abandoned. In', \, larN- 
Shelley's hands the idea of 'the man alone' as a model for the self is taken to its 
logical conclusion and exposed as a nightmare existence. In Chapter One we 
discussed Adorno's and Horkheimer's comment that *Men pay for the increase 
of their power with alienation from that over which they exercise their power'. 167 
If the object that we attempt to gain power over is the self. then following 
Adorno's and Horkheimer's logic we become simultaneously disempowered 
from ourselves, or rather we produce the conditions for our disempowerment. 
Victor Frankenstein is certainly disempowered as a result of his narcissistic act of 
creation, but more generally the individual who claims to be in possession of 
himself is disempowered because of the social alienation that accompanies his 
empowennent. Throughout this thesis I have hoped to illustrate the limits of 
possessive individualism as the model for the self In conclusion I will reengage 
with some of the key connecting ideas in the texts studied to try and present an 
alternative model of human agency. In doing this I will need to look again at 
some of the terms we have been using, particularly the ideas of *culture' and *the 
individual'. I have chosen to do this at the end of the thesis as our readme of 
167 g an mI- Theodore W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enl(i htenment, tr s 
John Cu m n- 
(London: Verso 1997), p. 9. 
-) r., ý 
Rousseau, Wordsworth and Mary Shelley will contribute to rather than contradict 
this redefinition. 
Rousseau, Wordsworth and Mary Shelley all conceive of self-formation 
in relation to models of growth. The growth in question is not just organic but 
related to the expansion of understanding. The mind expands passing through 
various developmental stages but never reaches a point of completion. as the 
acquisition of knowledge and the emergence of the self meet in the experience ot 
consciousness, an experience that is ongoing. Thus the self is constantly 
emerging from and merging into a state of knowing. This state of knowing 
cannot be objectified, or strictly compartmental i sed in order that it might be 
made known either to ourselves or to others. To this extent Wordsworth was right 
to be suspicious of models of the mind that attempt to compartmental i se mental 
faculties and stages of intellectual development, though Wordsxvorth's implied 
attack on Locke was unjustified as Locke's ontological perspective. as discussed 
in Chapter Five, was far more complex than Wordsworth's characterisation of it. 
Nevertheless, Locke, Rousseau, Wordsworth and Shelley present us with a 
developmental model of human subjectivity. 
This dynamic model of the self seriously undermines the ideology of 
possessive individualism (even though the philosopher who provided us with this 
dynamic model, Locke, also helped produce the ideology it undermines). For if 
consciousness is ongoing then we cannot take possession of ourselves. because 
we cannot contain consciousness, and so transform it into a totalised projection 
of who we are. All we can do is reproduce self-formations that signify 
idetitity. 
but can never be completely identical. In this way we can appear to 
be the self- 
same person - and so we act in character, think 
in a certain way, displaý the , ýmie 
eccentricities. But in reality we do not even have total control over this, for 
though we perform our character, we are not in full command of the 
performance, as the traits we display are the product of a process of developnient 
that is inextricably linked with our cultural conditioning. The term culture here 
is crucial, and I want to explore its meaning briefly. both as a social term but also 
in relation to individual human development. 
Raymond Williams in Keywords and later in Marxism and Literature 
points out that the meaning of the word culture in the early fifteenth century, a 
meaning that persisted into the early nineteenth century, was primarilý- connected 
to the tending of natural growth, for example in relation to the cultivation of 
crops and animals. 168 By the end of the sixteenth century this meaning had 
extended to include tending to the growth of human faculties. Throughout this 
thesis I have used the term culture to refer to particular communities, at particular 
times in history, and the cultural forms that arise from these communities 
including their cultural identities. But Williams' earlier definition. a definition 
that would have been pertinent throughout our period, reveals an ironic 
discrepancy in my use. For example, Rousseau in tmile displays an anxiety that 
his pupil will be polluted by the intrusion of contaminants from an alien 
4culture', to use the modem sense of the word; but to use the earlier definition of 
culture', Emile's education is a cultural experience. as it involves the cultiN, anon 
of his faculties in order to ensure his natural growth. We might extend this to 
include Locke, Wordsworth and Shelley, all of whom like Rousseau are 
concerned with the development, indeed NN-e might say cultivation. of the human 
mind. In the case of both Rousseau and Wordsworth a strong emphasis is placed 
168 For Williams discussion of the concept of 'culture' see Raymond ýVilliams. kfarv/Arn and 
I-M Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1977). pp. I Ke -words. - .41 of 
Culture and Society (London: Fontana Press 19831). pp. 87-93). 
on 4natural' growth in childhood, in order that the child might not grow up to be 
overly dependent on or influenced by human others. We can relate this to the 
ideology of possessive individualism, which demands that in order to maintain 
his individuality an individual must be constantly vigilant of the boundaries 
separating him from other people. But of course in order to do this he must be 
aware of others. Even tmile, whose childhood is spent in relative isolation. 
eventually enters the social world, ostensibly as his ovt)n man. The adult tmile 
must be conscious of what divides him from his fellow men, and what principally 
divides him is the nature of his 'cultivation', thus his claim to individuality is 
based upon the uniqueness of his 'cultural' experience. But if we revert to the 
modem meaning of the word culture, and insist, as Mary Shelley does, that self- 
consciousness cannot fally develop without some form of cultural (social) 
awareness, then we might say that our positioning ourselves as individuated from 
society, involves the projection of psychological boundaries that are the product 
of our socialisation. 
It is useftil. to turn again to Raymond Williams who reveals that the 
meaning of the word 'individual' is not historically fixed, and that its earlier 
usage contradicts its modem meaning: " [I]ndividual' which had once meant 
indivisible, a member of a group, was developed to become not only a separate 
but an opposing term -'the individual' and society". 
169 Williams identifies 
Locke's An Essay on Human Understanding as contributing to the emergence of 
the modem sense of the term, and of course, as we have found. Locke's E, ýay is 
a key text for understanding the emergence of the ideology of possessive 
individualism. Williams notes that the earlier meaning of *individual' persisted 
16 9 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature. p. 12. Also see Keywords. pp. 
161-165 
into the eighteenth century when 'individual was rarely used without explicit 
relation to the group of which it was, so to say. the ultimate indivisible 
division'. 170 Indeed, according to Williams the transition in the word's meaning 
occurred in the second half of the eighteenth centuxý,, a crucial period for 
understanding the emergence of the discourse of possessive individualism. The 
changing meaning of the terms 'culture' and 'individual', and particularly their 
establishment as opposites in modem usage is clearly relevant to the emeroence 
of the idea of the autonomous individual as an entity distinct from societ), 7. But 
what I want to do in these closing pages is to imagine an alternative to the model 
of possessive individualism, a model that employs the terms "culture' and 
'individual' in a way that embraces the dialectic of their historical transitions in 
meaning. Following Williams, it is my contention that the various meanings of 
the term culture intersect in the person of the individual, who is, as Williams puts 
it, the 'ultimate indivisible division'. Evidence for this can be found in the 
representations of ýindividual' and 'cultural' development in 
ýmile. The Prelude 
and Frankenstein. 
The model of 'natural growth' shared by Rousseau, Wordsworth and 
Shelley, relates to the idea of culture as a 'noun of process' with all three writers 
dealing with the 'culture of minds' . 
17 1 Rousseau attempts to facilitate tmile"s 
natural growth, and where necessary advocates subtle 
interventions in order to 
tend to a child's 'natural' development. Wordsworth's poem addresses the 
growth of the poet's mind, acknowledging the mother* s significance in 
tending to 
the earliest stages of development, but placing a strong emphasis on 
indiN", dual 
growth both organically and in relation to 'spiritual' 
development. Shellcý',, 
170 Keywords, p. 16' )- 
171 Williams, Keywords, p. 87 
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description of the Creature's early life emphasises the growth of his mental 
faculties, a growth that whilst he is in the woods is independent of other human 
beings. All three writers also acknowledge that at some point a child , vill come 
into contact with human culture. This experience is not ahvays a negatiN e one. as 
all three writers express an attraction for simple rural life. Rousseau is attracted 
to a patriarchal rural culture. Wordsworth in The Prelude and elsewhere 
associates himself with the local culture of the English Lakes. Shellev"s depiction 
of the Creature suggests her appreciation of the simple life of the De Laceys. 
Thus all three writers have a concept of what we might call *tradifional' culture. 
which Williams relates to the idea of a plurality of cultures arising from 
particular communities and localities. 172 Notably this form of 'culture" is the 
product of localised social processes that involve an interaction between 
communities and their environment. These rural cultures can be related to the 
earlier meaning of culture, as involving an interaction between human beings and 
the land. In this way the landscape becomes a 'cultural space'. because it has 
been shaped by human effort. Traditional culture, at least in theorý', provides us 
with a happy compromise between 'the human' and *the natural'. A form of 
culture that produces far more anxiety in our writers is the type of culture , ve 
associate with the 'growth' of civilisations. Williams relates this notion to the 
idea of universal history, an idea espoused by Enlightenment historians and 
philosophers, that identified a *secular form of human development' that can 
be 
related to the concept of human progress. 
173 We have discussed this at some 
length in relation to Rousseau in Chapters One and Two. but to emphasise the 
point, Rousseau saw the development of civilisation as producing a (-Yulf 
bcm-een 
172 ibid, p. 89. 
173 
ibid, p. 89. 
'human culture' and 'human nature'. Wordsworth also creates a division 
between authentic traditional culture. as found in the Lakes, and inauthentic 
artificial culture, the by-product of civilisation, as found in cities. He expresses 
this throughout his writing, perhaps most clearly in the Preface to the Lp-ical 
Ballads. Wordsworth articulates his distaste for the urban culture of London in 
Book Seven of The Prelude, though it should also be pointed out that 
Wordsworth also expresses admiration for London as an Imperial capital and an 
exporter of 'civilised' culture to the rest of the world, describing London as: 'The 
fountain of my country's destiny / And of the destiny of earth itself (The 
Prelude, VIII, 743-744). Mary Shelley's suspicion of civilisation is suggested by 
the Creature's revulsion when he learns about the inequalities that arise from the 
growth of civilisation, a knowledge that comes to him courtesy of Volney. The 
point about all three writers is that their work can be used to II lustrate the 
emergence of a 'cultural' dialectic, in which various cultures, including the 
'culture of minds', interact with one another. Now, particularly in the case ol' 
Rousseau and Wordsworth, some effort is made to keep these cultural spheres 
separate, in order to retain the idea of the individual as operating outside social 
formations. Nevertheless, their work can be read against the grain of their 
intentions to reveal the contradictions implicit in their positions. I want to return 
briefly to a moment in Mary Shelley's novel, the moment when the Creature 
recalls hearing a musical instrument for the first time. to reveal how the 
individual is indeed the 'space' where cultures meet and develop. In doing this I 
hope to begin to develop a model of cultural agency. that provides us with an 
alternative to the model of possessive individualism. 
6 
The Creature's ability to appreciate the music he hears the De Lacey 
father playing is, using a Lockean model, the consequence of his previous period 
of 'natural' growth, in which his senses became refined. What he identifies on 
the most basic level is the materiality of sound, its basic tonalitN-. But of course 
he does more than this, as the music being played makes a cultural' (social) 
impression on him, he recognises it as being different from the sounds he hears 
in nature: 'sweeter than the voice of the thrush or the nightingale" (Franke i isle in 
p. 85). What he comes to recognise as he listens to the De Lacey father play is 
that the music is being made - that it is a product of human culture. As readers 
the power of this scene is heightened by the fact that what the Creature perhaps 
unconsciously recognises in the music is something of himself For the Creature 
is 'man-made', the man in question being Victor Frankenstein. ý, vhose original 
aspiration was to create an object of beauty, the scientific equivalent of a work of 
art. In a sense then the Creature is more than human precisely because he is 
man-made - his creation was not conceived in the mind of God but in the mind 
of a human being. The Creature was put together. made, shaped by human 
hands. But the Creature's status as a cultural artefact is not what makes him 
human. What makes him human is his capacity to make meaning out of 
4cultural' situations. In other words what makes him human is his creative 
potential. The figure of the Creature reveals that in someway we are all each 
others' co-creators. We create and are created by *others'. In this way we 
resemble both Victor and his 'creation'. But the Creature produces anxietý in us 
is because he forces us to confront our indeterminate status as both the producer 
and product of ourselves and the social world we inhabit i0th others: that ýN, e are 
both responsible and beholden. 
Our potential as human beings is defined by our culturalihistorical 
circumstances, but it cannot be reduced to our cultural/historical circumstances. 
The recognition of the humanity of others involves recogmsing that we share 
certain capacities and faculties in common. This of course was of major concern 
to philosophers of the Enlightenment. So, whilst recognising that an individual's 
consciousness reflects the historical situation he/she is in. what we might retrie-ve I 
from Enlightenment thought, and those subsequently influenced by it, is that 
there is an aspect to human consciousness that is in somewaY universal, and It 
relates to our shared abilities. The difficulty arises with attempts to schematise 
what is common to all in an attempt to establish 'what is man'. But if x\ e refuse 
this reductionist model, but still retain the idea of human potential as a means of 
recognising our shared humanity, then this allows us to imagine the possibilitý, of 
social transformation, not through creating a false division betweeti 'the 
individual' and 'society', but by engaging in cultural practice. In engaging in 
cultural practice we are necessarily participating in a collective actiN-Ity, but we 
are also exercising agency that is particular to us as 'Individuals'. 
The 'individuals' discussed in this thesis have established their 
independence through their recognition of a cultural realm that is external to 
them: the space of others and the discourse that arises from this space. Even 
when conversing with other people they retain their independence because they 
perceive themselves as having grown apart from other people: of having 
undergone a period of development that is unique to them. In this way they 
establish what we might call the culture of the individual. But in order to 
do this 
they must deny their cultural inheritance. they must establish themselves as 
cultural orphans. They must believe that -who tlieý- are' 
is someho\N, self- 
begotten, that the child is indeed father to the man. What I hope to have 
established is that this declaration of independence, a declaration founded on the 
idea of autonomous development, is based upon a false premise. We are 
beholden to other people, not just other individuals, but to a wider c Li Itural 
dialectic. Indeed recognising the debt we owe to a wider cultural sphere need not 
necessarily involve surrendering one's individuality, but mi I ight conceivablY 
involve having our potential as individuals more fully realised. 
One of my main aims in writing this thesis was to put into question the 
idea that an individual can be his/her own proprietor; but in doing this I do not 
want to present the individual as nothing more than his/her social conditioning, 
The ideology of possessive individualism, an ideology that persists to the present 
day, has not liberated 'individuals' but limited their potential. To free oursel-ves 
of this ideology is to recognise our status as participants in a wider social 
dialectic that facilitates our creativity and reveals our status as co-creators. In 
this way all human action is social practice in so far as it points to ffie existence 
of others. By recognising the contribution of 'these others' we can begin to 
question the perception we have of ourselves as alienated individuals. This type 
of questioning is an important step on the way to the emergence of a sense of 
solidarity - something akin to the feeling the 
Creature has in his earliest 
observations of the De Lacey family - that will allow for the development of 
cultural formations that realise our collective potential and so 
bring about 
political change. 
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